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Barely has literature failed to inspire the concept of trauma. Nor has trauma been a trivial 
cogitation for literature. This reciprocation, which is ingrained in the ineludible alliance 
between the two, has given rise to innumerable masterpieces throughout the history of 
literature from classic works of Homer to the modernist works of Woolf, Faulkner, and 
Hemingway. Nonetheless, trauma studies were not formulated in literature until two decades 
ago, which shapes an uncanny question mark never to be erased.  
Cormac McCarthy’s traumatic footprint in literature is as inerasable as the very same 
question mark, insofar as most, if not all, of his canon has been indelibly imbued with the 
notion of trauma. His characters seem to have a uniquely innovative bearing of 
traumatization, which is rarely found with that weight in other analogous works of literature. 
Chigurh, called the “prophet of destruction” by McCarthy himself in No Country for Old 
Men (2005), punches a hole into the forehead of his victims, leaving his vile mark 
metaphorically on the decaying civilization. Ballard in Child of God (1973), in what is termed 
as necrophilia, makes love to his victims, while judge Holden in Blood Meridian (1985) kills 
children, collects scalps, and never dies. This traumatic road eventually boils down to The 
Road (2006) in which everything comes to naught: an ashen apocalypse. 
 Lending themselves to widespread critical acclaim, the novels No Country for Old 
Men and The Road did not fail to lend themselves to silver screen translations, which were 
indebted to the directorial efforts of the Coen brothers and John Hillcoat in 2007 and 2009, 
respectively. The narratives, textually or visually, are densely informed, if not formed, by the 
notion of trauma, which consolidates not only the bond between the two novels but also the 
traumatic trajectory from the novels to the films. It is thus through a thoroughgoing analysis 
of trauma and its footprints that a mastery of the inner workings, mysteries, and thematics of 
the aforementioned narratives will come to life, which is what the present dissertation aspires 
to achieve. Composed of three chapters, the foregoing dissertation sets out to initially 
establish the theoretical framework for trauma notions in chapter one whose application will 
shape the arguments of chapters two and three for the novels/films No Country for Old Men 
































A literatura raramente deixa de servir de inspiração a um qualquer conceito de trauma. 
De igual forma, o trauma não é uma cogitação trivial para a literatura. Esta reciprocidade, 
que está enraizada na ineludível aliança entre os dois, deu origem a inúmeras obras-primas 
ao longo da história da literatura, desde obras clássicas de Homero até às obras modernistas 
de Woolf, Faulkner e Hemingway. Não obstante, os estudos de trauma começaram a surgir 
com maior incidência na literatura nas duas últimas décadas, o que dá forma a um ponto de 
interrogação inquietante, que nunca é apagado. A pegada traumática de Cormac McCarthy 
na literatura é tão inextinguível como esse mesmo ponto de interrogação, na medida em que 
a maioria, se não a totalidade, do seu cânone está indelevelmente imbuída da noção de 
trauma. As suas personagens parecem ter uma ligação única e inovadora com o trauma, que 
raramente é encontrado com este peso noutras obras análogas da literatura. Chigurh, 
apelidado de “profeta da destruição” pelo próprio McCarthy em No Country for Old Men 
(2005), faz um buraco na testa das suas vítimas, deixando metaforicamente a sua marca vil 
na civilização decadente. Ballard em Child of God (1973), no que é denominado de necrofilia, 
faz amor com as suas vítimas, enquanto o juiz Holden em Blood Meridian (1985) mata 
crianças, colecciona escalpes, e nunca morre. Esta traumática estrada acaba por levar a The 
Road (2006), na qual tudo se reduz a nada: um apocalipse de cinzas. 
 Tendo sido aclamados pela crítica em geral, os livros No Country for Old Men e The 
Road foram igualmente levados ao grande ecrã através dos esforços de realização dos irmãos 
Coen e de John Hillcoat, em 2007 e 2009, respectivamente. Estas narrativas, textuais e 
visuais, são densamente informadas, se não formadas, pela noção de trauma, que consolida 
não só a ligação entre os dois romances, mas também a trajetória traumática desde os 
romances até aos filmes. É, portanto, através de uma análise aprofundada do trauma e das 
suas pegadas que um domínio sobre o funcionamento interior, os mistérios e as temáticas das 
narrativas acima mencionadas ganhará vida, que é o que a presente dissertação aspira a 
alcançar. 
 O primeiro capítulo deste estudo visa fornecer um repertório teórico do discurso do 
trauma sobre o qual se basearão os argumentos subsequentes dos capítulos dois e três. Assim, 
este capítulo fará uma primeira incursão num domínio de definição de trauma, a fim de 
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assegurar inicialmente um nicho para a compreensão primária do conceito de trauma. Como 
é expectável, esta linha de incursões incluirá as correntes de pensamento de Cathy Caruth, 
conhecida como um das principais nomes dos estudos de trauma e que introduziu 
inicialmente a estética do trauma no reino da literatura através seu livro seminal Unclaimed 
Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History (1996). Baseado fortemente no pensamento 
freudiano, a análise do discurso de Caruth sobre o trauma terá recurso a fundamentos como 
a essência espectral do trauma e a sua não-referencialidade ou temporalidade perdida. 
Revelando o misterioso ângulo de flashbacks, o capítulo abordará as posições críticas de 
pensadores de trauma como Hustvedt, para não mencionar a famosa noção de “compulsão 
de repetição”, cuja criação é creditada a Freud. A “realidade” de Lacan, como um argumento 
exegético pertinente, será aqui adicionalmente discutida, abordando a natureza inassimilável 
do encontro traumático. A premente visualidade do trauma e o seu assoberbante mutismo daí 
resultante relembram o pensamento crítico de Hartman, que se baseia no “Boy of Winander” 
de Wordsworth. 
Uma das maiores contribuições para a poética do trauma é a de LaCapra, cujo ensaio 
seminal “Trauma, Absence, Loss” (1999) tem reunido um grande número de seguidores. A 
dicotomia “ausência/perda” de LaCapra será um prelúdio para a dicotomia “reagir/resolver”, 
que virá igualmente à luz neste capítulo. A crítica testemunhal, com o seu profundo enfoque 
nas formas como as vítimas de trauma podem desenvolver um mecanismo de libertação dos 
seus traumas é outro constituinte deste capítulo, que englobará nomes como Felman (1991), 
Marder (2006), Laub e Podell (1995). Além disso, o capítulo lançará luz sobre a noção de 
atraso, ligando-o aos nomes de pensadores como Freud (1939), Caruth (1996) e Laplanche 
(2001). Em desacordo com o pensamento clássico sobre o trauma, encontra-se a nova escola 
do trauma, através das vozes de Balaev (2008, 2014) e Belau (2001), que proporcionam novas 
perspectivas tais como crescimento, renascimento e resiliência no discurso do trauma. 
Injustamente, o trauma planeia a sua incursão de igual forma na psique imaculada das 
crianças, advindo daí o conceito de trauma infantil, que irá formular outra grande corrente 
analítica neste capítulo. Esta corrente dependerá principalmente dos pensamentos críticos de 
Reviere (1996) e Shengold (1989), que teorizaram abundantemente sobre este tema. “O 
Estranhamente Familiar”, como uma noção difundida em muitas obras literárias, e 
particularmente no cânone de McCarthy, raramente se distanciou da estética do trauma. Dito 
de outra forma, o laço inabalável entre o “estranhamente familiar” freudiano e a ficção do 
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trauma tem sido um reduto do qual muitas obras-primas inigualáveis têm nascido. 
Informando o próprio epicentro do discurso do “estranhamente familiar”, a morte e a 
repetição parecem falhar às vítimas do trauma em todas as frentes possíveis. Estes elementos 
assombrosos que alimentam os tropos traumáticos serão a linha argumentativa na qual se 
basearão a maioria dos argumentos teóricos deste capítulo. 
O segundo capítulo da dissertação terá como objetivo trazer à luz os diálogos entre o 
quadro teórico previamente construído no capítulo um e os traumas que moldaram a narrativa 
de No Country for Old Men. Uma boa parte dos argumentos de trauma deste capítulo gira em 
torno de Chigurh, o “profeta da destruição”, e de como este, enquanto fantasma do trauma, 
tanto caça como atormenta as demais personagens de uma forma brutal e robótica, usando 
uma assombrosa arma de abater gado que faz um buraco na testa das suas vítimas. Alicerces 
do trauma tão diversos como a espectralidade, a crítica testemunhal, a ausência/perda, o 
trauma intergeracional, o crescimento e “o estranhamente familiar” irão emergir na fase 
crítica dos nossos argumentos. Tendo orquestrado os diálogos esteticamente significantes 
entre o mundo do trauma e No Country for Old Men de McCarthy, este capítulo dirigir-se-á 
para o mundo visual dos irmãos Coen. A análise visual, devo enfatizar, será apenas seletiva 
ao longo de todo o capítulo, na medida em que apenas investigará os momentos traumáticos 
previamente elucidados no texto de McCarthy. 
Numa linha semelhante, o terceiro capítulo da presente dissertação visará o modo 
exegético relacional entre os tropos do trauma e a obra The Road de McCarthy. Centrada 
num apocalipse temporalmente vago, a narrativa parece ser propensa ao tropo de trauma de 
não-referencialidade ou à temporalidade perdida. Temporalidade à parte, McCarthy faz com 
que todos os traumas, canibalismo e infanticídio, ocorram a uma personagem que é ainda 
uma criança, daí a adequação das discussões sobre traumas infantis. Além disso, o capítulo 
irá lançar luz sobre o testemunho e os seus constituintes, principalmente ouvir e falar, que 
parecem funcionar melhor que nunca através dos espaços traumáticos da narrativa 
apocalíptica. Todos os esforços do par de colectores não visam senão a sobrevivência, que é 
outro tropo do trauma, daí a formulação de outra parte deste capítulo à luz deste conceito. 
Todos estes momentos textuais de trauma se prestarão a uma análise visual, tendo como 
âmago os esforços de realização de John Hillcoat. 
Ao colocar os fundamentos teóricos para o discurso sobre o trauma no primeiro 
capítulo e ao moldar a dialética que se segue entre este capítulo e os particulares tropos do 
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trauma das narrativas do corpus nos capítulos dois e três, a atual dissertação não terá por 
objetivo apenas desvendar os mistérios, os códigos e a temática que se encontram sob a 
superfície de No Country for Old Men e The Road de McCarthy, mas tentará também 
descobrir a própria estética visual, em momentos traumáticos seletivos, através da qual os 
irmãos Coen e Hillcoat fixaram as suas assinaturas nestes filmes. 
 




















































The dissertation in hand sets out to explore two of Cormac McCarthy’s novels titled No Country 
for Old Men (2005) and The Road (2006). Prone to visualization, the two narratives made their 
way onto the silver screen under the same titles with the adaptational efforts of the Coen brothers 
and John Hillcoat in 2007 and 2009 respectively. The above-cited works achieved critically 
distinguished acclaim, among which the academy awards won by the film No Country for Old 
Men and the Pulitzer Prize bestowed upon the novel The Road in the same year could be 
mentioned. The narratives, textually or visually, are densely informed, if not formed, by the notion 
of trauma, which consolidates not only the bond between the two novels but also the traumatic 
trajectory from the novels to the films. It is thus through a thoroughgoing analysis of trauma and 
its footprints that a mastery of the inner workings, mysteries, and thematics of the aforementioned 
narratives will come to life, which is what the present dissertation aspires to achieve. 
 Any narrative casts its lot with the concept of trauma in more ways than one, and this has 
been the underlying grand narrative in literature even far before it was officially acknowledged as 
literature. On closer inspection, the main plank of classic literature, with writers such as Homer, 
Ovid and Sophocles and their works lying at its heart, is but grounded on the notion of trauma. In 
like manner, most biblical tales, which have ineluctably inspired many seminal works in fiction, 
poetry and drama with instances as diverse as Dante, Shakespeare, Donne, and Milton, have at 
their heart a trauma narrative. From Crusades to French Revolution to even Industrial Revolution, 
trauma seems to have afforded to run its roots down into the very essence of all the historical and 
socio-political cornerstones of civilization. Contemporary times have been no exception to the 
reign of this discourse either, insofar as two world wars and the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers 
have proven to be emblematically traumatizing. Nonetheless, trauma studies were not formulated 
in literature until two decades ago. A question mark never to be erased. 
Cormac McCarthy’s canon has been indelibly imbued with the notion of trauma. Striking 
a close chord with the aesthetics of biblical tales and classical literature on many fronts, 
McCarthy’s canon stands as one of the most compelling emblems of trauma. His characters seem 
to have a uniquely innovative bearing of traumatization, which is barely found with that weight in 
other analogous works of literature. Chigurh, called the “prophet of destruction” by McCarthy 
himself in No Country for Old Men, uses a cattle gun to punch a hole or a third eye into the forehead 
of his victims, leaving his vile mark metaphorically on the already decaying civilization. Ballard 
in Child of God (1973), in what is termed as necrophilia, makes love to his victims, while judge 
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Holden in Blood Meridian (1985) kills children, collects scalps, dances wildly and never dies. All 
such traumatizing innovations are instantiated anew throughout McCarthy’s oeuvre coming down 
the road only to meet his solo surviving pair in The Road, who bear witness to the roasting of an 
infant on spits or the marauding gangs eating each other. Another creative trauma footprint by 
McCarthy: the apocalypse. 
The fluid matter-of-taste notion of trauma metamorphosed into an autonomous discourse 
via its seminal conception which came at the hands of Cathy Caruth, known as the mother of 
trauma studies in literature. By virtue of her book Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and 
History (1996), she set in motion the very dynamics and aesthetics upon which the later trauma 
rhetoric was predicated. Relying heavily on Freudian tenets, majorly Moses and Monotheism, 
Caruth characterizes trauma as a wound not only inflicted on the body but on the soul.  
This wound, then, haunts, Caruth notes, its victim eternally, casting its sinister shadow on 
his/her psyche for as long as he/she lives, hence the spectral trope of trauma. Apart from the 
haunting effect, trauma seems to fall on an unreliable plane of narration, which constitutes the very 
nature of its non-referentiality. This traumatic trope, once more, derives itself from the Freudian 
hermeneutics apropos the biblical tale of Moses and his emancipating odyssey from Egypt to 
Canaan, whose details this study will survey in the first chapter. Thus, these two traumatic tropes 
of haunting and the non-referentiality will be the ground upon which the majority of my arguments 
will hinge, as the corpus narratives seem to be heavily informed by such traumatic tropes. For 
instance, Chigurh in No Country for Old Men is as spectral as the ghost of trauma whose haunting 
possesses the psyche of the characters and the audience alike. In The Road, barely can one make 
sense of what did away with the world, which runs in tandem with the trope of non-referentiality. 
Integral to discourse of trauma is the concept of flashback, which is another way for the 
traumatized memory to come to terms with the moment of trauma. Of a rather sensory nature than 
linguistic, flashbacks urge the victim to turn to the moment of trauma recurrently, hence its 
unavoidable displeasure. Such displeasing temporal journeys to the moment of trauma could 
likewise be likened to Caruth’s portrayal of PTSD in Trauma: Explorations in Memory or how the 
post-traumatic encounters possess the psyche of the patient incessantly (151). This traumatic trope 
acquires further significance once it is investigated in the light of Freudian “repetition compulsion” 
in “Remembering, Repeating, and Working through” and how trauma victims are exhorted to 
repeat the same traumatic act over and over in hopes of working them through eventually (150-
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155). Last but not least, all such rhetoric is tangential to Lacanian “real”, a mysterious arena in 
which the traumatic moment is “missed” as it cannot be incorporated into the symbolic realm, 
hence its un-assimilable essence is Lacan’s lens (53-55). The foregoing study aims at shaping a 
dialogue between the aforementioned threads of trauma discourse and the corpus narratives, 
insofar as flashbacks and their implications seem to occupy a massive traumatic space of the 
narratives, particularly in The Road. 
Of germane kinship with the concept of trauma is the thought current inherent in the 
writings of Hartman. Enamored with Wordsworth’s poetry, Boy of Winander from “The Prelude” 
in the main, Hartman, in “On Traumatic Knowledge and Literary Studies”, writes a great deal 
apropos a boy who is not only overwhelmed by the power of nature but also equally in dire need 
of nature’s help to process the haunting images of nature. Mute all throughout the narrative, the 
boy finds nature as “his most generous concept” (633), with whose reciprocation he finds his 
utmost emancipation. The narrative is as mute, haunting, and visually charged as possible, all of 
which are the tropes which seem to mesh efficiently well with the rhetoric of trauma. The study in 
hand will initially detail Hartman’s thought streams in chapter one so that the later analogous 
exegeses of chapters two and three in unravelling the corpus narratives, by dint of the previously 
established theoretical framework, will be feasible. That the narrative of The Road is rife with a 
traumatized nature, muteness and visuality could pertinently serve the purpose of the project in 
this respect. 
One of the greatest contributions to the poetics of trauma has been made by LaCapra whose 
seminal essay “Trauma, Absence, Loss” (1999) has garnered a large following.  Making “absence” 
and “loss” consonant with terms like trans-historical and historical traumas respectively, LaCapra 
contends that “absence” has never existed in the first place, while the concept of “loss” is 
particularly evident through its formation (700). Warning all against the conflation of the two 
terms, LaCapra seems to ultimately opt for the absence-to-loss transformation over that of loss-to-
absence, in that this transformation seems to obliterate the anxiety generating essence of 
“absence”, whose anxiety eventually comes to naught via this process. Moreover, the process 
facilitates the determination of a traceable source for the absence-oriented anxiety, which is 
attendant upon psyche of the victim (707). All such threads will come to light in chapter one, which 
will be followed by chapters two and three raising questions concerning how LaCapra’s model 
contributes to trauma language of No Country for Old Men and The Road. 
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 Another significant train of thought in trauma discourse is indebted to the dichotomy of 
“acting-out/working-through”, with whose original inception Freud is credited. In “Remembering, 
Repeating and Working-through” Freud famously argues that “the patient does not remember 
anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory 
but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it” (150-151). This 
will to repeat or “compulsion to repeat” is what pervades the famed dichotomy of “acting-
out/working through” set forth by LaCapra, which basically purports that the trauma victim needs 
to work through the trauma, or mourn it, in order to leave behind the phase of acting it out. If this 
mourning fails the patient, an eternal impasse, melancholy in particular, is what the patient will be 
mired in (698). The trauma narratives in this study both unfold in the backcloth of this dichotomy 
whose conquering side, depending on the character, will be revealed in the chapters to be 
composed. Does Bell in No Country for Old Men favor a state of melancholy or mourning upon 
realizing his abject incompetence in pursuing the ghostly Chigurh? In like manner, do the solo 
scavenging pair of father and son act out or work through the apocalyptic cannibalism and 
infanticide? These are a few queries to which chapters two and three will aspire to provide due 
answers.  
This dichotomy-oriented plane of exegesis with LaCapra’s reasoning at its epicenter will 
be further fortified by Onega and Ganteau’s notion theorizing how the patient has recourse to 
“sensorial images instead of words” (3). Stated differently, the victim finds himself/herself at the 
mercy of images in order to work the trauma through. This conception seems to run utterly parallel 
to Žižek’s notion of symbolization “In order to cope with a trauma we symbolize” (qtd. in Wolfreys 
126). Once more, what symbols or images do the corpus narrative offer which could facilitate the 
process of “working-through”? McCarthy’s poetic writing cannot lose sight of such aesthetics 
whatsoever, even if not directly for trauma reasoning. 
Once trauma plagues the heart and soul of a victim with a hard blow, the victim is to embark 
upon a response/release trajectory. This trajectory is known as testimonial criticism in the jargon 
of trauma which is indebted to Shoshana Felman’s seminal book Testimony: Crises of Witnessing 
in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History co-authored by the renowned psychoanalyst Dori Laub. 
The testimonial path whose major staple is bearing witness to the traumatic experience is, at root, 




[T]he most urgent and essential claim of Testimony is to show that even though we 
do not ‘recover’ from our traumatic past, nor can we ‘cure’ it, ‘overcome’ it, or 
even fully understand it, we can and we must listen to it and survive it by listening 
to its effects as they are transmitted to us… Because bearing witness entails 
speaking in the first person in order to attest to a truth that can only be validated 
through the very act of speaking itself, testimony places the speaker in a unique and 
difficult position. (Marder 4) 
 
With their relentless focus on the devastation of humanity, morality and civilization, the corpus 
narratives have a propensity for driving the characters, and the audience by extension, towards the 
realm of testimony. What makes this testimonial path, for instance in No Country for Old Men, so 
keenly felt is how Sheriff Bell, having borne witness to Chigurh’s brutalities, turns to the initial 
italic monologues of each chapter expressing the irreparable hurting of his psyche. How 
testimonial can such lamenting or melancholy get? Or is one even entitled to feel at liberty to call 
this testimony? Analogously in The Road, the pair cannot help but bear witness to the wasteland 
and the post-apocalyptic atrocities of the world. All such testimonial threads seem to serve as the 
backcloth against which the trauma aesthetics of the narratives run, whose illumination will be the 
mission which the future chapters will accomplish. 
 Germane to the current argument of testimony is the concept of cure or therapy whose 
impetus is transparently found in the words of Hustvedt. Through her lens, once the traumatic 
experience is narrated or written by the victim, a sense of agency will be the least of its rewards: 
“Writing about my shaking did not cure me of the symptom, but it did give me a greater sense of 
control and agency” (par. 33). The same sentiment, which is called the “talking cure”, pervades 
the thoughts of Hartman in “Trauma Within the Limits of Literature”: “[t]he talking cure is also a 
homeopathic cure and literature could be viewed as a talking cure to a higher degree” (259). 
 All this testimonial thread can only chime with the voice of another trauma trope, namely 
survival. In other words, it is only through survival that the testimonial threads will feel effectual, 
hence the appellation of “Art of Trauma” by Laub and Podell: “survival itself should be considered 
as a type of art of trauma” (991). Integral to this art, Laub and Podell note, is a dialogue with the 
past: “In essence it is only through its indirect and dialogic nature that the art of trauma can come 
close to representing the emptiness at the core of trauma while still offering the survivor the 
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possibility of repression and repossession” (993). Within the framework of this study, it should be 
via the aesthetics of The Road and its characters that the “Art of Trauma” could secure itself a 
certain niche for argument, as most of the scavenging efforts of the pair seem to come down to 
nothing but survival. 
 Trauma possesses its own narrative, yet it runs constantly late as it is too much to take at 
the time of its occurrence, thereby gaining the title “belated”. Relying on the Freudian analyses in 
Moses and Monotheism once more, Caruth employs the famed Freudian accident to characterize 
the belated nature of trauma. The accident victim ascertains the true gravity of the accident far 
later than the moment of trauma. Indeed, the victim, Caruth points out, has to forget or lose sight 
of the initial traumatic encounter only to enable himself/herself to restore the moment in “another 
place, another time” (17). This latency, in view of Moses’s murder by the very same people who 
were unshackled by him, renders this particular trauma narrative, and by extension all trauma 
narratives, not only belated but also unreliable. Perhaps Whitehead’s account duly captures the 
gist of my analysis: 
 
Caruth’s insistence on the inherent belatedness of experience and understanding 
challenges the notion of a straightforward textual referentiality. If history is 
characterised by its continually delayed or deferred entrance into experience, as 
Caruth suggests, then there is a need to profoundly rethink the modes of our 
engagement with the past. History is no longer available as a completed knowledge, 
but must be reconceived as that which perpetually escapes or eludes our 
understanding. (13) 
 
This survey, expectedly, will touch upon the critical views of Laplanche who opted for the term 
“afterwardsness” in lieu of belatedness. Caruth’s interview with him will mark one of the first 
chapter’s critical cornerstones whose application will come to fruition once the relational mode of 
analysis in chapters two and three will come to life. The traumatized characters, particularly Sheriff 
Bell in No Country for Old Men, seem to be overwhelmed by the heavy weight of the trauma, 
which Chigurh in the same narrative impose on them, hence unable to instantaneously come to 
terms with it. In The Road, however, the traumatic plane seems to suffer from a temporal 
imprecision which, once more, evokes the unreliability of the narrative theorized by Caruth.  
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 That trauma is hauntingly incomprehensible in the eyes of Caruth is cast doubt on by the 
new school of trauma thinkers at whose heart stands Balaev. All the terminology grounded on the 
impossibility of trauma’s nature encompassing terms such as “incomprehensible, unrepresentable 
and non-locatable” are reconsidered through the fluid lens of Balaev who asserts in “Trends in 
Literary Trauma Theory”: 
 
In contrast to the abreactive model of the self as a fixed entity that then fragments, 
the trauma novel demonstrates that the reorganized self is relational and emerges 
relative to a specific place that produces a specific articulation of a transformed 
identity. This expression of the self is socially contingent and connected to a place 
of inhabitation and meaning, not binarily dependent on a linear re-enactment of a 
traumatic experience. The protagonist's subjectivity is, thus, depicted as a fluid 
process located in relation to new realities or new knowledge. (9) 
 
Thus, it is with a sense of hope, fluidity and rebirth that Balaev’s novel voice echoes. That trauma 
spreads like a disease from one generation to another, thereby earning the title “trans-historical” 
or “trans-generational” trauma by Caruth once more, is likewise repudiated by Balaev: 
 
The theory of intergenerational trauma conflates loss and absence and collapses 
boundaries between the individual and group, thereby suggesting that a person's 
contemporary identity can be ‘vicariously traumatized’ by reading about a 
historical narrative or due to a shared genealogy that affords the ability to 
righteously claim the social label of "victim" as part of personal or public identity. 
(3) 
 
All such revisionist trauma rhetoric provides a new insight into how one can negotiate the 
previously established rigidities of trauma discourse, which is instrumental in developing not only 
further trauma aesthetics in general but also in aiding the fundamental arguments of this study in 
particular, insofar as the new voice of trauma begs to be heard in both narratives.  
 Linda Belau’s voice hastens to abide by the same opposing resonance as that of Balaev did, 
save that she underlines the inability of the language in addressing the overwhelming essence of 
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trauma. In so doing, the traumatic moment betrays the principles of the symbolic bringing the 
materiality of its signifier(s) to a futile realm. Not incorporated to the body of the symbolic, this 
impossibility of trauma falls into a pitfall out of which it cannot climb, hence its so-called celestial 
and out-of-earth feature. However, Belau and similar thinkers steadfastly rise against this celestial 
and sublime nature attributing the whole case to the inconsistency or incompetence of language in 
overcoming the inadequacy of the material signifier: 
 
This ethic of the impossible, however, drives the subject beyond the social to an 
encounter with the inadequacy of the signifier as she moves beyond the particular 
event of her suffering to a failed encounter with the very possibility of knowing that 
suffering completely. The psychoanalytic intervention assures us, then, that we are 
responsible in the face of something that exceeds symbolic guarantee. This is the 
ethical dimension of trauma that gets left behind when we attempt to place 
traumatic experience beyond language and representation, beyond the traumatic 
materiality that is the signifier. (par. 2) 
 
Faithful to the same insight is the critical angle of Derrida’s thoughts when he underlines the 
“‘impossibility and necessity’ of bearing witness to the ‘unexperienced experience’” (qtd. in 
Wolfreys 133). Chapter one will substantiate Belau’s thought stream further by Ramadanovic’s 
notions and Lanzman’s documentary Shoah (1985). Belau’s concept of inadequacy of language in 
addressing the compelling essence of trauma should be a critical plane on which the relational 
mode of this study’s arguments, particularly in The Road given the lost materiality of the signifier 
to the apocalyptic trauma, in securing a niche between the undermined materiality of the signifier 
and the formidable weight of trauma could be built.  
 Albeit unfair, trauma does not fail to wreak havoc on the psyche of children, hence the term 
childhood trauma. This psychic raid robs, Reviere posits, the child of his/her nascent schemas, 
which are characterized by Bruhn as “expectations, rules, or axioms derived from past experience 
that the individual maintains about himself, others, and the world” (qtd. in Reviere 28). This loss 
is instantly followed or otherwise accompanied by further devastation inflicted upon the child’s 
sense of self-image, adaptational skills, and flexibility. High on the agenda here and quite germane 
to Reviere’s critical angle is the concept of “Soul Murder” put forth by Shengold who outlines the 
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concept of childhood trauma within the literary writings of seminal writers such as Dickens, Orwell 
and Kipling. 
 Murdered spiritually, these children, Shengold theorizes, will not develop the “ability to 
feel joy and love, as a separate person” (2). The aftermath of such a severe blow to the child’s 
psyche will constantly overshadow his life in terms of concepts such as family, identity and safety. 
Despite the inherent or otherwise the environmentally acquired strength in some children who 
seem to grow out of such severe traumatization, some other children develop a self-destructive 
path which might culminate in suicidal tendencies. Given the traumatized child character in The 
Road, such exegeses, Reviere’s and Shengold’s trauma accounts in the main, will prove to be of 
significant contribution to the textual and visual analyses yet to be shaped in future chapters. 
 Trauma has constantly been prone to develop kinship with “the uncanny”, whose inception 
principally belongs to Freud. This alliance has operated like a bridge that has fueled both realms 
with aesthetics, of a rather macabre type, which have ultimately given rise to the progress of both 
notions. Conceived by Freud through a landmark essay under the same title in 1919, the sentiment 
has mostly hinged upon anything that has to do with fear, ghosts, and suddenly unfamiliar feelings. 
However, in a broader sense, “the uncanny” can encompass elements such as repetition, animism, 
silence, death, fear of being buried alive, odd coincidences, double, telepathy, alienation, 
dismemberment, double, and castration. 
 The foregoing study will set out to expound on repetition as one of the quintessential 
elements of “the uncanny”. Repetition has informed the central plank of the trauma discourse, as 
Caruth and Freud have incessantly referred to its significance in many fronts, not to mention the 
concept of “compulsion to repeat” illuminated earlier. This united arena is best acknowledged in 
the words of Whitehead: 
 
One of the key literary strategies in trauma fiction is the device of repetition, which 
can act at the levels of language, imagery or plot. Repetition mimics the effects of 
trauma, for it suggests the insistent return of the event and the disruption of 
narrative chronology or progression. Many writers, including Barker, Morrison and 
Sebald, repeat key descriptions or episodes from one novel to another, and this 
technique both suggests an underlying trauma and implicitly critiques the notion of 
narrative as therapeutic or cathartic. Freud's work on the uncanny reveals that even 
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apparently innocuous daily objects and incidents can be drawn into an atmosphere 
of trauma. (86) 
 
If the repetition of an “innocuous daily” deed instills uncanny fear in the heart of a person, what 
can be said of the type of the fear stemming from the repetition of Chigurh’s cattle gun’s hissing 
or plunging sound before punching a hole into the forehead of innocent victims, not to mention 
the repetition of his ominous ghostly spectral figure? All these will shape the plane on which the 
present study’s analyses will be built in the ensuing chapters. 
 Death is another constituent of the uncanny spectrum whose color weight cannot be 
compared to that of other constituents. Ubiquitously felt everywhere, death is likened to a surreal 
entity which haunts whatever it lays its hands on, as Royle contends: “[t]here is a shade of surreal 
about the death drive and a shade of the death drive about surrealism” (97). This surreal sentiment 
of death has highly pervaded the fiction of the uncanny. The notion of alienation will not go 
unnoticed either, as it seems to sit well with the trauma tropes in instilling a sense utterly imbued 
with spectrality and defamiliarization. Given the horrifically high body of death and its surreal 
nature in the corpus narratives, an examination of its uncanny role within this study seems to be 
invariably essential. Chigurh’s ghostly death-laden portrayal could be a significant embodiment of 
the surreal aesthetics to which “the uncanny” state of death has been attributed. This will perhaps 
formulate another relational mode of exegesis in the future chapters. 
 It would be facile to lose sight of the long-sought dialogue between trauma and ethics. 
Majorly taking its cue from Levinas’s concept of the “face of the other”, the present study will 
endeavor to exhibit how one could sense a strict sense of moral obligation for the very face of the 
individual one has barely witnessed. That the character of Moss in No Country for Old Men returns 
to the scene of massacre only to quench the thirst of the dying man, whose face he had barely seen, 
could be one of the instances by which the Levinasion insight of the “face of the other” could be 
corroborated. The same insight is problematized in Craps’s writings which tend to offer a beacon 
of hope and redemption in the face of unforgiveable traumas. 
All the aforementioned theoretical features will be argued in the first chapter irrespective 
of their relational mode with the novels and the films. Once this study approaches chapter two, all 
such established theoretical framework will operate as the stage upon which the textual and visual 
analyses will emerge. The analytical pattern in this study will stem from the novels, as points of 
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departure, towards the films, in which the corresponding trauma argument will find its converging 
or otherwise diverging instantiation. This pattern is by no means a system of prioritization by 
which one work (the novel) could be thought to take precedence over the other (the film). Nor is 
this a procedure through which the cliché-ridden concept of interdisciplinary loyalty between the 
two arts, namely literature and cinema, and the directorial efforts thereof could be assessed. 
Instead, this is only a pattern whose application is merely grounded in its facilitating power as the 
departure from the text to the image makes more sense once we wish to know the trauma delicacies 
and nuances, or the dialectics thereof, which are inscribed on the images and whether or not they 
correspond to those of the novels, not to mention the chronological considerations between the 
novels and the films. This, once more, is not a merit measuring exegesis.  
Apart from this pattern and the impetus behind it, the foregoing study will operate on a 
particular selective basis, which means the study will merely focus on the traumatic moments of 
the novel and their corresponding visual images in the films. Not only will this selectivity provide 
the study with further consistency and pithiness, but it will also help the arguments to come to 
fruition in terms of a united centrality, which is but unravelling the concept of trauma in both 
media.  
For instance, a good part of chapter two will revolve around the monologues of No Country 
for Old Men as the ground, suggested by this study, on which the testimonial criticism falls. Having 
delved into all the theoretical trauma features inherently felt in monologues, the chapter will then 
proceed toward the film No Country for Old Men and delineate how the Coen brothers have 
deployed their visual subtleties to portray the very same testimonial threads in the monologues.  
The uncanny traumatic moments of McCarthy’s No Country for Old Men, in a similar vein, will 
be another instantiation of this pattern in which the study will take such textual moments as its 
departure point and will later veer in the direction of its visual moments in the film.  
This study’s apocalyptic chapter will abide by the same established pattern. Moving from 
the post-apocalyptic lines of McCarthy’s The Road towards the disturbing pixels of John 
Hillcoats’s adaptation, this chapter will aim at unravelling how the moments of trauma converge 
to or diverge from each other. For instance, having expounded on the traumatic staple of non-
referentiality in McCarthy’s words, which will occupy a major part of chapter three, the study will 
endeavor to shift its lens on how the aforementioned notion is visualized in Hillcoat’s silver screen 
translation. The analytical thread of childhood trauma will be subject to the same pattern, which 
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means the staples of childhood trauma such as the loss of schemas, adaptive measures and self-






























































“What does not kill me makes me stronger.” 
– Nietzsche, Twilight of Idols 
“Scars have the strange power to remind us that our past is real.” 
– McCarthy, All the Pretty Horses  
 
 
A Haunting Prologue 
 
Why the mass? Why the babel? Why the whispers? Why the wait? 
A woman is to be hung by the neck until she is dead and the largest square of the 
town is to take in the eager crowd of spectators. What a lesson it would teach. A 
pilgrimage. 
Susurrus dies down. The condemned has arrived. Is it fear? Is it shock? Which is 
prey? Which is predator? A moment of daze shared by both halts the world. 
The noose hungers. First click of a camera. The spell is broken. Chants erupt; 
remove the demon. Fingers point. The woman is led on. Voyeurs watch through 
hollow eyes. A child stares, absent-mindedly picking his nose, never blinking; what 
a way to go. 
The demon has reached the foot of the gallows. A set of thirteen steps is all that is 
left from life. To ascend is to be no more. The air grows staler with each step 
climbed. The howling of the crowd is breached by the macabre wailing of the soon-
to-be-dead. Onlookers feast mutely upon the pleas of the demon. 
The noose is fed. The words of the irreversible condemnation are uttered. Illusion 
snaps. Life crumbles. Breath gives way with a long chain of snorts and squirms. 
The child is watching. As one heart slows down many others pace up. Thoughts 
shift. How long will the body dangle? How long will the taste of bone marrow 
linger? How long will the stench of lifeless float around? How long will the 
memory of the screeching voice amuse? 
Even after the removal of the token of justice, will the long shadow of the rope 
vanish? Will it be the same? 
Which is dead, the corpse on the rope or the remembering crowd? (an unpublished 
short story) 
 
These are a few words, called a minimalist short story by some, I scribbled long ago upon 
witnessing the public hanging of a woman who had allegedly committed adultery. The scale of the 
traumatization this savagery left me with was beyond measure. There and then I realized what 
trauma could do to one’s soul. The hanging woman’s face never faded away from my memories, 
nor did the booing of the crowd. Albeit unpublished nominally, it published itself on the bedrock 
of my psyche. 
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Barely can one be privy to the mazes and labyrinths of trauma. Trauma betrays your 
principles, alienates your world-view, and shatters the sanctuary of your peace. That all this 
bitterness befalls the victim is what any trauma scholar would attest to; yet addressing the concept 
of trauma is tantamount to chasing an apparition. It fools you into believing it, still all you get is 
disillusionment. Its controversial nature knows no end. It taps on the un-tapped and it calls the un-
called. Even writing on it is traumatic. In more ways than one, it tends to resist definition; yet in 
essence, it is instantiated anew every moment. Its mysteries, grandeur and awe have instilled life 
in the greatest literary works of the world. This resultant pervasiveness has afforded the concept 
of trauma not only a status of being a literary trend but also a full-fledged culture: “it has been 
turned into a repertoire of compelling stories about the enigmas of identity, memory and selfhood 
that have saturated Western cultural life” (Luckhurst 80). By the same token, Kirby Farrell 
contends, trauma is but “a cultural trope that has met many needs” (14). 
In the light of the gruesome portrayal of the hanging scene I wittingly shaped the outset of 
my first chapter with, one might insinuate that a trauma story needs to solely rely on texts, of 
literary nature necessarily, yet this is not but a fallacy. Trauma fiction is not necessarily tied up 
with a certain medium, nor does it need to embody a certain oddity. It has already matured and 
mutated into a myriad of media, arts, and disciplines, as Nadal and Calvo point out: “[a]lthough at 
first trauma was mainly associated with extremely unusual events, it has now become a powerful 
and complex paradigm that infiltrates contemporary history, literature, culture and critical theory” 
(1). 
Seeking a central or singular trauma for humanity is also frowned upon by Derrida. He is 
vividly at pains to warn us against discriminating between/among traumas of various weights, 
origins, and localities. In so doing, Derrida is adamantly insistent on inviting us to stand against 
the exclusive significance of some names such as Auschwitz or Holocaust in giving rise to the 
yardsticks by which the weight of the other so-called minor traumas could be measured. Briefly 
put, and in ways of avoiding any obfuscation, we need to distance ourselves from discrimination 
and singularity in dealing with the discourse of trauma and repudiate the unanimous privilege 
which certain Europeans bestow upon Auschwitz, hence refraining from eclipsing certain 
traumatic events “other than Auschwitz, ones which are just as abominable, names which have 
names and names which have no name” (qtd. in  García Düttmann 99-100)”. In other words, the 
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culture of singularity, not only from Derrida’s position but also from any scholarly standpoint, has 
no place in the dialectics of trauma. 
Cormac McCarthy’s canon is putatively thought to manifest profound traces of trauma. 
The present project is targeted at employing the concept of trauma in unraveling Cormac 
McCarthy’s No Country for Old Men (2005) and The Road (2006), both of which made their way 
onto the screen under the same titles through the adaptational efforts of the Coen Brothers (2007) 
and John Hillcoat (2009), respectively. The above-cited works, be they textual or visual, were 
acclaimed critically. To name but a few, the novel The Road won the Pulitzer Prize and the film 
No Country for Old Men received four Academy Awards, including the Best Picture Award. All 
said, what unflinchingly consolidates the bond of each novel to the other or the two novels to their 
corresponding adaptations, I firmly argue, is the concept of trauma. Although trauma is irreducible 
to any certain taxonomy, I will, in an effort to fastidiously abide by my study objectives, make use 
of diverse trauma models in this chapter so that I can cogently lay the groundwork to develop my 
later arguments in the second chapter of this study, which will be dedicated to the analysis of the 
above-mentioned works. 
 
Caruth: Incomprehensibility, Haunting, and Non-referentiality 
 
When Caruth published her seminal book Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History, 
she might not have been aware of the train of events, or the extent thereof, she was setting in 
motion. One might have ventured the guess she was about to elaborate on Freud and perhaps move 
about the same circles or a notch or two up. Yet, she, wittingly or otherwise, breathed life into a 
whole new horizon in literary criticism and theory. Albeit occasionally perplexing and intricate, 
the book seems to majorly turn to Freud on many fronts. The present line of arguments tends to 
take their cue from the Freudian notion of traumatized history in Moses and Monotheism, which 
was the underlying theoretical framework for Caruth to introduce her first chapter “Unclaimed 
Experience: Trauma and the Possibility of History” in the mentioned book.  
 Rarely does a writer make a claim so bold as to defy the most commonly reiterated 
historical facts. Freud beats the odds, though. To him, what history has registered in regard to 
Moses is but a common fallacy nurtured by overheated figments of imagination. The truth lies 
elsewhere; where most of us have not had the courage to take a questioning look at. Moses was 
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not a Hebrew but an Egyptian. Even the thought of it might be traumatizing to some certain 
believers. In his account, Moses was an Egyptian who liberated the Hebrews from the tyranny of 
the Pharaoh (exodus) and returned them to Canaan. The liberator, however, met his demise in a 
rebellion at the hands of the very people whom he had unchained from the tyrannical reign of the 
Pharaoh. This account, as opposed to the biblical account, is appalling in many respects. Having 
slain their liberator, they were left with nothing but the sense of guilt, which gave rise to all the 
historically collective hatred towards the Jews, their race, and perhaps eventually the traumatizing 
events of Holocaust and Anti-Semitism1, hence Freud avers: “[i]t seems that a growing feeling of 
guiltiness had seized the Jewish people and perhaps the whole of civilization of that time as a 
precursor of the return of the repressed material” (139). 
How does Caruth then use this particular Freudian account in addressing the implication 
of her trauma theories? For this to be explicated, let us take a step back towards some fundamental 
notions. Cathy Caruth prefers to start her founding or defining words in the light of what Freud 
wrote in the third chapter of Beyond Pleasure Principle. Repetition of a traumatic event through 
dreams or nightmares, Caruth remarks, comes at the heart of Freud’s understanding of trauma: 
“Perplexed by the terrifying literal nightmares of battlefield survivors and the repetitive 
reenactments of people who have experienced painful events, Freud wonders at the peculiar and 
sometimes uncanny way in which catastrophic events seem to repeat themselves for those who 
have passed through them” (1). Thus, the foundational component of a trauma, Caruth should 
remark relying on Freud, is the recurrent return of the traumatic event by which the psyche of the 
victim was wounded.  
The wound is not a simple word and has to do with trauma again. In fact, trauma, in a 
terminological sense, is derived from the “Greek trauma, or wound, originally referring to an injury 
inflicted on a body” (3). As most of the elemental concepts in psychiatry stem from Freudian 
thoughts, Caruth prefers to refer to his words on this occasion as well. The physical wound which 
was mentioned earlier is meant to be more mental or abstract from Freud’s position as Caruth 
sheds light on the matter writing “in Freud’s text, the term trauma is understood as a wound 
inflicted not upon the body but upon the mind” (3). The effect this wound has exerted on the mind 
is far more durable than that of a simple physical wound. Commencing his words with an example 
 
1 For a thorough account of the roots of anti-Semitism refer to Part III-Section I of Moses and Monotheism. Briefly 
put, the staple of this jealousy, says Freud, arises from the assumption that Jews were “the first born, favorite child of 
God” (147), hence superior to the other races. 
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in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud attempts to portray the gravity of the mental pain and 
torture in the character of Tancred in Tasso’s romantic epic Gerusalemme Liberata: 
 
Its hero, Tancred, unwittingly kills his beloved Clorinda in a duel while she is 
disguised in the armour of an enemy k night. After her burial he makes his way into 
a strange magic forest which strikes the Crusaders army with terror. He slashes with 
his sword at a tall tree; but blood streams from the cut and the voice of Clorinda, 
whose soul is imprisoned in the tree, is heard complaining that he has wounded his 
beloved once again. (16) 
 
This Freudian image in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which was the referential basis for 
Caruth, is a solid indication of how a traumatic event constantly finds a way of coming back to its 
victim and how the haunting effect thereof will never cease throughout the victim’s later life. The 
voice coming out of a tree is not only a reflection of a ghostly haunting effect trauma brings upon 
the victim, but also “the enigma of otherness of a human voice that cries out from the wound, a 
voice that witnesses a truth that Tancred himself cannot fully know” (3). The otherness of the voice 
and its repetitious appearance throughout the victim’s life form a very peculiar amalgamation of 
components that make its very existential nature completely inaccessible and non-locatable, which 
is manifestly exhibited by Caruth in the Freudian example: “just as Tancred does not hear the voice 
of Clorinda until the second wounding, so trauma is not locatable in the simple violent or original 
event in an individual’s past” (4).  
Furthermore, the traumatic image is entirely repetitive as well as unintentional, whose 
nature I detailed in an essay entitled “Trauma and Mental Perversions in Dennis Lehane’s Shutter 
Island”: “[i]t is thus through a repetition of his unknowing act of slashing at the tree that the 
haunting phantasm of his wife forces into him a malicious shock of what he had earlier done to his 
beloved” (Sadeghzadegan et al, 39). 
To further expound on the ghostly or haunting nature of trauma, one could exploit 
Wolfreys’ words, the genesis of which is once more derived from the Freudian thoughts. Calling 
it a ghost, Wolfreys goes on to give trauma a “spectral” (133) feature that only leaves its mark 
without the victim’s discernment. He does not fail to take heed of the “phantomatic or 
phantasmatic” (133) nature of the trauma, in that he turns to Althusser’s words in elaborating on 
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the paradoxical nature of phantasm saying “something occurs . . . but nothing happens . . . 
everything is immobile” (qtd. in Wolfreys 134). Lastly, Wolfreys puts phantasm akin to the notion 
of symbol, that which “belongs to the order of apperception rather than perception” (134). Thus, 
the haunting trace of trauma, apart from its spectral characteristics, lands on a rather phantasm-
centered province singled out solely by one’s ability of apperception rather than perception. 
 Having shed light on some foundational terms and the very essence of a wound so grave 
as to be called trauma, I will now turn my attention towards trauma’s socio-historical implication 
which was discussed earlier in regard to Caruth’s pursuit of Moses and Monotheism. Is the 
traumatized history a denial of history? Can one rely on a historical account which stems from a 
traumatic event? Taking her cue from Freudian thoughts as well as her interpretational liberty, 
Caruth contends: 
 
For many readers, Freud’s questioning of history─ his displacement of the story of 
a liberating return by the story of a trauma─ has seemed to be a tacit denial of 
history. By replacing factual history with the curious dynamics of trauma, Freud 
would seem to have doubly denied the possibility of historical reference: first, by 
himself actually replacing historical fact with his own speculations, and second, by 
suggesting that historical memory, or Jewish historical memory at least, is always 
a matter of distortion, a filtering of the original event through the fictions of 
traumatic repression, which makes the event available at best indirectly. (16) 
 
A trauma-related history, in the words of Caruth relying on the thoughts of Freud, can never be 
reliable; the very same unreliability that rendered the famed Freudian accident2 story unfathomed, 
if not for belatedness. The more one desires to ascertain the true essence of a trauma-oriented 
history, the more lost one gets in its course, since “[f]or history to be a history of trauma means 
that it is referential precisely to the extent it is not fully perceived as it occurs; or to put it somewhat 
differently, that a history can be grasped only in the very inaccessibility of its occurrence” (18). 
Whitehead does not fail to approach Caruth’s view purporting, “[f]or Caruth, referential truth or 
experience is no longer opposed to fiction but is inextricable from it, providing the reader with 
 
2 Caruth uses the famous example of an accident illustrated by Freud in his book Moses and Monotheism to portray 
the analogy between the belated nature of the symptoms of the accident and the delayed appearance of Monotheism 
after the murder of Moses (Caruth 16-17). 
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radically new problems of interpretation and understanding” (13). Thus, with Caruth as one’s 
paradigm, historical truth or the true history would be untenable, if not impossible. 
Relevant and noticeable here would also be Siri Hustvedt’s contentions in regard to 
Trauma’s incapacity in being narrated: “Trauma has no narration” (par. 7), as traumatized people 
alter their perception of time.3 To them, “once upon a time” becomes “once upon no time” (par. 
7). In addressing the vaguely formed temporal nature of a trauma-oriented history, Hustvedt 
tactfully employs the term “amnesia”: “History is made by amnesia. In the American Civil War, 
they called it soldier’s heart, and over time it changed its name to shell shock, then war neurosis. 
Now it’s PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder, the most antiseptic of the terms for people who 
witness the unspeakable” (par. 13). One cannot help but notice how both Hustvedt and Caruth are 
inclined to converge to the notion of unreliable history via using different terms such as “amnesia” 
and “inaccessibility” respectively. 
In Hustvedt’s logic, trauma creates its own narrative thread; one that becomes an utterly 
separate line of storytelling. Preserved on a different plane, “memories of war, rape, near-fatal 
accidents, and collapsing buildings aren’t like other memories. They are kept separate in the mind” 
(par. 17).  Trauma gives rise to its own plotline with its own rules and principles. Referring to her 
own novel The Sorrows of an American, Hustvedt, once more, reaffirms this particular position of 
trauma through the following words: “Trauma isn’t part of the story; it is outside story. It is what 
we refuse to make part of our story” (51-52). On an analogous note, Ronell observes that, “trauma 
can be experienced in at least two ways . . . as a memory that one cannot integrate into one’s own 
experience, and as a catastrophic knowledge that one cannot communicate to others” (313-314).  
This integrating inability must be precisely what Baer terms a “twofold structural 
disjunction between an experience and its integration into narrative memory, understanding, and 
communicability” (10). The inability to incorporate the traumatic event into the memory, Baer 
proposes, is grounded in the fact that the traumatic memory lies “somewhere outside memory yet 
within the psyche” (10). What, however, can revitalize the devastated soul of the victim, or what 
is left of it, is the engagement with the poetic aesthetics of Baudelaire and Celan, hence the 
appellation Remnants of Song: Trauma and the Experience of Modernity in Charles Baudelaire 
and Paul Celan for his book. It is more than fascinating to observe how Baers’s insight strikes a 
 
3  Hustvedt’s argument here has its roots in the thoughts of two psychoanalysts named Francoise Davoine and Jean-
Maxx Gaudillèrre. For a thorough understanding of their work, refer to their History Beyond Trauma. 
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chord with those of Housvedt and Ronell, not to mention the founding words of Caruth with the 
same centrality. 
The selected narratives of this study are in passionate need of a temporality-oriented, if not 
time-referred, exploration. Time, history and narration make so little or otherwise vague sense, 
particularly in The Road, that one could feel the time has stood still. It is as if the more one is 
seeking out a historical reference, the more ambiguity beats him. Nobody could even venture a 
guess as to whether where, when and how the original trauma or the apocalypse has occurred and 
the trauma-oriented line keeps itself vaguely isolated. All such clues and dialogues between the 
traumatic notions and the temporal or historical perspectives, through which the narratives unfold, 
are the arguments I intend to demonstrate in chapter two of this project.  
 
Haunting Flashbacks and Lacanian Real 
 
The phenomenon of flashback is deemed to be one of the most pivotal components of trauma 
discourse. Albeit multifarious in nature, flashback constantly finds its link to the province of 
memory, remembrance and sensory perception. Hustvedt’s account of traumatic flashback is as 
follows: 
 
The flashback is a fascinating form of traumatic remembering. In The Shaking 
Woman or A History of My Nerves I explore emotional memory and its relation to 
flashbacks, and my own experience of them after a car accident. Emotional 
memories appear to be processed differently in the brain from more pedestrian 
memories, which may explain the phenomenon of traumatic flashbacks. A 
neurobiological study conducted in 1996 on people who experienced flashbacks 
concluded that these memories are ‘organized on a perceptual and affective level 
with limited semantic representation and tend to intrude as emotional or sensory 
fragments related to the original event with stability over time.’ This is an elaborate 
way of saying that what returns in a flashback is remembered not through language 




Given this pithy account, flashbacks possess a rather sensory, be it visual or auditory, and 
emotional nature than linguistic. Then, how can one explain the profound body of all the words 
that a trauma victim refers to in coming to terms with his/her traumatic event? One could claim all 
those linguistic efforts are but at the service of portraying the visual or the emotional moments of 
the incurring of the trauma. Findings of Van der Kolk and Sapporta substantiate the same: “[t]hese 
experiences may then be encoded on a sensorimotor level without proper localization in space and 
time. They therefore cannot be easily translated into symbolic language necessary for linguistic 
retrieval” (qtd. in Hustvedt par. 9). In the words of Caruth, in a similar vein, flashbacks and their 
repetition can only be justified through “the absolute inability of the mind to avoid an 
unpleasurable event that has not been given psychic meaning” (59).  
 Perhaps another way to approach the concept of flashback in the rhetoric of trauma should 
be through negotiating the concept of “repetition compulsion” which originally belongs to Freud. 
In “Remembering, Repeating and Working-through” Freud famously argued that “the patient does 
not remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it 
not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating 
it” (150-51). He went on to call it the “compulsion to repeat”. The force of repetition has been high 
on the critical agenda of trauma notions. Upon another occasion, Freud puts a spectral gloss over 
the way the traumatized patient/person strives to act out a repressed memory: “a thing which has 
not been understood inevitably reappears; like an unlaid ghost, it cannot rest until the mystery has 
been solved and the spell broken” (1975, 122). Similarly, in her introduction to Trauma: 
Explorations in Memory, pioneering scholar Cathy Caruth employs the term “possession” to touch 
upon the same spectral aspect and then goes on to elaborate on another traumatic phenomenon 
called PTSD “in which the overwhelming events of the past repeatedly possess, in intrusive images 







Of closest affiliation to the concept of spectrality, flashback and possession is the Lacanian 
“real”.4 Lacanian “real” has always been deemed mysteriously ambiguous: “Lacan never 
accurately describes the ‘real’: he seems to think of it as what lies beyond the world of 
signification, perhaps a primordial immediacy of experience prior to language or a chaotic 
condition of mere thinghood prior to objectivity. For Lacan, the real is the “impossible” (Habib 
590). Lacan himself asks, “Where do we meet this real? For what we have in the discovery of 
psycho-analysis is an encounter, an essential encounter─ an appointment to which we are always 
called with a real that eludes us” (53).  Then Lacan delves into how he opts for the word tuché to 
mean the same as an encounter with the real: “[f]irst, the tuché, which we have borrowed … from 
Aristotle, who uses it in his search for cause. We have translated it as the encounter with the real. 
The real is … the return, the coming-back, the insistence of the signs ….” (53–54). One might look 
askance at the arguments developed so far wondering how this encounter or in better terms the 
encounter with the real goes rogue. On this Lacan contends: 
 
What is repeated, in fact, is always something that occurs─ the expression tells us 
quite a lot about its relation to the tuché─ as if by chance ….The function of the 
tuché, of the real as encounter─ the encounter in so far as it may be missed, in so 
far as it is essentially the missed encounter─ first presented itself in the history of 
psychoanalysis in a form that was in itself already enough to arouse our attention, 
that of the trauma. Is it not remarkable that, at the origin of the analytic experience, 
the real should have presented itself in the form of that which is unassimilable in 
 
4 The Lacanian triple order model is best outlined in the words of Habib in his comprehensive A History of Literary 
Criticism: From Plato to the Present: 
Lacan posits three orders or states of human mental disposition: the imaginary order, the symbolic 
order, and the real. The imaginary order is a pre-Oedipal phase where an infant is as yet unable to 
distinguish itself from its mother’s body or to recognize the lines of demarcation between itself and 
objects in the world; indeed, it does not as yet know itself as a coherent entity or self. Hence, the 
imaginary phase is one of unity (between the child and its surroundings), as well as of immediate 
possession (of the mother and objects), a condition of reassuring plenitude, a world consisting 
wholly of images (hence “imaginary”) that is not fragmented or mediated by difference, by 
categories, in a word, by language and signs. The mirror phase – the point at which the child can 
recognize itself and its environment in the mirror – marks the point at which this comforting 
imaginary condition breaks down, pushing the child into the symbolic order, which is the world of 
predefined social roles and gender differences, the world of subjects and objects, the world of 




it─ in the form of the trauma, determining all that follows, and imposing on it an 
apparently accidental origin? (54–55) 
 
Thus, through Lacan’s lens, “real” is not only traumatic but also un-assimilable, hence its being 
missed and mysteriously non-existent. Inspired and humbled by the Lacanian “real”, Hartman 
employs the concept of “real” to justify the dialectics of traumatic knowledge in his “On Traumatic 
Knowledge and Literary Studies”: 
 
The real is not the real, in the sense of a specific, identifiable thing or cause; 
however specific it may be, it is also a burning idea, or its own "wake" of desire. 
The encounter with the real takes place, on the part of both analyst and analysand, 
within a world of death-feelings, lost objects, and drives. It might be described, in 
fact, as a ‘missing encounter’… or an unmediated shock...(539) 
 
Thus, “real” becomes real when it is missed, muffled and consequently silenced to the most elusive 
part of the person’s psyche. Apart from its elusive and lost nature, “real” seems to be responsible 
for many more undertakings than one could imagine, “[i]t has the force of a reversal or interruption, 
of a peripety displacing one meaning by another, or which undoes the knot of signifier and 
signified that establishes signification” (Hartman 539). Albeit silenced, real can really voice the 
unvoiced, interrupt the uninterrupted and live beyond the lived: “to live as a piece of the real is to 
live beyond the limits of law of the signifier…” (539). To recap, “real” is emblematically 
controversial in that it is silently voiced, vaguely significant and unmentionably missed. 
 
Hartman’s Mute Visuality and Green’s Secondary Thinking 
 
Interviewed by Caruth, Hartman touches upon another thread of trauma rhetoric apropos of 
visuality and imagery. Taking his cue from Wordsworth’s haunting poetry, he addresses how the 
poet’s emphatic realization of “particular places” fascinated him: 
 
I was interested in how Wordsworth drew his stories and fictions out of his 
fascination with particular places. These highly charged images, I tried to show 
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how the poet unblocked them, how he developed them. Many of them were ocular. 
Visuality was dominant within his sensory organization; and something, call it 
nature, call it an economic principle within sensory organization, pitted the other 
senses against the eye. Symbolic process, I said, was related to this undoing of 
images. (Caruth and Hartman 632) 
 
Thus, the undoing of the images─ rather of an ocular nature─ could not have occurred without the 
extraordinary power of the nature. Later, Hartmen, however, brings up how the two concepts of 
individual imagery and visuality diverge from each other, stating “there is something powerfully 
abstract about visuality, in distinction from individual images. So you can fall in love with the 
visual, whereas you can’t fall in love with obsessive images” (633). 
Put another way, individual imagery can never be as aesthetically subjective as when it is 
enmeshed with the power of nature. Nature, one is to infer, is like the catalyst for the pictorial 
realization of the shocking images the person comes in contact with. In other words, “the 
movement from charged individual image to visuality is parallel to the movement from specific 
and haunting places to Nature. Nature is his most generous concept” (633). The haunting imagery 
of the individual, plainly put, is helped out or processed in the light of the generous help of nature. 
However, tragically enough, the leading character or the Boy of Winander5, having arrived at 
dissonant voices from nature, or an epiphany as called by some, dies in his youth with the poet 
standing on his grave, as Wordsworth writes: “[m]ute, looking at the grave in which he lies” (line 
422). Perhaps this is the moment of apocalypse as well, which is yet another realization achieved 
by Hartman, which could eventually relate to the present study in terms of traumatic events. 
Apocalypse, from his position, is a passive indifference leveled towards humans in a hyperbole: 
 
That if the human mind does not live fully, responsively, within nature, or nature 
does not respond to us, then the end-result, projected forward, is apocalyptic. The 
death is like a hyperbole of this moment, a hyperbolic act of an imagination that 
leaps down not up, taking off from a simple failure of response. Should this failure 
 
5 The major aesthetics of the Caruth’s interview with Hartman are grounded in Wordsworth’s Boy of Winander 
episode in Book 5 of The Prelude. Hartman seems to be inspired as well as humbled by the Romantic poetry and 




of response accelerate, then we will have no habitat, no mutuality of nature and the 
human mind. (635) 
 
Muteness in Wordsworth’s poetry, Hartman should note, is another contribution to the traumatic 
atmosphere of the poetic narrative. The boy moves obscurely from a point to another, seeking out 
even a more obscure response on the part of nature. He never utters a single word. The traumatic 
or the poetic is mute and the mute is traumatic. Silence is the key to the unraveling of the boy’s 
character, as Hartman marks down: “[t]he problem that arises, then, is the way that poetic and 
exemplary moment is characterized: even though it is a poetic moment, it is also a moment of 
muteness” (636). In elucidating the muteness further, Hartman subtly offers the following: 
 
We go from muteness to muteness, even if it is a muteness described in words. That 
is, the Boy of Winander─ and this is one reason why we feel that the episode was 
meant to be paradigmatic of human development, and that the death came too 
soon─ is shown at the point where speech is still mimicry. He is not shown 
speaking, he makes a pastoral pipe with his hands, but this is not speech. He doesn’t 
mimic speech, he mimics the owls, nature's sounds. And so you expect the question 
to be: how do you go from that stage to mature poetic speech? Yet The Prelude 
records the growth of the poet's mind, not of speech itself. You are given the pre-
mature moment, then the mature moment, but the mature moment is like the pre-
mature moment, because the pause is lengthened, and you are shown a silent poet. 
(636) 
 
Thus, the poet takes us up on an odyssey─ of a mysteriously traumatic type─ towards the maturity 
of the mind with the catalyzing devices of muteness, visuality and nature, all of which are 
paramount elements integral to the analysis of the narratives of our corpus. 
 Muteness and flashback are indelibly enmeshed in the trauma thoughts of yet another 
pioneer psychoanalyst called André Green. As a psychoanalyst deeply inspired by Lacan, Green 
wrote about trauma at length. His prolific writing and academic contributions eventually earned 
him the membership in the dignified British psychoanalytic Society. The concept of “secondary 
thinking” is one of the most significant contributions Green made to psychoanalysis. Devoted to 
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the aesthetics of Green’s “secondary thinking”, Herman Rapaport writes a whole chapter entitled 
“Secondary Thinking: Dostoevsky’s Notes From Underground” in the book Contemporary 
Approaches in Literary Trauma Theory. In order to perceive the concept of “secondary thinking”, 
one, I suggest in the first place, had better turn to Green’s own words in describing the two modes 
of thinking: 
 
Two temporalities are at work at the heart of conscious activity; one on the surface, 
following its course with the regularity that governs language, thus obeying the 
formation of linear linguistic sequences, according to a determined progression; the 
other, underlying the first, which seizes the opportunity of free association (none 
the less intelligible) to maintain a system of linking that is uncertain, changing, de-
hierarchicised, de-categorised, more or less actualized, requiring [of the psycho-
analyst] a different mode of listening (floating attention) guided by new referents 
organized in chains, according to the principle of pleasure/unpleasure or, beyond 
that, of the compulsion to repeat from the unconscious to the id which is in 
immediate contact with the preconscious. (qtd. in Rapaport 43-44) 
 
Thus, the two lines of thinking called “linear” and “de-hierarchicised”, Green believes, correspond 
to primary and secondary thinking respectively. What makes the secondary thinking distinct from 
the primary mode of thinking is its occasional dominance over the primary thinking when the 
trauma victim finds his/her position hard to bear, hence a sort of flashback or retroactive return to 
the event which traumatized him/her in the first place: “the secondary thinking becoming the more 
dominant line, even if it is the more freely associated, de-constituted, and uncertain of the 
discourses or languages” (Rapaport 44). This dominance aside, another angle which defines 
“secondary thinking” is how the trauma victim cannot reveal the unsaid, even though he/she goes 
through an ordeal of doing so, which is noted by Green: “[t]he more the analysand speaks, the 
more he says; the more he speaks without quite saying entirely what he has on his mind, the more 
he says and reveals that there are things he is not saying” (qtd. in Rapaport 44).   
Thus, the victim reveals a part of his psyche, yet the other part, which is somewhat amiss, 
remains silent: “[t]he positivity of what is said and the negative of what is silence” (6) are in 
constant battle. Therefore, what we have herein is, in essence, an amalgamation of 
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presence/absence, negative/positive and saying/not saying. This is not but a total decline of a 
victim’s psyche towards an irrevocably elusive and fragmented silence. The resultant silence, as 
Green notes, has in part to do with the break-down of the victim’s discourse in his/her flashbacks 
to the very event of the trauma: “[secondary thinking] threatens to break the thread of the 
discourse” (qtd. in Rapaport 45). Should the concept of “secondary thinking” come down to one 
phrase or term, it should be but the inability to utter something when it has already happened on a 
traumatic plane. Perhaps, the term “beta bits”, coined by the renowned British Psychoanalyst Bion, 
can pave the way towards a better mastery of the concept of “secondary thinking”. “Beta bits” are 
“split off psychotic elements that don’t link in order to form coherent and consistent thinking” 
(Rapaport 44). These bits, Bion argues, serve as the “gaps in patient’s discourse”, which could be 
related to anybody or anything without making any sense. 
Narratives of our corpus exhibit manifest traces of the traumatic notions of muteness and 
visuality. The corpus plots seem to staunchly rely on the aesthetics of silence and interpretation of 
images. This acquires further significance once the omnipresent flashbacks and the visual decoding 
of nature─ specifically in The Road─ through the characters’ steering past each and every ruin 
come to the fore. Put briefly, the narratives and the characters are likely to be constituted by the 
aforementioned aesthetics and notions whose unraveling will come to light in chapter two. 
 
LaCapra: Absence and Loss  
 
It is impossible to write a full account of trauma discourse and not take heed of Dominick 
LaCapra’s seminal essay “Trauma, Absence, Loss”. Unfolding his essay with TRC6 , Post-
apartheid South Africa, and Post-Nazi Germany as a prelude, he is deliberately quick to single out 
the delicate distinction(s) between loss and absence. Truth laid bare, the more one conceives of 
drawing a distinguishing line between the two concepts, the more anguish one will be in. Indeed, 
 
6 Truth and Reconciliation Commission served the South African Justice system as a Post-Apartheid forum to listen 
to the voice of the victims and the human right violations which occurred during the pertinent era. It is the preference 
of this project to resort to LaCapra’s judgment apropos the mission of this Commission: 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission was in its own way a trauma recovery system. Its awe-
inspiring and difficult, if not impossible, project was to provide a quasi-judicial setting in which the 
truth was sought and some measure of justice rendered (at least retrospectively) in a larger context 
where former victims were now rulers who were trying to find ways and means of reconciling 




LaCapra himself revealed the very agonizing blur between the two: “still the distinction between 
absence and loss cannot be construed as a simple binary because the two do indeed interact in 
complex ways in any concrete situation and the temptation is great to conflate one with another” 
(700).  
Seemingly, LaCapra is more vexed by the conflation of these two concepts than 
demarcating one from the other, yet in an effort to set them apart from one another, he contends 
that absence is trans-historical whereas loss is historical. “The historical past is the scene of losses 
that maybe narrated….reactivated, reconfigured and transformed in the present of the future” 
(700). Absence knows no time and chronicles nothing, whereas loss is an indispensible component 
of the historical past.  Furthermore, losses are more specific and address particular events in 
history, be they individual as in the murder of a loved one or collective as in Holocaust or world 
wars. By contrast, absence tends to refer to the entities that one has never had in the first place, as 
LaCapra maintains: “in terms of absence, one may recognize that one cannot lose what one never 
had” (701). It is thus safe to infer that absence has to do with “ultimate foundations in general, 
notably metaphysical grounds” (701). Absences might be thought to be more holistic than losses. 
 With this stance in mind, once can take a step closer to the very agitating worries LaCapra 
has in terms of conflating these two notions. Apropos of this conflation, LaCapra holds: 
 
When absence is converted into loss, once increases the likelihood of misplaced 
nostalgia or utopian politics in quest of a new totality or fully unified community. 
When loss is converted into (encrypted in an indiscriminately generalized rhetoric 
of) absence, one faces the impasse of endless melancholy, impossible mourning, 
and interminable aporia in which any process of working-through the past and its 
historical losses is foreclosed or prematurely aborted. (698) 
 
Later elsewhere, LaCapra maintains that melancholic agitation and paralysis stem from the 
conflation of absence and loss. Once the individual or the society is melancholic or mentally 
paralyzed, LaCapra warns, the thoughts of a ubiquitous trauma strikes every single individual in 
the community allowing them to think in terms of trauma culture: “one encounters the dubious 
ideas that everyone is a victim, that all history is trauma, or that we all share a pathological public 
sphere or a wound culture” (712). This culture of trauma may consequently lead to the inclusion 
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of the individuals who did not go through the same traumas, hence overshadowing their collective 
identity, about which LaCapra shed light: “[c]onflation of absence and loss would facilitate the 
appropriation of particular traumas by those who did experience them, typically in a movement of 
identity formation that makes invidious and ideological use of traumatic series of events in 
foundational ways or as symbolic capital” (712). Then, what approach should be adopted to come 
to terms with the absence/loss dichotomy, or perhaps lack7, and not be doomed to a collective 
trauma culture? LaCapra responds: 
 
Historical losses can conceivably be avoided or, when they occur, at least in part 
compensated for, worked through, and even to some extent overcome. Absence, 
along with the anxiety it brings, could be worked through only in the sense that one 
may learn to live better with it and not convert it into a loss or a lack that one 
believes could be made good, notably through elimination or victimization of those 
to whom blame is imputed. Conversely, it is important not to hypostatize particular 
historical losses or lacks and present them as mere instantiations of some inevitable 
absence or constitutive feature of existence. (712) 
 
Thus, LaCapra is at pains to urge one to “work through” loss and to convert “absence” to a less 
anxiety-provoking entity. At issue here, the nuances of the absence/loss aside, is the anxiety which 
originates from the aftermath of such traumas. Anxiety, LaCapra infers in the light of Freudian 
dicta, has a mysterious indefinite nature, hence its analogy with absence. In a similar vein, anxiety 
brings an air of not knowing what to fear: “[t]here is no particular thing to fear. And Anxiety─ the 
elusive experience or affect related to absence─ is a fear that has no thing (nothing) as its object” 
(707). Thus, for one to conquer this absence-oriented sense of anxiety, one needs to locate a 
specific thing or entity by which this fear could be generated and consequently find ways of 
eliminating or mastering the same fear. Put another way, one needs to provide oneself with a 
definite source of fear to elude the elusive absence-oriented anxiety. This route, remarks LaCapra, 
 
7 The term lack enters LaCapra’s discourse in association with loss. Put briefly, lack is the present mode of loss: “Loss 
is often correlated with lack, for as loss is to the past, so lack is to the present and future. A lost object is one that may 
be felt to be lacking, although a lack need not necessarily involve a loss. Lack nonetheless indicated a felt need or a 
deficiency; it refers to something that ought to be there but is missing” (703). Lack, LaCapra cautions, should not be 




can be paved through the transformation of absence to loss. This pathway renders the indefinite 
defined, the elusive clarified and the mystery debunked, as the author further notes: 
 
The conversion of absence to loss gives anxiety an identifiable object─ the lost 
object─ and generates the hope that anxiety may be eliminated or overcome. By 
contrast the anxiety attendant upon absence may never be entirely eliminated or 
overcome but must be lived with in various ways… in converting absence to loss, 
one assumes that there was (or at least could be) some original unity, wholeness, 
security, or identity which other have ruined, polluted, or contaminated and thus 
made ‘us’ lose. (707) 
 
Thus, apart from locating a certain identifiable source of fear, one has to, LaCapra says, find the 
others “who made us lose” and eliminate them. Put plainly, in order for one to come to terms with 
one’s absence-centered anxiety, one needs to annihilate the specific source and eradicate the sinful 
others respectively to master the anxiety and to regain the wholeness or unity of identity. If one 
decided to do otherwise, namely to treat absence as absence, the result will entail the “empowering 
possibilities in the necessarily limited, non-totalizing, and non-redemptive elaboration of 
institutions and practices in the creation of a more desirable, perhaps significantly different─ but 
not perfect or totally unified─ life in the here and now” (707). This process will then generate 
nothing but ambivalence both in terms of anxiety and empowerment. 
  
Acting Out /Working Through 
 
Of closest pertinence and prominence here is the concept of “acting out” and “working through” 
to which Freud was credited and for which he was consequently famed.8 To Freud, the traumatized 
patient is incarcerated within the prison of his/her repeating the traumatic event(s), hence the term 
“compulsion”: “As long as the patient is in the treatment, he cannot escape from this compulsion 
 
8 The staples of the Freudian notion of “acting out/working through” were developed through an essay which initially 
appeared under the title of “Remembering, Repeating, and Working through” in 1914. Since then, many thinkers have 
touched upon the concept in the light of their own preferences and liberties, hence the ubiquity of the term “acting 
out” over “repetition” by Freudian predecessors or other pioneer thinkers in the field. Freud, however, opted for the 




to repeat; and in the end we understand that this is his way of remembering” (2001, 150). The 
compulsion to repeat, Freud theorizes, does not have to take the shape of words only, instead “[the 
patient] repeats everything that has already made its way from the sources of the repressed into his 
manifest personality-his inhibitions and unserviceable attitudes and his pathological character-
traits. He also repeats all his symptoms in the course of the treatment” (151). By dint of the 
aforementioned repetition, the patient might eventually pave his/her way towards a better 
understanding of the trauma(s), thereby allowing the moment of “working-through” to step in: 
“[o]ne must allow the patient time to become more conversant with this resistance with which he 
has now become acquainted, to work through it, to overcome it, by continuing, in defiance of it, 
the analytic work according to the fundamental rule of analysis” (155). The psychoanalyst has no 
other choice than be patient here, as “[t]his working-through of the resistances may in practice turn 
out to be an arduous task for the subject of the analysis and a trial of patience for the analyst” 
(155). The course of therapy, Freud warns, can neither be avoided nor hastened. 
 The implications of the above-mentioned Freudian concept have been somewhat dense and 
compelling. Many thinkers, LaCapra at their epicenter, have referred to them in more ways than 
one. Perhaps the pithiest description of “acting-out/working through” LaCapra put forth could be 
captured in the following lines: 
 
I would also distinguish in non-binary terms between two additional interacting 
processes: acting-out and working-through, which are interrelated modes of 
responding to loss or historical trauma. … I have argued elsewhere that mourning 
might be seen as a form of working-through, and melancholia as a form of acting-
out. Freud compared and contrasted melancholia with mourning. He saw 
melancholia as characteristic of an arrested process in which the depressed, self-
berating, and traumatized self, locked in compulsive repetition, is possessed by the 
past, faces a future of impasses, and remains narcissistically identified with the lost 
object. Mourning brings the possibility of engaging trauma and achieving a 
reinvestment in, or recathexis of, life that allows one to begin again. (713) 
 
From LaCapra’s position, which is completely indebted to and analogous with the Freudian model, 
one could aim for an impasse or otherwise a revival relying respectively on “acting out” and 
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“working through”. A mourned trauma, as opposed to a stalled trauma, has, nonetheless, a better 
chance of a promised life, regeneration and “re-cathexis”. Elsewhere, LaCapra employs the 
concept to develop another thread of argument apropos a type of revitalization or collective re-
contextualization of trauma via resorting to working-through: 
 
Through memory-work, especially the socially engaged memory work involved in 
working-through, one is able to distinguish between past and present and to 
recognize something as having happened to one (or one's people) back then that is 
related to, but not identical with, here and now. Moreover, through mourning and 
the at least symbolic provision of a proper burial, one attempts to assist in restoring 
to victims the dignity denied them by their victimizers. (713). 
 
Mourning, LaCapra vividly suggests, opens the gates of emancipation, redemption, 
recontextualisation of community whose members would have otherwise suffered from a 
permanent dereliction leading to an ensuing trauma culture; a culture whose irreversible nature 
cannot be remedied whatsoever. Moreover, the “socially engaged” can help prevent this nascent 
loss from converting to a mysterious ever-lasting absence by virtue of mourning or working 
through: “[o]ne would … help prevent the indiscriminate generalization of historical trauma into 
the idea of a wound culture or the notion that everyone is somehow a victim (or, for that matter, a 
survivor)” (722).  
LaCapra’s position apropos working-through and his disapproval of the Caruthian jargon9 
in this respect is staunchly substantiated by Craps’s words: “Dominick LaCapra … a trauma 
scholar more directly interested in transformative political practice, has expressed some 
misgivings about what he perceives as Caruth and Felman’s excessive fixation on the symptomatic 
acting-out of trauma, which threatens to inhibit action in the present oriented to a more desirable 
future” (11). The same sentiment pervades Kaplan’s words when she states, “I understand and 
appreciate the criticism of Caruth’s insistence on the ‘unspeakability’ and ‘unrepresentability’ of 
trauma: I will argue that telling stories about trauma, even though the story can never actually 
 
9 Caruthian jargon is meant to address the superiority of the impossibility, incomprehensibility, and the “acting-out” 




repeat or represent what happened, may partly achieve a certain ‘working through’ for the victim” 
(37). 
Perhaps another grave consequence of not working the trauma through should be how the 
victim finds himself/herself at the mercy of images and symbols once acting-out overwhelms 
his/her soul. In this respect, Onega and Ganteau posit: 
 
Unable to narrativise the traumatic experience in logical terms, the subject gives 
expression to his or her trauma by means of sensorial images instead of words. 
Unlike words, sensorial images are emotionally charged and symbolic, so that when 
they emerge from the unconscious during the process of acting out, they are 
experienced by the subject as overwhelming and incomprehensible. (3) 
 
LaCapra’s words do not fall afar here. The author, however, involves the concept of violence in 
relation to symbolization as well. Violence, says LaCapra, will overcome the psyche of the victims 
or the survivor once the symbolizing cannot be done optimally or “[i]n other words, violence in 
unmediated form may be more likely when there are no accepted or legitimized modes of 
symbolizing difference and conflict in an effective manner that enables them to be addressed and 
to some extent dealt with” (709). What best recaps all this thread of argument is the widely-
appreciated line by Žižek: “In order to cope with a trauma we symbolize” (qtd. in Wolfreys 126).  
In his book On Belief, Žižek does mention how both psychoanalysis and the religious 
tradition ought to cherish the hard-learned lesson of resorting to the province of symbolization: 
“Man is not simply overwhelmed by the impact of the traumatic encounter─ as Hegel put it, but is 
able to ‘tarry with the negative,’ to counteract its destabilizing impact by spinning out intricate 
symbolic cobwebs. This is the lesson of both psychoanalysis and the Judeo–Christian 
tradition”(47). Having composed Slavoj  Žižek: A Critical Introduction, Parker quotes him writing 
that “trauma has no existence of its own prior to symbolization; it remains an anamorphic entity 
that gains its consistency only in retrospect, viewed from within a symbolic horizon” (qtd. in 
Parker 68). 
 In another reading of the famed dichotomy of “acting-out/working through”, Louwagie, in 
her “The Ethical Stance of Testimony: Memory Politics and Representational Choices”, discerns 




The first type of memory politics tends to an all-or-nothing logic. Most critics 
situated in this category ban representation in order to avoid totalizing narratives 
and defend─ in an equally absolute way─ the radical alterity of the Holocaust. 
Caruth, for instance, refutes any process of “working through,” because she 
identifies narrative with a ‘full’ and ‘stable’ interpretation….The second type of 
memory tends to replace the ‘hyperbolic’ all-or-nothing logic by a partial or 
progressive approach of the events. It is more particularly based on an intensive 
processing of the events- defined in terms of working through, contextualization 
and dialectical démultiplication. This dialectical perspective, however, is not 
perceived as the way to total redemption. (15) 
 
Although this graphic taxonomy converges with all the threads of the analyses this study has put 
forth so far, it manages to disillusion, if not cripple, our thoughts in one particular facet; and that 
is not but the road to emancipation. Redemption, from the position of LaCapra and his proponents, 
seems to be feasible once the process of “working-through” is completed. However, redemption, 
Louwagie’s research illuminates, is unattainable. At odds with Louwagie, Stampfl urges us to hope 
for the positive traces of trauma which ennobles the character of the character through instilling 
resilience in them: 
 
The resilience of some individuals in the face of disaster, and the vulnerability of 
others, even with respect to triggering events that do not seem especially dire, seems 
to carry the idea of wound far from the context of the relatively objective cut or 
concussion. The idea of resilience introduces uplifting themes to the study of 
trauma. Along these lines, ideas of rebirth or redemption come into play, ideas 
which exceed the concept of recovery defined merely as the return of normal 
functioning. (136) 
 
What best captures the soul of this heated debate is made manifest in Nietzsche’s famed dictum, 
“[f]rom the military school of life.─ What does not kill me makes me stronger” (33), the very same 
quote which appeared in the guise of an epigraph to this chapter.  
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 Do the narratives of our study suffer from absence or loss or both? Has the conflation 
between the two modes occurred in any of the narratives? Do the characters opt for “acting-out” 
or “working-through”? How do the corpus narratives turn to symbols? All the dialectics of 
“absence and loss” and the intellectual products thereof, in more ways than one, find their way to 
the very epicenter of not only the narrative nuances but also the elegant thematics and motifs of 
the novels and the films of our selected canon. Chapter two of this research will attempt to address 
the mentioned issues. 
 
Testimony: Listening, Speaking, and Survival  
 
Release from or response to trauma has set in motion another thought current termed “testimony” 
in critical trauma studies. The term is indebted to the efforts of Shoshana Felman through her 
seminal book Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (1991) 
co-authored by the renowned psychoanalyst Dori Laub. The two ushered in the new redeeming 
voice of testimonial criticism; the voice without which many traumatic voices would have been 
left unheard. For an initial yet transparent illustration of the concept of testimony, it is imperative 
that one turn to the very words of Felman and Laub who believe the most paramount staple of 
traumas in the history was the Second World War whose quintessential role in trauma dynamics 
is still tangibly felt: 
 
The major texts, films and documents submitted to the scrutiny of this book . . . 
(Camus’ novels, de Man’s essays, the poetic project of Celan, videotaped Holocaust 
testimonies, and the film Shoah by Claude Lanzmann) were all written and 
produced subsequent to the historic trauma of the Second World War, a trauma we 
consider as the watershed of our times and which the book will come to view not 
as an event encapsulated in the past, but as a history which is essentially not over, 
a history whose repercussions are not simply omnipresent (whether consciously or 
not) in all our cultural activities, but whose traumatic consequences are still 




Then, the Second World War, from Felman and Laub’s angle, is not only unfinished but it has also 
launched many other sagas of traumatic aftermath whose effect has but lingered on to the present 
time. It is through the act of bearing witness to all the brutalities and atrocities of historical traumas 
that one can allow the testimony to come alive. This is substantiated by the words of Elissa Marder, 
“testimony (here understood as the act of bearing witness to traumatic events) is a necessary and 
vital response to the ongoing consequences of traumatic history” (3). Wolfreys’s angle seems to 
contribute to the same path, “[t]estimony, in order to be such, cannot be calculated, for every 
testimony must respond to the singular specificity of the traumatic experience” (130). In a similar 
vein, and putting on a pedestal Shoah10, Hartman asserts, “Witnessing, moreover, cannot take place 
without some hope in the future, in generational transmission. Perhaps all writing presupposes this 
hope-the manuscript in a bottle as well as the buried milk canisters…” (“Shoah”, 48). 
 At the very heart of testimonial criticism comes the act of listening. On a Caruthian or 
conventional note, traumas are essentially unfinished and ubiquitous and they will recur in ways 
one can never ascertain. Testimonial criticism, however, is aimed at the very release of or recovery 
from this Caruthian enduring dereliction. This so-called emancipation comes at the hands of 
listening; “[but] the most urgent and essential claim of Testimony is to show that even though we 
do not ‘recover’ from our traumatic past, nor can we ‘cure’ it, ‘overcome’ it, or even fully 
understand it, we can and we must listen to it and survive it by listening to its effects as they are 
transmitted to us through the voices of its witnesses and survivors” (Marder 4). 
 Speaking, notes Marder, should be the other pivotal piece of Felman’s spectrum in shaping 
her testimonial scrutiny: 
 
Because bearing witness entails speaking in the first person in order to attest to a 
truth that can only be validated through the very act of speaking itself, testimony 
places the speaker in a unique and difficult position. By responding to an ethical, 
political, moral, or even unconscious imperative that compels someone to take up 
the position of the witness (that is, to put oneself in the place of truth by ‘telling the 
 
10  This is a seminal documentary visualizing the most ruthless brutalities of Holocaust to the best of its abilities. 
Directed by Lanzman, the documentary has been one of the most oft-cited examples in the realm of trauma studies in 
the last twenty years. Inspired by its authentic aesthetics and its intense insights, Hartman composed a seminal essay 




truth’), the person who assumes the burden of that truth often does so at great 
personal risk. (4) 
 
Thus, testimony exiles the witness to a solitude whose components are constituted by the acts of 
listening and speaking. This solitude, nonetheless, does not belong to the witness. Indeed, what 
alienates this solitude is that which alienates the truth. The more the witness exposes 
himself/herself to the truth, the more he/she discerns the truth does not belong to him/her, 
notwithstanding all the hard-earned listening and speaking: “[t]ruth does not belong to the speaker, 
the listener, or the empirical, material world. But by understanding testimony as a medium through 
which truth can be transmitted, Felman’s work enables us to be attuned to the truths transmitted 
by trauma even as those very truths may not be entirely ‘knowable’objects…” (Marder 4). Thus, 
Felman exhorts us to listen to the voices of the dead inasmuch as it heralds a future unchained 
from its traumatized past: 
 
Felman’s notion of testimony teaches us that we must open our ears, hearts, and 
minds to the voices of the dead as they continue to speak through the voices of the 
surviving witnesses. She also shows that in opening ourselves to these voices from 
the past that live in the present, we may also be able to open ourselves to the 
possibility of a future that might escape being overly determined by, or ensnared 
in, the (unwitting) traumatic repetitions of its (unknown) traumatic past. (Marder 
4). 
 
All the dark dimensions of trauma render the healing process barely viable. Nevertheless, many 
victims or survivors have diverged from the regressive paths succeeding at having the harsh 
aftermath ebb away gradually. One approach to arrive at this maturity is via shaping a narrative or 
a story out of the traumatic event. Albeit irreversibly horrifying, any event, Hustvedt argues, can 
be narrated as a story with cobwebs of fiction spun around it: 
 
When horror can be articulated and told as a story, no matter how terrible the story 
is, it becomes part of an autobiographical narrative, and as such, it has already 
changed character. It has become a willed repetition rather than an automatic and/or 
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hidden one. It has gained a temporal, narrative reality, one we share with others, 
something made possible by our reflective self-consciousness. (par.1) 
 
 The most heinous atrocities befalling a victim, Hustvedt maintains, could be coped with 
insofar as one spins a web of time, space and conscious narration. Elsewhere further on, she is not 
afraid to cite herself as a living example of this conscious narration: “Writing about my shaking 
did not cure me of the symptom, but it did give me a greater sense of control and agency” (par. 
33). The sense of agency Hustvedt speaks of seems to be tantamount to the sense of self-
consciousness or perhaps awareness; precisely the sentiment which victims, bereft of narration or 
narrative, are deprived of.  The agency fostered in her by narrating her own traumas allowed her 
not only to come to terms with her own trauma but it also rendered her aware of her weaknesses, 
hence the sentence “I am the shaking woman” at the end of the novel. One, now, can see through 
the Hartman’s logic in stating “[t]he talking cure is also a homeopathic cure and literature could 
be viewed as a talking cure to a higher degree” (Hartman, “Trauma Within the Limits of 
Literature”, 259).  The very same concept does not escape the critical thoughts of Modell who 
juxtaposes the therapeutic essence of the narrative with the tool of metaphor11 stating,  
 
In considering the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis, we believe that metaphor 
contributes to what can be viewed as a self-reinforcing loop. … metaphor is central 
to the communication and interpretation of unconscious meaning. One therapeutic 
effect of making the unconscious conscious is the creation of new meanings that 
expand the sense of the agency of the self. (10) 
 
Through an analogous angle, J. Edward Mallot purports, “talking benefits the victim by beginning 
the emotional processing of events; hearing one testimony may encourage others to step forward” 
(23). 
 
11 The concept of metaphor is famously thought, by Brooks and some other trauma analysts, to be closely intertwined 
with the way a victim can cope with the aftermath of a trauma: “Narrative operates as metaphor in its affirmation of 
resemblance, in that it brings into relation different actions, combines them through perceived similarities …, 
appropriates them to a common plot, which implies the rejection of merely contingent (or unassimilable) incident or 




All this testimonial hope entailing terms such as cure, therapy, sense of agency which are 
deemed to be the outgrowth of narrativisation (acts of listening and speaking) or story telling 
bearing the weight of eminent scholars such as Hustvedt, Hartman and Modell, along with my 
arguments on symbols mentioned earlier indebted to LaCapra and Žižek, work in tandem with the 
aesthetics of the concept of “working-through” originally employed by Freud and his re-reading 
successors. The corpus narratives in this project signal the aforementioned dynamics significantly. 
In The Road, for instance, the characters literally speak and listen to the dead nature in ways of 
grappling with what, they might even disbelieve, has happened. All these relational modes of 
analysis will come to the fore in chapter two. 
Of inherent affinity here is the notion of survival. One could cogently argue that all the 
testimonial aesthetics and dynamics are mostly, if not solely, targeted at the ultimate path of 
survival; something perhaps all trauma victims strive for. This should be the reason why Laub and 
Podell bestow the title of “Art of Trauma” on the very act of survival: “survival itself should be 
considered as a type of art of trauma” (991). Stressing the role of “internal other” as the locus for 
all the personal memories, they go so far as to claim that the loss of the “internal other” is 
tantamount to the disappearance of the representation: “[w]ithout this internal other, there can be 
no representation” (991).  
Interestingly enough, the only “antidote to the annihilation of the ‘internal’ other, Laub and 
Podell argue, is the “witnessing presence created in the art of trauma” (991). Considering 
“witnessing and emptiness” as a double locus for art of trauma, they contend that it is only through 
a present dialogue with the traumatic past that the victim could approach the empty core of trauma: 
“In essence it is only through its indirect and dialogic nature that the art of trauma can come close 
to representing the emptiness at the core of trauma while still offering the survivor the possibility 
of repression and repossession” (993). To recap, art of trauma liberates the victim, shapes a 
dialogue with the past, and transcends the psyche of the victim to come to terms with the trauma, 
hence a successful survival.  
Alluding frequently to Celan’s poetry, Laub and Podell elevate the art of poetry as the 
medium or art which effectively mirrors the empowering means of not only conversing with the 
past but also seeking out the trace of survival. It is not a coincidence that Baer, too, relies on the 
unparalleled power of poetry, Celan in particular, to delineate how a poetic engagement, or a 
dialogue to recall Laub and Podell, can allow the trauma victim to come to terms with the 
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unresolved experience, hence a successful survival. Then, “considering the poetic representation 
of unresolved experience” (9), is the redemption many trauma victims yearn for. In another 
analogous reading, and relying on the views of Judith Herman, Suleiman states, “[w]hatever camp 
one is in, finally, I think it is important to understand that trauma is not only a drama of a past 
event, but also, even primarily, a drama of survival” (280).  
The literary convention of survival proceeding from the testimonial discourse of trauma 
cannot be disregarded if one is to do justice to the analysis, be it thematic or methodic, of the 
narratives chosen for this research. Survival, I propose, takes the central stage in both narratives, 
particularly in The Road. The detailed nuances of the act of survival in the corpus narratives 





A brief survey of the concept of belatedness or latency in trauma is what I wish to lean towards at 
this juncture. At the risk of sounding repetitive, the current study has to reiterate Caruth’s reference 
to Freud’s Moses and Monotheism. In order to lay the groundwork for the premise, Caruth 
commences her argument with the renowned example of the accident about which Freud wrote a 
great deal. Going through what Freud terms “traumatic neurosis”12, the victim might survive the 
aftermath of the accident. Rendering this story consonant with that of Jewish monotheism, Freud 
is bound to draw an interface between the two accounts, which is the latency. The same way the 
accident victim was doomed to go through a latency period to truly come to terms with the nature 
of the accident, the Moses slayers were doomed to go through such a long span of time, “during 
which no trace is to be found of the monotheism idea” (Freud qtd. in Caruth17), as to eventually 
be receptive of the return of monotheism. What adds to the gravity of the case is that the victim 
never grasped the accident while happening and it was not until a while later that the victim grows 
a sense of cognition regarding the accident, hence the term belatedness: 
 
 
12 This refers to a series of grave psychical and motor symptoms experienced by the victim whose first emergence 
does not happen before what is also termed “incubation period” (Caruth 1996, 16-17). Needless to say, the kinship 




In his use of the term latency, the period during which the effects of the experience 
are not apparent, Freud seems to compare the accident to the successive movement 
in Jewish history from the event to its repression to its return. Yet what is truly 
striking about the accident victim’s experience….is not so much the period of 
forgetting that occurs after the accident, but rather the fact that the victim of the 
crash was never fully conscious during the accident itself. (Caruth 17) 
 
Caruth contends that the repetition of the traumatic experience solely hinges upon its first 
forgetting, and that is the true power of trauma. Thus, the traumatic event is not fully 
comprehended at the very time it occurs and is instead forgotten only to be restored in a later time 
and another place: [a]nd it is this inherent latency of the event that paradoxically explains the 
peculiar, temporal structure, the belatedness, of the Jews’ historical experience” (17). As the 
murder of Moses is too much to take at the time of its occurrence, the event has to connect itself 
to “another place, in another time” (17), hence its belated nature. History, particularly of trauma, 
Caruth infers, is “grasped only in the very inaccessibility of its occurrence” (17). Put briefly, a 
traumatic history is either belated or inaccessible, neither of which, this study suggests, is reliable. 
It is most apt if one refers to the words of Whitehead in interpreting Caruth’s insight: 
 
Caruth's insistence on the inherent belatedness of experience and understanding 
challenges the notion of a straightforward textual referentiality. If history is 
characterised by its continually delayed or deferred entrance into experience, as 
Caruth suggests, then there is a need to profoundly rethink the modes of our 
engagement with the past. History is no longer available as a completed knowledge, 
but must be reconceived as that which perpetually escapes or eludes our 
understanding. (13) 
 
 The belated nature of trauma has reverberated through many pioneer trauma thinkers’ 
thought streams. If one aims to do justice to the notion of belatedness, one cannot do so without 
recourse to the analytical views of Jean Laplanche.13. In a seminal interview with Laplanche, 
 
13 A leading French thinker and a pioneer psychoanalyst whose dynamic contribution to the rereading, and perhaps 
completing, of Freud’s notions in miscellaneous respects mainly sexuality is widely appreciated. What, indeed, he is 
famed for is but his revisionist attitude toward Freudian Seduction Theory.  
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Caruth, in ways of seeking an acknowledgement for her own grasp of Laplanche’s attitude towards 
belatedness, shares with him, “you say that in order to be psychic the memory of the original 
implantation must be revivified. In your written work, you describe this relation between the 
original moment and its revivification in terms of Nachträglichkeit” (Caruth and Laplanche 11). 
Setting forth the translated term as the belatedness, Caruth further asks him for his favored 
alternative of the term, to which Laplanch responds somewhat hilariously: “We translate 
Nachträglichkeit in French as aprèscoup, and in English I have proposed that it be translated as 
‘afterwardsness,’ which is now gaining acceptance. After all, the English language can use such 
words with ‘ness.’ I read something about ‘whitehatedness,’ so why not afterwardsness?” (12).  
Acknowledging the words of Caruth apropos her version of understanding Laplanche’s 
belatedness─ the original moment of trauma until the revivification thereof─ Laplanche opts for 
the term “afterwardsness”, whose distinguishing lines are later illuminated, which do not come 
high on this project’s agenda presently. Some pages towards the middle of the interview, Caruth 
and Laplanche both intersect at a point whose underlying essence is that which concerns the 
unknown temporal facet of the trauma: “[s]o to understand the truly temporal aspect of 
Nachträglichkeit, or afterwardsness, you have to take into account what is not known, both at the 
beginning, and later. What is radically not known” (18). To recapitulate, “afterwardsness” of 
trauma, Caruth and Laplanche concur accordingly, includes something “uninterpreted or 
unassimilated” (22).  
Modell’s interrogation of belatedness, too, does not fall short of pertinence herein. 
Directing our attention towards how Freud “referred to the retranscription of memory as 
Nachträglichkeit” (Metaphor, 36), Modell illustrates how the human brain is capable of 
categorizing, assorting and refreshing the given data depending on its perceptive process and the 
mechanisms thereof, all of which are thought to be termed Nachträglichkeit after Freud: “[t]he 
sorting of similarity and difference is another way of describing category formation. 
Categorization is a function of memory, and memory, in turn, is a property of neural systems” 
(Metaphor, 36). Although this reading bears the mark of re-transcription or recontextualization, it 
tends to diverge from the purely unassimilated sense of the traumatic event. The emphasis of 
Modell, to be precise, falls on the categorizing ability of the brain as well as memory in shaping 
the concept of belatedness. 
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Barely can any trauma rhetoric underpin the concept of the belatedness as resonantly and 
thoroughly as that of Laplanche and Pontalis. They expound on the staples of the concept of 
belatedness as follows: 
 
a. It is not lived experience in general that undergoes a deferred revision but, 
specifically, whatever it has been impossible in the first instance to incorporate fully 
into a meaningful context. The traumatic event is the epitome of such unassimilated 
experience. 
b. Deferred revision is occasioned by events and situations, or by an organic 
maturation, which allow the subject to gain access to a new level of meaning and 
to rework his earlier experiences. 
c. Human sexuality, with the peculiar unevenness of its temporal development, 
provides an eminently suitable field for the phenomenon of deferred action. (112)  
 
That Laplanche and Pontalise’s outline embodies some of the most integral components of the 
logic of belatedness─ terms such as unassimilated, revision, and impossible─ is truly thought-
provoking. Thus, the traumatic and the unassimilated moment recontextualizes itself through the 
act of deference in the hopes of affording its victim the opportunity to revisit, revision, or 
instantiate anew the missed meaning. 
 Albeit favored by many trauma thinkers, the concept of belatedness galvanized intensely 
heated controversies as well. It was only a matter of time before some critics leveled their 
criticism─ mainly of negating nature─ against the belatedness model, particularly associated with 
Caruth. Barry Stampfl, in order to accentuate the weight of this opposition, makes an ironic use of 
the phrase “laundry list of complaints” (134). Some of the staples of such critical views with 
respect to Stampfl are: 
 
Our dominant paradigm of trauma takes for granted the cultural presuppositions of 
the western hegemony, ignoring alternative premises and practices; (therefore) it 
focuses exclusively on the plight of the individual at the expense of social 
collectivities ; it assumes a singular catastrophic event as the cause of 
traumatization, ignoring everyday insidious abuse; it overestimates linguistic or 
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psychic damage while minimizing the material aspects of trauma; and it erases the 
distinction between victim and perpetrator. (134) 
 
Disregarding the socio-cultural schemes and overemphasizing the linguistic and psychic facets of 
the traumatic event, to name but a few, are among the salient points shaping the complaining voice 
of the opposing camp. Ruth Ley’s critical voice, Stampfl suggests, takes the center stage of the 
opponents’ complaints, for Ley believes Caruth misread the Freudian concept of Nachträglichkeit: 
“Caruth’s (mis)reading of Freud’s concept of Nachträglichkeit transforms what Freud had 
conceived of as a delayed recoding of a repressed memory from early childhood into ‘an 
ineluctable process of infection’ spreading uncontrollably from witness to witness” (qtd. in 
Stampfl 135). This particular misreading of Freud, in the light of Ley’s logic, clouds the very 
principle by which Freud coined the whole concept of belatedness insofar as Freud never meant 
the belatedness to resemble an infection which spread from a witness to another. 
How do the narratives of our corpus fare in the midst of all the arguments incorporated into 
the concept of “belatedness”? The narratives of McCarthy’s oeuvre, particularly the narratives 
chosen for this project, offer abundantly in this realm. For instance, in the particular case of No 
Country for Old Men, the capsule and its uncanny state of killing people shocks both the characters 
and the audience so bitterly as to require further time to digest or take in the overwhelming nature 
of the shock, hence the belatedness of the trauma.  
 
A Beacon of Hope: Balaev and Belau 
 
Perhaps the name Balaev is as awe-inspiring as the life it has breathed into the challenges flung 
upon the mainstream trauma notions. The Freudian camp of Caruth needs to be relocated and 
renegotiated once Balaev’s opposing aesthetics occupy the stage. Indeed, this must be the utter 
reason why she includes a chapter titled “Literary Trauma Theory Reconsidered” at the very outset 
of the book she edited. In her seminal essay “Trends in Literary Trauma Theory”, she subtly 
undermines the long-standing position of trauma via introducing a series of trends whose final 
impetus finds its force in the very annihilation of the primary models. With a retrospective 
approach she states,  “[a] central claim of contemporary literary trauma theory asserts that trauma 
creates a speechless fright that divides or destroys identity” (Trends, 1).  
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Of analogous note here, I additionally suggest, should be the model developed by Abraham 
and Torok. In their The Shell and The Kernel: Renewals of Psychoanalysis (1994), they make 
several allusions to the term “splitting” in the ego as to finally title it “internal psychic splitting” 
(100), explicating it as: “two distinct ‘people’ live side by side, one behaving as if s/he were part 
of the world and the other as if s/he had no contact with it whatsoever” (100). Put briefly, trauma 
cuts the person (ego) in half, thereby creating two selves out of one. Similarly, Bloom states 
“trauma produces a disconnection syndrome, a functional ‘split‐brain’ preparation in which the 
two hemispheres appear to function separately and autonomously” (76).  
Apart from the debate of disassociation, Balaev is consequently quick to adduce more facts 
to reveal the salient features of the abreactive model14 of trauma, favored by trauma writers such 
as Kali Tal15, to pave the way for her own resonantly opposing voice later. Some of the key terms 
to characterize the nature of the Caruthian abreactive model, mentions Balaev, are 
“unrepresentable, unspeakable, timeless, repetitious, contagious and infectious”. From the position 
of Caruth and the abreactive thinkers, trauma shatters, dislocates, dissociates and eventually leaves 
the victim haunted, unable to grow back to his/her initial state. This shattering could encompass 
many psychological disorders such as PTSD, amnesia and multiple personality disorder. The 
identity of the victim could never be rebuilt in the light of the abreactive model. Yet, the novel 
notions of trauma, Balav claims, are suggestive of a more fluid dynamism: 
 
In contrast to the abreactive model of the self as a fixed entity that then fragments, 
the trauma novel demonstrates that the reorganized self is relational and emerges 
relative to a specific place that produces a specific articulation of a transformed 
identity. This expression of the self is socially contingent and connected to a place 
of inhabitation and meaning, not binarily dependent on a linear re-enactment of a 
traumatic experience. The protagonist's subjectivity is, thus, depicted as a fluid 
process located in relation to new realities or new knowledge. (“Trends”, 9) 
 
14 The abreactive model is the mainstream trauma model emphasizing the role of trauma by its recreation through the 
narrative memory of experience. This is the same Freudian Caruthian camp placing the stress on the impossibility of 
trauma’s representation or conception, hence the dissolution of the self and the temporal gap. 
15 Kali Tal’s Worlds of Hurt: Reading the Literatures of Trauma has constantly been acclaimed for its unified account 
of individual/collective traumas on a biographical scale including the most traumatizing milestones of humanity such 
as the Holocaust and Vietnam War. Pitting the individual war traumas against the sexual violence targeted at women, 





Then, the trauma victim’s identity does not necessarily shatter or disassociate, and even against 
what the odds are, the victim’s identity could display more fluidity to new realities. Put differently, 
the victim might be said to be reborn. The above-mentioned account of trauma as “repetitions, 
infectious and contagious” is primarily indebted to Caruth’s notion in her Unclaimed Experience: 
Trauma, Narrative and History, that one’s trauma is never his/her own (24). This particular notion 
lays the groundwork for yet another compelling trauma model normally called the “trans-
historical/inter-generational” trauma, as described by Balaev: 
 
The theory indicates that a massive trauma experienced by a group in the historical 
past can be experienced by an individual living centuries later who shares a similar 
attribute of the historical group, such as sharing the same race, religion, nationality, 
or gender due to the timeless, repetitious, and infectious characteristics of traumatic 
experience and memory. Conversely, individual trauma can be passed to others of 
the same ethnic, racial, or gender group who did not experience the actual event, 
but because they share social or biologic similarities, the traumatic experience of 
the individual and group become one. This leads to the claim that trauma narratives 
can recreate and abreact the experience for those who were not there--the reader, 
listener, or witness can experience the historical experience firsthand. (3) 
 
The above-mentioned depiction of trauma, however, is subject to many critical complaints, among 
which one could mention the duality of “absence/loss”. The theory fails to draw a marked line 
between the personal loss and the historical absence; the very vexing pitfall against which 
LaCapra, as this study brought to limelight earlier, advised any trauma researcher. The above-
mentioned model conflates these two terms irreversibly, which is further noted by Balaev: 
 
The theory of intergenerational trauma conflates loss and absence and collapses 
boundaries between the individual and group, thereby suggesting that a person's 
contemporary identity can be ‘vicariously traumatized’ by reading about a 
historical narrative or due to a shared genealogy that affords the ability to 
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righteously claim the social label of ‘victim’ as part of personal or public identity. 
(3) 
 
Balaev mentions the work of Bouson as the most apposite example for the concept of 
intergenerational trauma. Bouson’s work is even further solidified once it leans towards the 
concept of violence: “Bouson offers useful insights on Morrison’s writing practices, but maintains 
an essentialist rhetoric regarding trauma and (racial) identity in an effort to link the current violence 
and despair of a racial/cultural group in America with the violence and oppression experienced by 
the same historical racial/cultural group decades ago” (3).  
All these notions of transhistorical trauma later meet their repudiating points: “the 
transhistorical model tends to produce a reductive view of the variety of responses to trauma and 
the processes of memory and identity formation found in literary representations” (3). This way, 
the transhistorical model is repudiated on many fronts. Despite such repudiations, many critics still 
cling to the model, as “some critics are quick to employ the transhistorical trauma theory as a 
means to explain the intersections between personal and social experience” (4). Balaev, to add to 
the point, turns to the cultural and local nuances of the genre of the novel by which the deeds of 
the protagonist could be corrobrated, hence a more individual perspective than social: 
 
To claim that the traumatized protagonist expresses a specific, idiosyncratic 
response to trauma, while also functioning as representative figure of a social group 
in order to relate the actions in the novel to a historical event, does not suggest that 
the protagonist asserts an essentialist, intergenerational identity based on a decades-
old event. The novel demonstrates the ways that an experience disrupts the 
individual conceptualizations of self and connections to family and community, but 
the values attributed to the traumatic experience are largely shaped by cultural 
forces created within the world of the novel. (5) 
 
It is not solely the trans-historical nature of trauma that is undermined by the diverse cultural social 
forces that attack the protagonist, but the famed unspeakable and incomprehensible Caruthian 
model is to be reconsidered here in the light of the same social mores which allow for a colossal 
sum of relativity in judgement: “[t]his perspective reminds us that the ‘unspeakability’ of trauma 
50 
 
claimed by so many literary critics today can be understood less as an epistemological conundrum 
or neurobiological fact, but more as an outcome of cultural values and ideologies” (5). 
Balaev’s stance in Contemporary Approaches in Literary Trauma Theory  evinces no 
significant divergence from that of her seminal essay, save for some more pluralistic approach 
details, which address the same conflict in terms of trauma being able to be articulated and 
expressed whereas the classic approach left no room for this expression or representation: 
 
In contrast, the pluralistic trauma model that allows determinate value and social 
specificity, even when a survivor like me had little agency in the moment of 
violence, thus acknowledges the variability of trauma in its definition and 
representations, and may emphasize the active potential for meaning in the moment 
of harm. (6 ) 
 
Thus, with the pluralistic approach towards trauma comes the notion of trauma having the potential 
to be expressed, represented and spoken, while the classic approach contended otherwise and 
believed trauma was unspeakable, silent and haunting. 
 Another staple of the pluralistic approach put forth by Balaev is the capability of trauma in 
locating its meaning. Unlike the classic trauma scholars who believed language can never express 
the nuances of trauma, the contemporary trauma thoughts lean towards a divergent path, as Balaev 
explicated the matter: “[c]ontemporary pluralistic approaches in literary trauma theory are more 
likely to acknowledge both the neurobiological and social contexts of the experience, response, 
and narratives, as well as the possibilities that language can convey the variable meanings of 
trauma” (7). The same deconstructive pluralistic notion holds true in the realm of locatability of 
trauma, something classic trauma scholars would deem unfeasible, which is illuminated further in 
the words of Balaev: “[i]f the larger social, political, and economic practices that influence 
violence are the background contexts or threads in the fabric of a traumatic experience in the first 
place, then trauma’s meaning is locatable rather than permanently lost” (8).  
 Balaev’s novel voice and her compelling opposition to the classical conventions of trauma 
and the trans-historical discourse of Caruth merit sufficient heed in negotiating the thematics and 
delicacies of the narratives chosen for this study insofar as some portions of the trauma-oriented 
discourse of our corpus casts aspersions on the conventional trauma trends. The substantiation or 
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decline of themes such as representation, locatability, comprehensibility and inter-generational 
nature of trauma are all among the arguments which will constitute the pillars of the body of 
chapter two of this study. 
 Another opposing insight posing a threat to the orthodox Caruthian streams of thought is 
the voice of Linda Belau. Looking askance at any tenet or thought which renders the trauma 
experience so extraordinary as to deserve the phrases such as “ambassadors of an exceptional 
realm, bearers of a higher (albeit more terrible) knowledge” (par. 1), Belau purports that trauma 
falls into a representable and accessible domain: “traumatic experience is not in fact inaccessible 
in the way or to the degree that its major theorists have asserted. Because traumatic experience--
and experience in general--is tied to a system of representation, to language, it is necessary to come 
to an understanding of the role that the signifier plays in trauma” (par. 2). Taking her cue from the 
logic of the symbolic as well as the impossibility of the traumatic event, she believes one has to 
venture into a province far beyond the symbolic to come to terms with the intensity of the traumatic 
suffering: 
 
Because traumatic experience is grounded in the repetition of an impossibility, it is 
indelibly tied to the real beyond the signifier. In this sense, trauma opens up an 
ethical space beyond the symbolic which is, nevertheless, intimately tied to the 
materiality of the signifier and, therefore, to our social and linguistic destiny. This 
ethic of the impossible, however, drives the subject beyond the social to an 
encounter with the inadequacy of the signifier as she moves beyond the particular 
event of her suffering to a failed encounter with the very possibility of knowing that 
suffering completely. The psychoanalytic intervention assures us, then, that we are 
responsible in the face of something that exceeds symbolic guarantee. This is the 
ethical dimension of trauma that gets left behind when we attempt to place 
traumatic experience beyond language and representation, beyond the traumatic 
materiality that is the signifier. (par. 2) 
 
Thus, the materiality of the signifier in a traumatic narrative is eclipsed, if not eliminated, by the 
impossibility of the experience or the original encounter, hence a left-behind ethical condition and 
the complexity of the victim’s ethical/psychic mode. Later, in an effort to further unravel this 
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conundrum, Belau frequently exploits the term “refusal of understanding” to represent something 
so unspeakable and unconceivable as to consequently arrive at what is termed as “the obscenity of 
understanding”.16 Deploying the renowned documentary of Shoah, she is at pains to expound on 
how Lanzmann’s Shoah is less concerned with the mission of unraveling the semantic layers of 
the film than transmitting the incomprehensibility of the traumas, which did not but paralyze all 
the holocaust survivors whom he personally interviewed. Lanzmann hopes to bring out the truth 
of witnessing through an impossible transmission of the incomprehensibility of the Shoah. 
 Thus, for Lanzmann, the act of bearing witness does not necessarily lend itself to the 
production of meaning. For Lanzmann, it seems, bearing witness takes place only in and as this 
form of transmission (Belau par. 26). Thus, to Belau, this inability to perceive the gravity of the 
Holocaust atrocities is precisely the ethical pitfall of trauma and its impossibility of repetition, 
hence the recourse to, as the least compensation possible, the transmission of what can be 
transmitted, namely the effort to give life to a nine hour documentary that can at least convey the 
meaning, if not produce the meaning. Interestingly enough, this conscientiously crucial but 
impossible transmission is elegantly showcased in the words of Derrida when he states the 
“‘impossibility and necessity’ of bearing witness to the ‘unexperienced experience’” (qtd. in 
Wolfreys 133). Striking the same chord and in an effort to be further privy to Belau’s novel insight, 
Ramadanovic deploys the concept homogenously in his “Introduction: Trauma and Crisis”. 
Embroiling in the initial portrayal of trauma solely as an instance of human experience and thus 
representable, he goes on to shed light on the inherent fault of the signifier: 
 
The signifier is marked by a constitutive inadequacy, a missing piece, and not, as 
some have supposed, a prohibited content. This is to say that since loss is a part of 
the subject's constitution, the signifier, or a symbolic act, cannot fill in the lack 
produced by a trauma or restitute the loss. The consequence of this inadequacy is 
that the subject is destined to encounter trauma in the present, where trauma appears 
 
16 “Obscenity of Understanding” should be best characterized in the words of Lanzmann as he is to be originally 
credited with the term: 
There is an absolute obscenity in the very project of understanding. Not to understand was my iron 
law during all the eleven years of the production of Shoah. I clung to this refusal of understanding 
as the only possible ethical and at the same time the only possible operative attitude. This blindness 
was for me the vital condition of creation. Blindness has to be understood here as the purest mode 




as a repetition. What is repeated here is the impossibility of returning to the past 
moment when the injury occurred. (par. 17) 
 
Then, the failure of the signifier is compensated through recourse to recurrent returns─ of rather 
impossible nature─ to the moment of trauma. In view of this failed attempt, trauma, Ramadanoivc 
asserts in light of Belau’s insight, is not to be classified as incomprehensible but in dire need of 
being transmitted as “a repetition of what is not possible” (par. 17). Thus, as the return trajectory 
to the past or original encounter is barricaded, the only thing that could sugarcoat the pain is but 
the repetition of the impossible moment in the present, hence the Caruthian jargon of haunting, 
which seems to be an over-exaggeration from the vantage point of Belau and her phenomenology. 
Thus, through a more logically scientific engagement with trauma and attributing the fault to the 
signifier rather than any other mysteriously metaphysic entity, Belau’s thought streams depart from 
the so-called unparalleled sublimities of the trauma and prefer to explore it in the light of more 




As a thread of my arguments in the pages to come is to entail the notions of childhood trauma, 
which are high on the critical agenda in addressing our corpus narratives, the research in hand must 
now veer in this direction. If trauma befalls its victim at the very outset of his/her growth, many 
complexities will arise, which might be beyond one’s ken. Susan L. Reviere, more in the guise of 
a clinician than a literary critic, happens to untangle the intricate knots of the concept of childhood 
trauma once mysteriously tied in medical jargon.  
However, her findings can be applied in the realm of literature and the selected narratives 
of this study. She postulates: “[i]f trauma is encountered during childhood at a time when schemas 
and beliefs about the self and world are forming, traumatic experience may interface with 
development of subordinate, general schemas that create a sense of continuity in self, memory and 
meaning” (37). Reviere is quickly attentive to the chronic nature of trauma at the same stage 
hypothesizing that the slightest blemish to the psyche of the child could leave its debilitating mark 
on the schema of the child forever, “particularly in an environment of chronic trauma, the 
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predictability and stability of experience necessary for the formation of adaptive schemas may be 
absent, disrupting schema formation at all levels” (37). 
           Then, at stake here are the nascent “schemas” of the child which will be teetering on the 
brink of annihilation in the event of early unset trauma. I take the liberty of shedding some quick 
light on the concept of “schema” now. With respect to Bruhn, schemas are “expectations, rules, or 
axioms derived from past experience that the individual maintains about himself, others, and the 
world” (qtd. in Reviere 28). In other words, one cannot expect the survivor of a childhood trauma 
to possess a solid self-image, nor is /shehe able to develop a world-view or a comprehensive 
cognition of his/her surrounding world. Furthermore, Reviere posits that the so-called survivor 
may sustain further damage as the trauma “may affect adversely the ability of the child to make 
future assimilations and accommodations and thus may reduce cognitive and behavioral flexibility, 
impairing the child's ability for adaptation” (37). Equally important here is what the child lacks in 
terms of the real phenomena that could occur to or around him/her, i .e. a “disruption in the ability 
to interpret reality in terms of existing schemas, failing to build on a personal narrative and to 
develop a capacity for flexible adaptive action” (37). To recap, the traumatized child will be devoid 
of the advantages of self-awareness, adaptation, schemas and flexibility. 
Through similar angles, since a child does not possess the ability of complete verbal 
representation, which originates from “the child’s immature capabilities for language, thought and 
affect modulation” (38), then to him/her as a chronic trauma survivor “traces of the traumatic 
experiences may survive only as loose constellations of unintegrated, fragmented percepts” (38). 
Under such circumstances, one may wonder whether or not the memory will be lasting with the 
survivor. What has been divulged is that “not only the child may have a limited ability to make 
sense of trauma for incorporation into organized memory; the early experience, even if encoded 
into some form of early schematic memory, is possibly unintelligible to the adult whose schemas 
have equilibrated over time” (38). What seems to be germane to the present line of discussions─ 
particularly the grave impact of trauma on the victim in terms of cognition and schemas─ could 
be the notions of Ramadavonic in addressing the “narcissism of trauma” in his essay “‘YOU 
YOUR BEST THING, SETHE’: TRAUMA’S NARCISSISM”.  
He, analogous with Reviere, purports that “trauma effects a withdrawal from the world and 
that the traumatized subject seems, at least in one of the early phases of trauma, focused on him– 
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or herself and closed off from anything that can be construed as different, threatening, or alien” 
(178). Enlarging on the self-centeredness of the trauma and the Freudian thoughts thereof, he 
argued that the trauma victims were inclined to opt for a type of “turning inward” (179) and foster 
a sense of apathy towards others. One, warns Ramadavonic, should not be fooled when he/she 
observes the altruism among the trauma victims: 
 
The altruism of trauma survivors and their dedication to helping others do not 
disprove this line of reasoning since trauma victims tend to help others only once 
they are well into working through their trauma. Those they help also tend to be 
like themselves, such as victims of the same kind of trauma or members of the same 
national, racial, or gender group. Even selflessness and solidarity among survivors 
can hence be tied to a narcissistic compulsive repetition and a kind of acting out. 
(19) 
 
Thus, the trauma victims’ altruism and compassion, if existent at all, only accounts for their own 
“narcissistic goal of self-preservation” (179), insofar as the victim feels his/her peers are content 
with the procurement of their share of altruism. Put briefly, far from helping others, they only care 
to help their own kind, hence serving the purpose of feeding their own narcissism. 
Perhaps what our study entails at this juncture should be more in line with the thoughts and 
perspectives of a psychoanalyst named Leonard Shengold whose extensive studies over literary 
material coupled with psychiatric findings have afforded him a unique status in both fields. In his 
aptly-denominated book Soul Murder, he sets out to interrogate the perpetration of brutal or 
ruthless acts against children that culminate in their emotional bondage, if not subjugation, to the 
abuser and finally, in their psychic and spiritual annihilation.  
Curiously novel in his approach towards literature and psychology, he strives for a new 
literary-psychoanalytic realm within which he tries his hand at examining the lives of canonical 
writers─ specifically their childhood─ such as Dickens, Orwell, Chekhov and Kipling. Shengold 
has abundantly and diversely defined the concept of “Soul Murder” throughout his book with 
respect to each writer’s autobiographical narratives (particularly Dickens), stylistics, and preferred 
motifs. Here are some thought- provoking descriptions regarding the concept of “Soul Murder” 




Soul murder is neither a diagnosis nor a condition. It is a dramatic term for 
circumstances that eventuate in crime─ the deliberate attempt to eradicate or 
compromise the separate identity of another person. (2) 
Murdering someone’s soul means depriving the victim of the ability to feel joy and 
love, as a separate person. (2) 
Child abuse is the abuse of power…. Soul murder is as old as human history, as old 
as the abuse of the helpless by the powerful in any group…. But soul murder has a 
particular resonance with the twentieth century with the world of Orwell's 1984- 
and a particular relevance to it. (3-4) 
Soul murder is my designation for a certain category of traumatic experience: 
instances of repetitive and chronic overstimulation, alternating with emotional 
deprivations that are brought about by another individual. (16-17) 
The term [Soul Murder] does not define a clinical entity; it applies more to 
pathogenic circumstances than to specific accounts. (17) 
Ibsen and Strindberg wrote mainly about the destruction of the souls within the 
arena of the family….the capacity to destroy a soul hinges entirely on having 
another human being in one's power, and this confrontation of the powerful and the 
helplessly dependent is inherent in childhood. (19) 
In soul murder the victim’s identity including the sexual identity, is lost. (20) 
 
Having perused the above-cited quotations, one can possess a vivid overview of what “Soul 
Murder”, be it in bodily or spiritual terms, could encapsulate. Then, “Soul Murder” is indeed 
indicative of a severe trauma imposed on a child’s psyche whose effects might echo in arenas and 
dimensions such as the identity, joy, deprivation, family, and the perpetration of crime. With this 
in mind, one is right to wonder what repercussions might befall the so-called survivor whose soul 
has been subject to such forces. It comes as no surprise to witness dramatic changes in such a 
person, and unlike the clichés, this survivor might not even survive the physical aftermath of the 
event as Shengold asserts: “the children may not physically survive the assaults or they may later 
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succumb to an inner need for annihilation analogous to that Rene Spitz17 (1954) found in his study 
of emotionally deprived infants who died after growing up in institutions” (6). The survivors of 
such abuse, thus, sustain a self-destructive path, which eventually creates in them a strong, 
conscience-distorting need for punishment. 
What soul murder can make out of a survivor has always been a heated debate. The 
vestigial gifts, be they a matter of vice or virtue in the victims, are greatly variable: “some abused 
children may sustain more abuse and transcend it better than others” (6), while some other “soul-
murdered (sadomasochistic) children can become psychotic, or psychopathic and criminal. Or, by 
using massive or primitive defenses, they may be able to contain the terrifying, primarily 
murderous charge of affect they have been forced to bear” (6). Last but not least, “some survivors 
appear to have derived from their experiences adaptive powers and talents that helped them 
survive” (7). Thus, the subject of adaptation in the victims of childhood trauma proves to be a 
profound nexus of controversies, as Reviere entirely repudiated the sustenance of “adaptive 
powers” in such victims.  
Given the fact that the leading character of one of our corpus narratives─ The Road─ is a 
child, all the above-mentioned accounts will be of overarching significance once our study leans 
towards exploring his psyche. The notions of adaptation and schema might be integral to the 




Having elucidated the salient features of childhood trauma, I wish, at this germane point, to allow 
this study to target the features of trauma victims, irrespective of the time in which trauma occurs. 
In this respect, Bloom’s words seem to be the most apposite choice. One conspicuous sign of a 
trauma victim is “the speech terror”, which makes the victim fall short of his/her linguistic 
functioning under stressful circumstances, as Bloom avers: “[t]his loss of language function is 
frequently profound and extremely important. The traumatic experience and all associations to it 
cannot be incorporated into a cognitive framework, cannot be ordered, partly because the brain 
system that accomplishes this task is shut down under the impact of extreme stress” (75-76). 
 
17 René Árpád Spitz was an Austrian-American psychoanalyst known for his contribution to Ego Psychology and his 
organized research in the realm of infantile deaths on account of malnutrition. 
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Stammering, one can obviously infer, should be a pertinent case of “terror”. Upon this realization, 
one could rightly tease out the truth lurking behind the stammering of countless shell-shocked war 
veterans. As for the representation ways and types of the trauma victim, Bloom posits: 
 
The victim experiences and remembers the trauma in nonverbal, visual, auditory, 
kinesthetic, visceral, and feeling ways, but is not able to ‘think’ about it or process 
the experience in any way. Since cognitive processes are dependent on language 
function, without words we cannot ‘think’… [trauma victim] cannot control the 
intrusive images, feelings, sensations. They come into consciousness unbidden, 
terrifyingly vivid, producing a vicious cycle of helpless self-revictimization. (76) 
 
Apart from the linguistic occlusion, another feature which stands out in trauma victims is 
the anti-social behavior, as Bloom asserts: “[a]s a result, intrusive sensory experiences and 
negative feelings predominate and behavior becomes increasingly separated from the social 
meaning system. The person disconnects from other people as they actively avoid listening or 
participating in a dialogue with the victim” (77). Hence, as victims are deprived of the skill of 
speaking, they only turn to the only language left before them: acting. The anti-social behavior 
aside, trauma victims express themselves through very idiosyncratic or odd behavior: 
 
As a result, the victims begin to signal their distress in the only way left open to 
them, through the repetitive, often ritualized, seemingly bizarre signal, symbolic 
and emotionally charged behavior of the nondominant hemisphere. One man tries 
to jump off a building, another woman repeatedly runs razor blades across her 
breasts, another buys an assault weapon and sprays bullets across a crowded street. 
(78) 
 
Violence, with the analytical stance of Bloom in mind, should be one of these idiosyncratic 
behaviors in trauma victims. Then, the trauma victims’ peculiar or violent behavior, be it toward 
themselves or others, cannot be justified through the typical behavioral landmarks. The novels and 
films of the present study─ particularly No Country for Old Men─ are replete with characters who 
exhibit a myriad of such behaviors. They would rather act than talk. Their violent behavior is 
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relentless, not to mention the idiosyncratic type─ the gas capsule and its traumatizing effect─ this 
violence has harbored in itself. 
 
Craps: Ethics of Trauma 
 
Perhaps another newly emerging voice in the recent trauma theory should be Stef Craps’. With his 
essay titled “Wor(l)ds of Grief: Traumatic Memory and Literary Witnessing Cross-Cultural 
Perspective”, he negotiated the dialectics of trauma through an interesting dialogue between the 
conventional trauma notion buttressed by Caruth and her followers and TRC. Initiating his essay 
with some introductory debates on trauma and touting Caruth as one of the founding mothers of 
this province, he is quick in criticizing her, Hartman, Felman and LaCapra for being oblivious of 
the cross-cultural implications: 
 
It is something of a surprise, therefore, to note that the founding texts of the field─ 
including, besides Caruth’s own work, writings by Shoshana Felman, Geoffrey 
Hartman, and Dominick LaCapra, among others─ largely fail to live up to this 
promise of cross-cultural ethical engagement. They tend to ignore traumatic 
experiences and histories of currently subordinate groups both inside and outside 
Western society, and/or to take for granted the universal validity of definitions of 
trauma and recovery that have developed out of the history of Western modernity. 
(53) 
 
Craps then unravels the body of TRC elucidating both the upsides and downsides. Cathartic 
opening of the wounds of the past was an upside for which TRC was praised; “[w]e open wounds 
only in order to cleanse them, to deal with the past effectively and so to close the door on that dark 
and horrendous past forever” (56). In contrast, some claimed that all the testimonies were heard 
ineffectually and to no avail: “They [Trauma Centre facilitators] just want us to be victims and tell 
our stories so they can help us. I am sick of telling my story. It makes them feel good to show that 
they are helping us, that things are really OK. They don’t really want to change things and what 
good does telling our stories over and over and over do?” (TRC qtd. in Craps 5). 
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 Departing from the TRC staples, Craps approaches his most pivotal objective attempting 
to negotiate the problem of trauma via Magona’s Mother to Mother as a literary response to the 
efforts of TRC. The novel Mother to Mother centers on the fictionalized assassination account of 
Amy Biehl, the famed Fulbright American activist on Apartheid, who had come to South Africa 
to pave the way towards the country’s first democratic elections. Four black youths beat and stab 
a renowned writer to death. The violence to which they resort in assassinating the leading character 
Biehl was outrageous. The four testified before the amnesty committee and all four were granted 
amnesty. Magona’s story, however, moves far beyond the surface. Magona sets out to shape a 
delicate dialogue between Amy’s mother and the killer’s mother Mandisa: “While expressing her 
grief over Amy’s death, Mandisa also asks for understanding for her son from, Mrs Biehl but by 
extension also from the reader: ‘you have to understand my son’. Mandisa’s narrative is a moving 
attempt to reach out and share grief, offer comfort, and foster mutual understanding across racial, 
ethnic, and cultural boundaries” (60). 
 Apart from a sense of empathy or sympathy, the novel essays to interrogate the hatred and 
the violence built up in the souls of the perpetrators via the apartheid atrocities of the era, which 
were portrayed as natural by the killer’s mother and as nothing that left her agitated or surprised. 
This was purely what the perpetrator’s mother Mandisa wanted Amy’s mother to understand, and 
consequently forgive her son: “Apart from uncovering hidden histories of violence and oppression, 
Mother to Mother also critically reflects on the possibilities for healing and reconciliation in the 
wake of the traumas of colonialism and apartheid” (62). Craps’ words, exploiting Magona’s novel, 
might indicate not only the direct dialectics between the two mothers but also the cry for help on 
the side of the victimized in order not to seek revenge. New beams of hope could be expected to 
shine at the horizon if this were achieved. This, then, is but a novel trauma outlook: 
 
It does so, however, not in a spirit of fatalism or despair, but in the stubborn belief 
that there is hope in crossing boundaries to witness the pain of others. In trying to 
find words of grief to bridge worlds of grief, Magona’s novel maintains faith in the 
idea that trauma provides the very link between cultures, and that working towards 
a fuller appreciation of the nature, extent, and ramifications of the pain of others 




Craps, this study implies, urges us to put the Caruthian rigidities behind us and instead seek out 
the ways by which the dialectics of pain and suffrage between or among cultures could not only 
be explored but also alleviated, hence new horizons towards forgiveness and redemption. This new 
outlook, however, resembles a “long road that remains to be travelled” (63). 
 
The Traumatic Uncanny: Repetition, Death, and Alienation 
 
Discourse of trauma is readily and outlandishly allied to the concept of “the uncanny”. No sooner 
does trauma haunt its narrative than “the uncanny” alienates its readers’ minds and souls. Both 
trauma and “the uncanny” haunt their narratives in an unprecedented fashion, hence the reason for 
the close alliance between the two. An intertextuality of an odd type, I must imply, presides over 
the bridge shaping the aesthetics of both concepts. This bridge infallibly keeps providing new 
insight to the nuances of both realms. Borrowing the terminology of Hegel, one could dare say 
trauma feeds the consciousness of “the uncanny” and vice versa, hence the crystallization of the 
dialectics between the two. It is no wonder when Royle, as a seminal “uncanny” theorist, shapes 
the very outset of his book: “[t]he present study is haunted, from before the beginning, by 
innumerable other texts” (3). 
It must sound fair to deem “the uncanny” a monstrous─ purposely monstrous for the sake 
of a due wording for “the uncannny”─ gate initially erected to allow literature to fly beyond its 
expectedly sweet mission and arrive at a fertile zone by which one might begin to have a faintly 
intelligible notion of what fear, in a spine-chilling sense, can be all about. To lay the concept bare 
to the naked eye, this is, to a certain degree, a reasonable occasion to have the words of Freud in 
his landmark essay “The Uncanny” (1919) at the behest of this study, the very person to whom 
this realm rightfully belongs: “The subject of the “uncanny” is a province of this kind. It is 
undoubtedly related to what is frightening─ to what arouses dread and horror; equally certainly, 
too, the word is not always used in a clearly definable sense, so it tends to coincide with what 
excites fear in general” (1964, 219). Distancing from the general layer of fear, the uncanny fear is 
dark and phantom-like. In his book The Female Thermometer: Eighteenth-Century Culture and 
the Invention of the Uncanny (1995), Terry Castle, fully indebted to Freud, contends, “[t]he 
Freudian uncanny is itself a sort of phantom, looming up out of darkness: an archaic fantasy or 
fear, long ago exiled to the unconscious, that nonetheless ‘returns to view’— intrudes on ordinary 
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life— but in a form so distorted and disguised by repression that we fail to recognize its 
psychological source” (7). Thus, “the uncanny” strikes dark fear into the hearts of its audience or 
readers without having a certain palpable source or a registered origin. 
Is “the uncanny” only a matter of horror and terror? Seeming to be too puny a question at 
first sight, it, yet deep inside, serves as the most quintessential instrument for discerning a clear 
direction to the present study. If the response to the question were affirmative, Bram Stoker’s 
Dracula would have been the token of “the uncanny”, whereas it is not. To Freud, for an artwork 
to merit the title of “the uncanny”, a myriad of elements have to prevail, including repetition, 
animism, silence, death, fear of being buried alive, odd coincidences, double, telepathy, alienation, 
dismemberment, double, and castration. These elements, in conjunction with some other elements 
this study cannot be thorough enough to adumbrate, pave the way towards a clear image of “the 
uncanny”. 
Repetition is an indispensible component of a traumatic narrative which has lent itself to 
acclaim and celebration not only in the eyes of Caruthian trauma thinkers but also within the 
frameworks of recent trauma theorists. Needless to say, repetition is also one of the pillars of the 
concept of “the uncanny”. This interface is an arena on which Anne Whitehead writes a great deal: 
 
One of the key literary strategies in trauma fiction is the device of repetition, which 
can act at the levels of language, imagery or plot. Repetition mimics the effects of 
trauma, for it suggests the insistent return of the event and the disruption of 
narrative chronology or progression. Many writers, including Barker, Morrison and 
Sebald, repeat key descriptions or episodes from one novel to another, and this 
technique both suggests an underlying trauma and implicitly critiques the notion of 
narrative as therapeutic or cathartic. Freud's work on the uncanny reveals that even 
apparently innocuous daily objects and incidents can be drawn into an atmosphere 
of trauma. (86) 
 
Thus, through a rupture in the narrative or recurrent descriptive modes, repetition renders the 
already traumatized text doubly traumatizing. In addition, the therapeutic effect is effaced, which 
adds even further to the traumatizing weight of the narrative. This repetition, Whitehead notes, 
renders even the simplest things uncanny in the light of the power of” “the uncanny”. The dual 
63 
 
nature of this repetition, Whitehead notes, oscillates between two the poles of a continuum, the 
former being “acting-out” or melancholia and the latter being “working-through” or mourning: 
 
Repetition is inherently ambivalent, suspended between trauma and catharsis. In its 
negative aspect, repetition replays the past as if it was fully present and remains 
caught within trauma's paralyzing influence. It corresponds to LaCapra's notion of 
‘acting-out’ and Freud's conception of melancholia, pathological responses to loss 
which seek to incorporate the other into the self as an act of preservation. Repetition 
can also work towards memory and catharsis, however. In this aspect it relates to 
LaCapra's concept of ‘working- through’ and Freud's notion of mourning. It 
represents the discharging of emotion cathected to loss and the subsequent 
reformulation of the past. LaCapra draws on the concept of ‘working-through’ to 
describe the role of literary texts in representing trauma, arguing that writing 
necessarily implies some distance from trauma and is an inherently curative 
process. (86-87) 
 
Thus, repetition either gives vent to the emotions (in the direction of catharsis, “working-through” 
or mourning), or it bottles them up (in the direction of melancholia and “acting-out”). However, 
the uncanny version of this repetition is bereft of individual will or control, as “[t]he uncanny is a 
source of dread because it acts as a mode of involuntary repetition and forces upon us the idea of 
something fateful and inescapable” (128). In addition, the uncanny duality, similar to the duality 
of traumatic repetition, vacillates between the “spatial paralysis” and “temporal amnesia”: 
“Arising from the transformation of something homely into something decidedly not so, the 
uncanny arouses in us the dual responses of spatial fear leading to paralysis of movement, and 
temporal fear leading to historical amnesia” (128). Thus, the uncanny instills in us the sense of 
stalling the movement and time, a type of repetitive paralysis which renders the traumatic 
repetition even creepier and more unmentionable. 
 Prior to embarking upon my argument apropos the uncanny death drive, I deem it necessary 
to shed some quick light on the concept of “catharsis” as it is integral to our explorations of trauma 
and “the uncanny”. In order not to lead my study astray, I will try to be as pithy as possible. 
Deriving its original nature from literary criticism and Aristotelian philosophy, catharsis seems to 
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have secured its status, if not stature, in almost every art and discipline. Yet, what genuinely 
unravels its aesthetics, I would like to argue, is the notion of violence, particularly on screen insofar 
as “its relevance for the topic of screen violence is undisputed” (Grønstad 32). 
 The advocates of catharsis aver that the sentiments of the viewer, while viewing the films, 
go through countless ups and downs. The gravity of some scenes, particularly indebted to their 
violent nature, finally urges the viewer to discharge his/her feeling of fear and pity. This very 
moment is when catharsis occurs: 
 
Those who subscribe to a theory of catharsis hold that the experience of watching 
fictional violence can be emotionally and morally beneficial, since it contributes to 
a purging of destructive impulses in the viewer. This is in some ways an 
instrumental theory of simulated violence, one in which the experience of spectacle 
provides an aesthetic means to a moral end. Fictional violence acts as a safety valve 
which mollifies whatever violent impulses the viewer may possess. (32) 
 
Central to the Aristotelian catharsis would be the components of pity and fear: “emotions of pity 
(eleos) and fear (phobos) … are so central to the substantiation of the catharsis effect”, as Grønstad 
further comments (33). Repentance or regret is thought to be another indication of a cathartic 
phase. In fact, repentance serves the process of the cathartic purging as a catalyzing agent. In short, 
fear, pity, and regret shape a chain of feelings which strip the viewer or the reader, viewing or 
reading a rather violent work, of his/her destructive senses, hence a purified and transcended state 
in his psyche. 
 Catharsis has succeeded in drawing to itself both detractors and proponents. To name but 
a few, names such as McKinney and Dukore stand out, as “[f]or Doug McKinney…catharsis is a 
means by which to approach the violence, and more recently Bernard Dukore has undertaken an 
Aristotelian reading of the function of the carnage in The Wild Bunch” (33). Allied to these names 
is yet another compelling voice such as Sobchack’s voice resonating, “[o]ur films are trying to 
make us feel secure about violence and death as much as it is possible; they are allowing us to 
purge our fear, to find safety in what appears to be knowledge of the unknown. To know violence 
is to be temporarily safe from the fear of it” (qtd. in Grønstad 33).  
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Oddly enough, catharsis has unwittingly brought upon itself a heavy body of opposition as 
well. Against catharsis stands a very assertive argument put forward by Prince. He has recurrently 
dismissed the notion of catharsis, and the pertinence thereof, as a fallacy; “[t]he amplification of 
viewer shock, horror, nausea … achieved through such tools of cinema as montage editing, loud 
music, or gory prosthetic effects, is unrelated to the emotions and reactions Aristotle described. … 
To use his notion of catharsis in connection with cinema violence, as Peckinpah did, is a 
misapplication of the term” (111). Prince incessantly refutes the non-cathartic nature of violence 
once it veers in the realm of explicit violence (110). This denotes the fact that graphic violence 
only invites aggression rather than fear and pity. Sturdier than the voice of Prince in undermining 
the legendary awe of catharsis is the voice of McCauley. He employs three grounds upon which 
the whole concept of catharsis seems to collapse, in the full sense of the term: 
 
First, McCauley believes that a theory of purgation will not work if there is nothing 
to be purged to begin with. Second, he challenges the assumption that exposure to 
cathartic drama functions to decrease rather than augment aggressiveness in the 
viewers. Third, McCauley wonders why dramatized violence would actually lead 
to purgation in the first place. (Grønstad 34) 
 
Whether the theory of catharsis is still binding or not, there are some certain facets of this 
theory which render it hard to discredit. Catharsis is unequivocally targeted at the existence of 
some certain emotions, irrespective of the way they are addressed, which yet proves the existence 
of their consequent pale, if not failed, purging. This view comes to light further as Grønstad 
mentions: “[h]ence, the theory of catharsis presupposes the existence of a specifiable set of active 
emotions─ particularly pity, fear, and anger─ in the audience. Furthermore, the theory assumes 
that these emotions need an outlet through simulation if they are not to become potentially 
disruptive” (35). Thus, violence, via a fashion of simulation, of rather cinematic nature here, 
touches upon such sentiments and allows the spectators to re-experience their feelings of fear and 
pity, hence a simulated cathartic discharge. 
 With this discharge comes another very efficacious aspect of catharsis which is the medical 
or the therapeutic dimension. Once the repressed feelings of the viewer come to the surface, a 
sense of redemption or emancipation is not far to be reached. The viewer, to be exact, feels 
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liberated: “Catharsis as purgation accentuates its therapeutic aspect; the sequential dynamic of the 
experience is one where the emotions of the viewer develop from tension to release (crisis), to a 
calm pleasure” (36). In line with catharsis, violence manages to also improve the narrative via 
complicating the plotline: “the violence may be found to enhance the structure of the narrative 
through its amplification of the crisis” (36). The therapeutic facet of catharsis and violence, not in 
matters of coincidence, aptly converge into the same therapeutic “talking cure” of which Hustvedt, 
Hartman, and Modell spoke and into which this study delved previously. The same way violence 
releases the therapeutic sense of catharsis which eventually remedies trauma, talking cures the 
trauma. Thus, one could dare infer, catharsis, too, is deemed a way of talking or “working 
through”; one that releases the repressed tensions previously built up by traumas. This must be 
why the cathartic notion and its therapeutic efficacy18 have constantly struck a close chord with 
the concept of “working through” and the modes thereof, such as testimony and survival in the 
direction of which this thesis previously veered.  
 The corpus narratives in this project─ specifically No Country for Old Men─ are 
profoundly embedded in the concept of violence which seems to be working in tandem with the 
force of catharsis. Characters are likely to discharge their traumatic burdens through violence 
which grants them the gift of catharsis. This angle will prove instrumental in interrogating the 
psyche of the characters and the narrative mode thereof in chapter two. 
Death, another muse for the aesthetics of “the uncanny”, is replete with tantalizing 
ambiguities. Bewildered by its essence, it suffices to know “[s]omething comes back because in 
 
18 The therapeutic efficacy of catharsis has been a heated controversy in the last decades. “The theory of catharsis 
implies that there is a therapeutic dimension to art”(36). Arnheim insists on the altruistic and pain-abating dimension 
of the art saying, “[b]y demonstrating what it can do for the distressed, art reminds us what it is meant to do for 
everybody” (qtd. in Grønstad 36). Against the notion of “art as therapy” stands a profound line of complaints whose 
quintessential essence derives from the fact that the viewers and characters possess a myriad of feelings among which 
pity and fear might not have a clear place: “The viewer’s experience of film fiction and art in general is considerably 
more complex than the theory of catharsis allows for. Audiences come to the movies equipped with a range of different 
emotions, among which pity and fear might not even be included” (37). In addition to the monolithic nature of the 
concept of catharsis, which is the result of violence here, it has been suggested that violence might not be able to 
cleanse the repressed emotions at all: “it has by no means been established that violent artworks actually cleanse the 
viewer’s negative emotions, and it is even possible, in theory, that at least for some viewers, these emotions may 
actually be reinforced by fictional violence” (37). Then, not only does violence not cleanse the psychic repression but 
it also augments the already concealed fictive violence inside the psyche of each and every individual. This, with an 
analytical stance, is but a total collapse of the cathartic “art-as-therapy” logic. Thus, this therapeutic dimension is far 
beyond the demands or the reach of catharsis: “The concept of “art-as-therapy” suggests a broader reach than the 





some sense it was never properly there in the first place” (Royle 95). It is both traumatic and 
uncanny. Death, I propose with no intention of overstating the argument, traumatizes “the 
uncanny” by means of adding to its already deeply bizarre and frightening state. Put differently, 
death or the death drive renders “the uncanny” doubly traumatic. As I delineated the inner 
workings of the uncanny notion of repetition in my previous arguments, one could readily infer 
that death strikes a very close chord with repetition, insofar as both converge to the same realm of 
“the uncanny”: “It is the notion of constant recurrence or compulsive repetition that leads Freud to 
his theory of death drive (95)”. The same is verified in the words of Whitehead asserting, “[t]he 
uncanny reminds us of our own internal and unconscious compulsion to repeat which is 
represented by the death drive” (128). 
The repetitive nature of death has yet set in motion another thought-provoking stream of 
logic in the aesthetics of “the uncanny”, namely its surreal nature. Shaping an analogy between 
death and surrealism, Royle contends, “[t]here is a shade of surreal about the death drive and a 
shade of the death drive about surrealism” (97). The impetus behind this analogy emanates from 
the omnipresent nature of death which entirely resembles the aesthetics of surrealism, as the author 
adds: “[w]e might try to elucidate the death drive’s capacity to be everywhere and nowhere in 
terms of what is called surrealism” (97). Lastly, Surrealism, Royle argues, is not active anymore, 
yet it has miraculously embroiled all the arts in its aesthetics. The same could be said about death 
inasmuch as it haunts us all without even being there. 
 Death drive presides over us all. Its ubiquity, Royle is not alone in asserting so, is out of 
the question. Barely can one escape it or want to escape it indeed. It is more of an urge to die. 
Adverting to T.S. Eliot’s Wasteland and its epigraph taken from the first century writer Petronius, 
he sheds light on how the character Sibyl cannot yearn for anything better than death: “Sibyl, What 
do u want?”, “I want to die” (qtd. in Royle, 98). Royle, on his quest for literary examples of the 
death drive, does not fail to turn to Yeats’ famous poem saying, “[w]hat disturbs our blood/is but 
its longing for the tomb” (qtd. in Royle 98). Lawrence’s most famous apocalyptic phrase “fight to 
the death” or “pleasure in self-annihilation”, “maddening suicidal drift of Woolf”, and many other 
literary instances whose mention falls beyond the extent and scope of this study, are the ways by 
which Royle is unraveling the workings of the death drive striving to prove the fact that death is 
what all of us yearn for.   
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Mentioning Lawrence as a compelling example of the death drive writer, Royle goes so far 
as to mention how his work is intertwined with the elements of the death drive: “Lawrence’s work 
is shot through with all the characterizations of the death drive that we have bullet-pointed here: 
the uncanny links with silence, woman, compulsive repetition, the demonic and diabolical, ghostly 
ubiquity and placelessness, solitude and singularity, writing and storytelling” (99). Thus, what 
adds to the gravity of the death drive in uncanny fiction is how it is affiliated with some other 
particular elements which bring about more macabre fear and suspense. 
Death and repetition are omnipotently felt in the narratives of our corpus. In other words, 
the narratives of our corpus are emblematic of death, its drive and its uncanny repetition. Not only 
do they haunt the narratives but they also shape a myriad of other thematic and semantic dialectics 
without which the stories would not have come to being. Perhaps the massacre at the outset of No 
Country for Old Men and the apocalyptic death of the whole humanity in The Road serve as 
striking instances of the uncanny death in our selection.  
Perhaps nothing dramatizes the uncanny feeling more than the alienation which “the 
uncanny” instills in one. If the defining element of “the uncanny” is the transformation of 
something familiar to unfamiliar and vice versa, one, without further ado, should think of 
alienation as the most pivotal constituent in this process. The awe of alienation humbles us once it 
“makes the familiar strange, it challenges our beliefs and assumptions about the world and about 
the nature of reality” (Bennet and Royle 37). On an artistic note, and through the lens of the famed 
playwright Brecht, “the alienating or defamiliarizing power of drama─ and art and literature more 
generally─ lies in the capacity to transform us and the world around us” (37).  
Derived from traumas of war and the complex brutalities thereof and “as a significant 
psychoanalytic and aesthetic response to the trauma of war” (Whitehead 133), the concept lent 
itself to the art of Surrealists, who, with their unrivalled innovation, utilized “the uncanny” “as an 
instrument of defamiliarization” (133). Thus, defamiliarization was the most pragmatic tool at 
Surrealists’ disposal to portray the aesthetics of “the uncanny”. Therefore, thinking of “the 
uncanny” as something that “has to do with making things uncertain: it has to do with the sense 
that things are not as they have come to appear through habit and familiarity, that they may 
challenge all rationality and logic” (Bennet and Royle 37) and bearing the afore-mentioned 
descriptions of the alienation in mind, it is not nor should it be imprudent to conceive that alienation 
serves as the most indispensable contributor to the formulation of “the uncanny”. 
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  Integral to trauma fiction as well as dystopian narratives, alienation has been subject to 
increasing attention in the recent years. As a mode, most dystopian works shock their readership 
through the very strange spatial settings as well as eccentric timelines they develop within their 
fictional worlds. This literary technique or device has been approached and appreciated under 
different titles such as defamiliarization by Russian formalists, alienation or distancing effect by 
Brecht, and eventually “cognitive estrangement” by Darko Suvin. All three terms serve the same 
purpose, as Booker depicts: 
 
The principal technique of dystopian fiction is defamiliarization: by focusing their 
critiques of society on spatially or temporally distant settings, dystopian fictions 
provide fresh perspectives on problematic social and political practices that might 
otherwise be taken for granted or considered natural and inevitable. This 
exploration of alternative perspectives obviously recalls the technique of 
defamiliarization that the Russian Formalists saw as the literary technique … it 
even more directly recalls the alienation effect of Bertolt Brecht…One recalls, for 
example, Dark Suvin's useful emphasis on ‘cognitive estrangement’ as the central 
strategy of science fiction. (19) 
 
Thus, dystopian fiction, by virtue of peculiar temporality and unprecedented spatiality, 
alienates the characters as well as the reading minds. In short, dystopian literature opens the 
readers’ eyes to such unprecedented and newly witnessed atmospheres as to give rise to an 
ineffable and peculiar sentiment called alienation, which questions the sense of reality and the state 
the person is in. This has served as an end not only in dystopian works, but also in contemporary 
trauma fiction. Thus, characters, who are exposed to a new temporality and spatiality, become 
alienated as well as alienating; the latter being the effect they impose on the audience and readers. 
Given the traumatic nature and the dystopian essence of the selected corpus of the present study─ 
traumatic applied to both novels and dystopian particularly attributed to The Road─ the uncanny 
alienation will provide a new insight in exploring the inner workings and unraveling the mysteries 





Epilogue: A Constructive Future Outlook 
 
How will trauma discourse fare in the midst of all the previously shaped theories? Will trauma 
fiction, once more, revolve around tangibly violent and uncannily haunting occurrences such as 
war, death and matters of the same nature? Prefacing the book Future of Trauma Theory: 
Contemporary Literary and Cultural Criticism, Michael Rothberg seems to have a propensity for 
approaching this question through distinctly different aesthetics. Commencing the preface with a 
trauma genealogy, he is rightly quick in inviting all the scholars in the field to lean towards new 
dynamics and novel theoretical engagement other than Holocaust and Euro-centric events: “But 
even those who remain focused on Europe and North America argue for the need to rethink the 
central categories of trauma studies. History, after all, moves on, even if we stay in place” (xii).  
Departing from the classic psychoanalytical paradigms of trauma studies and veering in 
the direction of more abstract, culturally diverse, and bio-political direction, Rothberg allows 
traumatic events such as global labor and climate change to pervade his arguments. Terming it 
“slow violence” and juxtaposing it against the classic extreme violence, he purports, “[t]he slow 
violence of climate change does not only require a shift in temporal perception away from the 
shattering event of classically conceived trauma; it also requires a recalibrated understanding of 
humanist history and subjectivity that displaces (without entirely eliminating) the positions of 
victim and perpetrator” (xvi). Rothberg, to lay emphasis on the novel future of trauma once more, 
urges us all to understand “how different forms of suffering and violence may inhabit the same 
social spaces and we need to understand what such overlap entails for the possibilities of resistance, 
healing, and social change” (xvii).  
Human errors know no end. Sides will be taken, wars will be fought and blood will be 
shed. Victims and perpetrators will emerge. If public hanging of an adulterer does not instill fear 
in humanity, Coronavirus will. Yet, how shall we fare in the face of all the traumatic events? One, 
this study hopefully suggests, needs to find novel ways of channelizing all such atrocities into 
constructive pathways of healing, betterment and social dynamism. Trauma notions will be 
reconsidered and re-constructed if we think outside the box, hence further responsible sentiments. 
In order to attain this, one has to opt for an ethical approach. Finding a safe haven, in which trauma 
and ethics exchange their dialectics, has always been a humanitarian dream. Nonetheless, this is 
precisely what Onega and Ganteau aim at in Contemporary Trauma Narratives: Liminality and 
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Ethics of Form. Leaning towards an ethical stance and following Levinas’s footsteps19, they 
address the concept of the “alterity based on the non-violent relation to the Other” (12) and urge 
one to be attentive and responsive: 
 
Through their attentiveness to the singularity of the traumatic event, they get the 
readers to open themselves to the violence of experience, to train their attentiveness 
and responsiveness, and to favour risk-taking over noninvolvement. In this respect, 
the liminal, vulnerable form of trauma narratives iconically performs an ethics of 
alterity that is also an ethics of vulnerability. (14) 
 
Urging us to lean towards the ethics of Levinas, Onega and Ganteau insist on practical modes of 
involvement, care, and responsibility on the side of the readers or the listeners. Thus, the future of 
the trauma fiction, this study aspires, might take the ethical trajectory striving to seek not only the 
novel socio-political and conscientious horizons but also the ideals Levinas once longed for. In No 
Country for Old Men, despite the densely traumatizing air of the narrative, one can still single out 
some deeply wounded yet moral characters as well as Levinasion encounters, which instill hope 
and passion in the minds of not only characters but also the audience. Thus, the ethical outlook of 
trauma, this study will also suggest in chapter two, plays a significant role in coming to terms with 









19 For a thorough understanding of Levinas and his ethics, refer to his Totality and Infinity (194-201). Yet, for a brief 
account of Levinasion ethics here, I prefer to refer to Wolfreys’s chapter titled “Ethical Criticism”. The concept of 
alterity, according to Wolfreys, is the site of responsibility. Alterity works completely in tandem with the moral duties 
and obligations humans tend to display for each other. “The notion of alterity itself … refers to our inherent 
responsibilities and obligations to the irreducible face of the other... This similarity of identity and human empathy 
establishes the foundation for our alterity… in short, the possibility of being ‘altered’, and for the responsibilities and 
obligations that we afford to other beings” (Wolfreys 115). Then, the Levinasian alterity, in short, is the very scope of 















Chapter two – No Country for Old Men: From the Good Old Days to the 















“What do you say to a man that by his own admission has no soul? Why 
would you say anything? I’ve thought about it a good deal. But he wasnt 
nothin compared to what was comin down the pike.” 
– McCarthy, No Country for Old Men 
 
The Haunting Spectral Trauma: Chigurh 
 
Barely can one feel untroubled upon sleeping into a nightmare like Anton Chigurh (Javier Bardem) 
in No Country for Old Men. Once one reads him in the words of McCarthy or views him through 
the visualized images of the Coen Brothers, the nightmarish haunting will never cease to exist. The 
character harbors some of the most seminal archetypes of malice, brutality, and darkness, in the 
full sense of the term. He, held by this study, is an unprecedented trauma per se; a character whose 
traumatizing behavior informs not only the traumatic weight of the narrative and the characters 
thereof, but also that of the readers’ and viewers’ response equally. The unsettling and unnerving 
impact Chigurh has on the characters and the audience alike, strips one of an iota of hope one could 
have towards an ethically elevating civilization in future. The gruesome hanging scene I portrayed 
at the outset of my previous chapter might be eclipsed in rigor and profundity, once one witnesses 
this traumatic phenomenon resonating through the narrative.  
This chapter sets out to explore the traumas, either in the guise of characters or traumatic 
events, of the narrative of No Country for Old Men. This exploration and its arguments will take 
their cue from the theoretical framework which was developed in the first chapter. It is only 
through the meticulous dialogue between the two, whose relational mode of analysis this chapter 
aspires to achieve, that a thorough investigation of the nature of trauma in the narrative will come 
to life. Furthermore, this chapter will lean towards the Coen brothers’ adaptation of this novel in 
order to observe their visual aesthetics and their selected portrayals of trauma in the film. 
In order to initiate my arguments efficiently, it is imperative that I refer to the peculiar 
mode of killing which Chigurh, the antagonist of the narrative, opts for. A gas running bolt pistol 
or a stunner is what Chigurh uses to murder his victims, punching a straight hole into the forehead 
of each and every victim he gets his hands on. Gilmore’s simile in describing Chigurh is not far-
fetched: “Anton Chigurh is like a walking abattoir. People are just cattle to him, which makes his 
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weapon of choice especially appropriate” (64). What adds to the gravity of this traumatizing 
behavior is how he allows a tossing coin and the ensuing side thereof to conduct the decision-
making process. Old or young, helping or unhelping, police or civilian, they all stop breathing at 
the hands of a psychopath who has made a habit of shedding blood. Codes, be they moral or legal, 
mean no more than his impoverished sense of mercy, humanity and logic. The duly employed 
words of McFarland in describing Chigurh, it seems to me, suit this occasion most aptly: 
Chigurh does seem to be some alien menace who operates outside categories of 
human understanding, certainly ethical categories. And although he bleeds and his 
bones can be broken, he exudes a certain physical invulnerability. He is almost 
robotic in his single-minded focus on completing his agenda. There is also 
something perversely alien in his choice of weaponry: a device for slaughtering 
cattle that resembles a portable oxygen tank. (171) 
Thus, the robotically brutal nature of Chigurh is utterly consonant with his uncanny choice of 
weaponry; a cattle gun which is as lifeless or alienating as, if not more than, Chigurh himself. One 
might look askance at the efficiency of this device in times when speed takes precedence over 
brutality. Yet, the crux of the matter is one should not think of efficiency as a priority here. The 
motive behind this choice lies somewhere between philosophy and insanity. Chigurh, with all his 
traumatizing insanity, makes the best of his efforts to sanely make a point, which is evidently 
exhibited in the words of Ellis (Barry Corbin):  
By killing people with a cattle gun, Chigurh is turning them into livestock, denying 
their humanity. Moreover, by shooting them in the forehead with it, Chigurh 
simultaneously deprives them of their living sight while imprinting in them a 
symbolic third eye—a visual representation of the enlightenment on matters of 
chance and destiny that he sometimes provides in a brief pre-murder Socratic 
dialogue. (137) 
 
That an insane character like Chigurh makes a point so bold as to be decoded only by the 
intelligentsia of a society is but a paradox in the full sense of the term; a paradox whose nature 
rests only on liminal perceptions, as Estes states “he is both above (by abilities) and below (by 
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depravity) everyone else in the text. Chigurh is both of, and not of, country. Chigurh’s liminal 
status is expressed through his weapon of choice, which mixes the categories of animal and 
human” (184). This paradoxical liminality in Chigurh’s character (human and non-human) and his 
uncanny device, I suggest, give rise to a particularly traumatizing and spectral air all throughout 
the narrative which haunt not only the characters but also the reading and viewing minds. Put 
differently, Chigurh and his cattle gun are like the ghost of trauma whose staples I dissected in 
chapter one. Together, they hunt as well as haunt their victims leaving their mark (the carved 
forehead) “without the victim’s discernment” (Wolfreys 133). Chigurh, in all his liminality, 
insanity and inhumanity, is the phenomenal ghostly trauma of the narrative, in that he haunts his 
victims by virtue of his spectral stealth the same way the ghost of trauma never ceases to chase its 
victims. He is like an apparition which sneaks up on his victims no less than the way a traumatic 
event quietly casts its dooming shadow on the psyche of the trauma victim.  
Bearing the greatest relevance for the current thread of arguments is the term “phantomatic 
or phantasmatic” employed by Wolfreys in an effort to accentuate the spectral nature of the trauma. 
Wolfreys refers to Althusser maintaining, “something occurs . . . but nothing happens . . . 
everything is immobile” (qtd. in Wolfreys 134). In No Country for Old Men, both film and novel, 
Chigurh, proves to be a specter par excellence to the best of his abilities. Resembling an unrelenting 
trauma, he haunts while being as silent as he can. Let us treasure McCarthy’s precious words in 
this respect: 
  
I dont know nothin. I wish I did. Or I think I wish it. 
Yeah. 
He’s pretty much a ghost. 
Is he pretty much or is he one? 
No, he’s out there. I wish he wasn’t. But he is. (152) 
 
This particularly eerie or macabre nature of trauma, termed phantasm by Wolfreys and best 
manifest in the haunting behavior of Chigurh, is duly noted in the words of Eric Hage who wrote 
a literary companion on McCarthy stating, “[h]owever, to all but Bell and those whom he has killed 
Chigurh remains a phantasm; even to Bell, who knows that he exists, he is a cipher”(123). This 
overwhelmingly spectral weight of traumatization, which comes at the hands of Chigurh and his 
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cattle gun, and the analogy I drew between Chigurh and the concept of trauma are best manifest 
and heaviest on the shoulders of Sherriff Bell (Tommy Lee Jones) who finds himself unable to 
cope with the phenomenal terror this combination instills in his heart.  
As Estes states, “In the end, Sheriff Bell retires because he cannot handle the rarified form 
of evil that is embodied in Anton Chigurh” (183). He deems himself no match for the new evil 
against whom he is meant to stand, thereby uttering: “when you encounter certain things in the 
world, the evidence for certain things, you realize that you have come upon somethin that you may 
very well not be equal to and I think that this is one of them things” (152). Equally significantly, 
Bell does not intend to tarnish the integrity of his soul, which cajoles him into saying “[a]nd I think 
a man would have to put his soul at hazard. And I won’t do that. I think now that maybe I never 
would” (McCarthy 5), hence his abject retirement. 
 As Chigurh’s inexorably spectral chase after Llewelyn Moss (Josh Brolin) takes the central 
stage of all the haunting aesthetics of trauma both in the novel and the film, the breath-taking 
encounter between the two and the traumatic shootings thereof should be the staple of all the 
haunting scenes McCarthy ever composed. Perhaps the following excerpt would serve my purpose 
the best: 
 
He stood at the door listening again. He dragged out the nylon bag from where he’d 
pushed it under the bed and set it in the chair in the corner. He went over and 
switched on the light at the bedside table and stood there trying to think…Then he 
went over and stood at the door, his thumb on the hammer of the shotgun. He 
dropped to his stomach and put his ear to the space under the door…Heart pumping 
against the dusty carpet. He waited. Two columns of dark intersected the bar of 
light beneath the door …The next thing he heard was the key in the lock. Very 
softly. Then the door opened. He could see out into the hallway… There was no 
one there. He waited. He tried not even to blink but he did…The man was no more 
than ten feet away. The whole room was pulsing slowly. There was an odd smell in 
the air. Like some foreign cologne. A medicinal edge to it. Everything humming. 
Moss held the shotgun at his waist with the hammer cocked. There was nothing that 
could happen that would have surprised him. He felt as if he weighed nothing. He 
felt as if he were floating. The man didnt even look at him. He seemed oddly 
untroubled. As if this were all part of his day…By the time he'd crossed the street 
Chigurh was already on the balcony of the hotel above him. Moss felt something 
tug at the bag on his shoulder. The pistolshot was just a muffled pop, flat and small 
in the dark quiet of the town. He turned in time to see the muzzleflash of the second 
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shot faint but visible under the pink glow of the fifteen foot high neon hotel sign. 
He didnt feel anything. The bullet snapped at his shirt and blood started running 
down his upper arm and he was already at a dead run. With the next shot he felt a 
stinging pain in his side. He fell down and got up again leaving Chigurh’s shotgun 
lying in the street. Damn, he said. What a shot. (57-59) 
 
The lexical aesthetics as well as the syntactical innovation (“Heart pumping against the dusty 
carpet, He tried not even to blink but he did, He felt as if he were floating, He didnt feel anything. 
The bullet snapped at his shirt and blood started running down his upper arm, With the next shot 
he felt a stinging pain in his side”) which McCarthy employs to portray this ghostly traumatic 
encounter instills in any reader the terror, awe and the spectrality of Chigurh. To add to the gravity 
of this haunting encounter, McCarthy never allows one to hear a word out of Chigurh, which 
renders the scene doubly uncanny and ghostly. In McCarthy’s words, “[t]he man didn’t answer. 
He could have been a mute for all that Moss knew” (59). What he lacks in verbal skills─ which 
adds to his uncanny ghostliness─  he makes up for with extraordinary chase and shooting skills, 
hence Moss’s confessional line20 after falling down upon Chigurh’s shot: “What a shot” (59).    
Another spectral strand within the haunting discourse of trauma in No Country for Old Men 
is readily detected in the never happening encounter between Sherriff Bell and Chigurh. 
Exhausting himself irreversibly, Bell constantly falls short of competence and agility in chasing 
Chigurh. Although they never meet, their telepathic ghostly encounters instill even more terror in 
 
20 This confessional line, I hypothesize, must arise from Moss’s fatal flaw in missing his shot at the outset of the novel 
while hunting an antelope. The same fatal flaw, or hamartia in literary terms, repeats itself in this haunting encounter, 
yet differently. While he could have killed Chigurh upon his entrance to the room, he preferred to do otherwise and 
let him live, only to have Chigurh shoot back at him some moments later and wound him severely. A decent 
interpretation of Moss’s fatal flaw in hunting the antelope, which could be what the whole narrative hinges upon 
implicitly, is what I intend to encompass at this juncture: “The protagonist of a classic Greek tragedy must be 
essentially a good person, a person whose intentions are good but who does not really or fully know himself or herself, 
and this lack of self-knowledge is mixed with a bit of hubris, which puts off one’s aim. This is quite literally suggested 
of Llewelyn at the beginning of the movie when he is hunting for antelope and ends up shooting one in the 
hindquarters. In a sense, the entire movie is prefigured in this scene. It is a scene that shows Llewelyn to be highly 
competent, an expert at hunting: the way he uses his boot for a barrel rest, the way he adjusts the sight for the distance 
of the shot, his patience in taking the shot, his picking up his shell after he takes the shot are all signs of his expertise. 
All are signs of his knowledge, his ability, his power, but the scene also shows his ultimate hubris, literally and 
figuratively. Instead of killing the antelope, he only wounds it, the worst possible outcome for a responsible hunter” 
(Gilmore 62). The hamartia, I should add to Gilmore’s words, repeats itself in the guise of mercy or any sentiment 
echoing the same, hence sparing Chigurh’s life. Had he followed the same robotic brutality Chigurh exercised all 




one’s heart than the actual encounter, as illustrated by Campbell: “[i]n what follows, Bell repeats 
the exact movements of Chigurh, sitting down on the sofa to drink milk, looking at his reflection 
in the TV screen. The two men never meet in the film but are cleverly associated in this uncanny 
moment as haunted and haunting presences of the West, as well as mirror images of each other” 
(335). Bell’s copying every single move Chigurh made without having met him does but add 
matchlessly to the gravity of the ghostly haunting which trauma discourse─ originating from 
Chigurh’s character in this narrative─ could offer. 
 
The Haunted Genre and the Brothers’ Intrigue 
 
The ghostly nature of Chigurh as the very root of traumatization in this narrative takes its toll not 
only on the characters and the audience, but also on the generic nuances of the novel and the film. 
Put differently, the genre and the aesthetics thereof are likewise haunted in No Country for Old 
Men, hence the resultant generic ambivalence. In the words of Campbell, “[t]he Western genre, 
therefore, like the ghostly figure of Chigurh, is present and absent throughout the film, hovering 
like a specter in the very material of the movie itself but always differently” (335). The genre is 
lost, unspecified and vague, in much the same way Chigurh is a man of “the present or the future, 
of unspecified race, language, and name” (337). In short, the genre is as spectrally traumatizing as 
Chigurh is. 
 Pivotal to luring the Coen brothers into visualizing this narrative should be this very generic 
ambivalence. Being enamored with deterritorializing or manipulating generic values and fixities, 
the Coen brothers “epitomize genre as a principle of contamination, a law of impurity, a parasitical 
economy . . . a sort of participation without belonging” (the Coen brothers qtd. in Adams 332). 
Genres as diverse as film noir, western, thriller, crime and action were attributed to the film. This 
genre ambiguity, which had ostensibly galvanized the brothers’ interest in the narrative, caused a 
certain body of oscillation in their own stance apropos the genre of the film. Consequently, 
“[p]ressed by interviewers to specify its genre, the brothers vacillated” (Adams 168). However, 
they eventually purported, “it’s the closest we’ll ever come to making an action film” (Coen 
brothers qtd in Adams 168). By the same token, Ryan P. Doom purports, “No Country for Old 
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Men remains a mash-up, combining neo-western, crime, road, horror, chase, and gangster movies” 
(150). 
Having the propensity for extenuating the cogent generic boundaries in their filmography, 
the Coen brothers found McCarthy’s No Country for Old Men as the most apposite material to 
entertain their ambition. The narrative, in more ways than one, subverts the typical structure of a 
Western film. To dissect this subversion, two courses are open to our advance. The first path, 
through which we can approach the generic breach in No Country for Old Men, is through 
exploring the moments of showdown: 
 
In the typical western a final showdown is the dramatic climax in the struggle of 
good versus evil, where the good ultimately prevails. No Country for Old Men 
thwarts the genre’s promise of a final showdown between Chigurh and Bell. In fact, 
they never meet face to face. The sheriff, always a step behind, fails to track down 
his man, whom he believes to be a ‘ghost’. Even the showdown between Moss and 
Chigurh in Eagle Pass ends in a draw, both of them wounded…(Adams 169). 
 
Showdown and the eccentricities thereof aside, one cannot help but notice the atypical attributes 
inherently felt in the character of Chigurh which subvert the expectations for a western villain. 
This peculiarity is addressed aptly in the words of Adams: “[t]he generic outlaw is driven by lust 
for money (a bank robber or bandit) and, lacking a moral code, will resort to violence and murder 
to get what he wants. Chigurh is not interested in money or material things. He uses violence as a 
tool for administering his twisted sense of justice” (169). Explicating some bizarre features 
inherent in Chigurh’s character, Hage pinpoints the same subversion saying “All of these qualities 
make Chigurh a psychopath, and, moreover, a zealot who acts out of unwavering adherence to 







That a psychotic killer abides by such odd principles21 not only subverts the generic 
expectations for a western villain but also deepens the traumatic graves in which the souls of the 
readers/viewers could be buried. The haunting figure of Chigurh coupled with the odd generic 
eccentricities of the narrative, which again have to do with Chigurh’s omnipotent traumatic role, 
should, to all intents and purposes, fuel the passion of the Coen Brothers in opting for the 
adaptation of this novel. One could venture to posit that Chigurh and his traumatizing peculiarities 
must have profoundly appealed to the Coen brothers, hence the deep kinship between McCarthy 
and the brothers in striving to render his character as spectral as possible.  
The generic subversion, the unpredictability of the narrative, and an aberrant Chigurh 
should be high on the critical agenda for the brothers, as Levine clarifies: “[b]ecause the brothers 
like to begin with a genre and then subvert it for their own purposes, they are hard to pinpoint or 
describe — and their next move is always impossible to predict” (59). Campbell’s account of the 
Coen brothers’ intrigue of the novel is even more thorough: 
 
Indeed the Coens were attracted to McCarthy’s book precisely because of its 
ambiguous affiliation to the Western genre, for as Joel Coen told Variety just before 
the film opened, ‘The novel works a certain way, where you think the story’s about 
one thing, and then [Cormac McCarthy] basically pulls the rug out and you’re 
forced to think, Well, then what is it about?’. Perhaps the best answer to this 
question is offered in another comment he made on the film: ‘No Country is 
perverse. And we always like something perverse.’ (333) 
 
 
21  Perhaps the most philosophical encounter of the novel and the film, which could denote the peculiar terrain in 
which Chigurh’ principles tread, is when Chigurh , once more like a specter, catches Carson Wells (Woody Harrelson) 
in his hotel room. Asking Wells “If the rule you followed led you to this of what use was the rule?” (McCarthy 90), 
Anton not only reveals that he is not merely a psychopath, but he also incorporates both Aristotle and Camus in one 
single question, as noted by Gilmore: “This is the great human question, the great philosophical question. It is the 
question that is central to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where he frames it in terms of the problem of how to live 
a life without regret. It is what lurks under Camus’s claim that the only real philosophical question is the question of 
suicide. That is, is there a rule that we can follow and, in following it, be brought to a place where we can affirm our 
whole life? Are some rules better than others, and if so, which rules, or, what ultimate rule, is the best?” (64). Shooting 
most his victim in the face or on the forehead, Anton, once more in the most haunting and traumatizing fashion, 
implies a violent form of wisdom’s third eye. However, in the particular case of Wells, which drives Chigurh to the 
most contemptuous terrain of his brutality, “[t]his horrific delivery of knowledge with death, however, is lost on 
Wells” (Ellis 107). All Wells gets is sudden random non-philosophical yet traumatizing shot insofar as Wells, I should 
argue, is not worthy of the wisdom shot. 
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Monologues, Testimony, and Incomprehensibility 
Release from or response to the unrelentingly traumatizing saga of events in No Country for Old 
Men with a spectral phenomenon called Chigurh, at its very core, seems to be ineluctable. 
Testimonial criticism, as delineated in chapter one of the present project, is tasked with the 
aforementioned release, namely through the act of bearing witness, which, per se, consists of 
listening and speaking. No character is more conscientiously overwhelmed by the phenomenal 
traumatization of Chigurh and his eccentric vileness than sheriff Bell in this narrative. Bell’s 
overwhelming desperation in the face of unspeakable traumas, I hold, can be expressed as well as 
released solely through the confessional monologues which appear at the very outset of each 
chapter in an italicized fashion. Put differently and briefly, Bell’s monologues release or cure the 
traumas in much the same way as Chigurh’s barbarity haunts and plagues the characters. 
Sheriff Bell’s voice is the abject voice of disillusionment not only with his own pursuit of 
bringing a phenomenal Chigurh to justice, but also with the bitter break of the country, its ideals 
and its dreams, hence the appellation No Country for Old Men22. This collapse or break is made 
manifest in the words of Estes purporting, “No Country for Old Men presents us with a world that 
is broken and much of the text is devoted to different characters’ thoughts on why this is the case” 
(179). The contemplation on the roots of this crumbling of the country or the world, mostly 
appearing in the voice of Sherrif Bell, not only informs the novel’s jeremiad tone but also sets in 
motion the apocalyptic mode of the novel, with which Booker concurs most emphatically. 
Exploring the films of the Coen brothers and in particular No Country for Old Men, Booker avers: 
 
22 The title of No Country for Old Men is indebted to the famed Irish Poet William Butler Yeats’ poem “Sailing to 
Byzantium” in his poetry collection “The Tower”, composed of four stanzas, first of which begins: 
That is no country for old men. The young 
In one another's arms, birds in the trees 
– Those dying generations – at their song, 
The salmon‐falls, the mackerel‐crowded seas, 
Fish, flesh, or fowl, commend all summer long 
Whatever is begotten, born, and dies. 
Caught in that sensual music all neglect 
Monuments of unageing intellect. 
A clear dusting of the poem reveals a deep jeremiad whose main constituent is not but lament or nostalgia for how the 
youth lose sight of the golden wisdom of the old. This way, the old, Bell in the guise of McCarthy’s voice resonating 
Yeats’s remorseful poem, feel redundant and have to sail away to Byzantium, a prosperous city replete with Yeats’ 
intellectual, social and artistic values. A haven in which the senescent do not feel depreciated, Byzantium hosts the 
precious artists and philosophers: “[i]t is Yeats’s vision, and certainly Nietzsche’s as well, that it is the 
artist/philosopher who is most needed to help restore the balance” (Gilmore 74). McCarthy, by the same token, 
imprints his agitated authorial voice in the character of Bell, lamenting how this country is no longer fit for the old 
like him and his likes, hence No Country for Old Men. 
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“[t]he film, like the novel, is set in 1980, which adds a certain irony to the fact that both versions 
of the story (though perhaps more the novel) are informed by an apocalyptic, end-of-the-world 
feel” (199). 
McCarthy’s beauteous west crumbles and the mythic country falls apart. Not boding well 
on the future of America, this vile change finds its matching embodiment in the portrayal of a 
psychopath called Chigurh, with whose brutality Bell is left speechless. Paradoxically and opposed 
to the term speechless, Bell has no choice but release the intolerable weight of this traumatization 
by virtue of uttering certain speeches or monologues, by means of which, he could alleviate not 
only the present traumas of Chigurh but also his past war memories, as Tatum reaffirms this by 
articulating, “[w]hat he bears witness to along the border in 1980 and his eventual decision to retire 
rather than pursue Chigurh resurrect memories of his World War II military service…” (91).  
The unparalleled power of speaking is precisely that which testimonial criticism aims at by 
allowing the victim to bear witness to the very agonizing nature of the trauma with which the 
victim is meant to cope. At the risk of sounding repetitive, I prefer to return to Marder who 
asserted, “[b]ecause bearing witness entails speaking in the first person in order to attest to a truth 
that can only be validated through the very act of speaking itself, testimony places the speaker in 
a unique and difficult position” (4). Hence, Bell, in No Country for Old Men, exercises this path, 
whose efficacy is what I shall return to later, in order to deal with his blighted condition. 
Testimonial monologues of Sheriff Bell are not only targeted at luring us towards the total 
defeat of Bell’s conscience and morality, but they also lead us towards his sense of guilt, shame 
and fears inherent in his unconscious, as illustrated in the words of Ellis: 
 
In this sense, Bell’s monologues serve as evidence that his conscious control of life 
has become overwhelmed by unconscious fears more than those myriad worries he 
cites in his earlier grumbling over the state of society. The narrative including his 
combat confession points to guilt over his behavior during combat. But that, too, 
proves to be another red herring (the circumstances of his position with the machine 
gun prove that his guilt over leaving that post is notably inflated). Bell’s real fears 
lie deeper, and thus his monologues employ the comparatively dreamlike quality of 




A salient feature inherently felt in most of Bell’s monologues centers on the incomprehensibility 
of the traumas imposed on him. The Caruthian incomprehensible or unspeakable nature of trauma, 
albeit dismissed by many trauma scholars, is integral to McCarthy’s23 monologues and the 
aesthetics thereof. Plainly put, the trauma victim would hardly be able to comprehend what has 
befallen him, nor would he/she be able to cope with its unspeakable weight. Apart from the 
phenomenal Chigurh, the narrative is rife with diverse traumas whose release, I argue, comes at 
the hands of confessional monologues of Sheriff Bell. A pithy litany of the aforementioned traumas 
could be found in the words of Lincoln: 
 
Page after page of quick-cuts from pursuers to pursued, a child murderer executed 
in the beginning, a troubled sheriff who’s never seen nine county homicides in a 
week, wives back on the dirt-poor ranch or trailer park, motel clerks snuffed with 
the cattle bore, patrolmen blown away, taxi drivers and border-crossers giving rides 
and coats to wounded runaways with bloody wads of cash, pubescent girls snuffed, 
doped Mexican kids killed joy-riding an old Buick through an intersection, Anglo 
teens aiding the devil for a few bucks in his get-away, and finally Bell’s ghostly 
dream of his father riding a horse past him with a fire-horn to carry civilization 
somewhere else, a nighthawk father-son vision portending another story. Not a 
pretty picture, not a romance, not for light-hearted readers. (147) 
 
 
All this, one should own up, is too much to take. Barely can anyone come to terms of 
comprehension with such traumas, hence the monologues and laments. To all this traumatic saga 
 
23 Sheriff Bell’s monologues are deeply privy to McCarthy’s intellectual and ideological concerns, hence my liberty 
to employ the phrase McCarthy monologues. Sherriff Bell’s jeremiad, in more ways than one and on many fronts, is 
not his but McCarthy’s, inasmuch as McCarthy’s lifetime authorial thematics as diverse as violence, nefarious nature 
of drugs, absurdity, individual and collective integrity, pessimism towards future civilization, ineptitude of the law, 
incompetence of the lawmen, morality, conservatism, fate, luck, existentialism, revenge, betrayal and retribution, are 
readily conveyed through these monologues. The themes are omnipresent in roughly all his canon including Orchard 
Keeper (1965), Child of God (1974), Suttree (1979), Blood Meridian (1985), All the Pretty Horses (1992), The 
Crossing (1994), Cities of the Plain (1998), and his later work The Road (2006). It is my preference to refer to Ellis’s 
words in this respect: “the novel’s apparent conservatism seemed so insistent that against all better judgment I began 
to suspect (as many reviewers have) that this indeed indicated the frightened political views of an author now twenty 
years older than Bell and yet speaking through him” (134). 
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comes the weight of war24, which weighs even further on the psyche of Bell as is Lincoln quick in 
mentioning how the whole family suffered serious war losses: “[u]ncle Ellis fought in the First 
World War, and his brother Harold died in that war. The dead brother’s son Ed Tom Bell fought 
in the Second World War, distinguished himself dubiously in battle, and came home to the Texas-
Mexican border as sheriff” (146).  
All this tangible traumatic diversity aside, there is yet a more philosophical or intellectual 
trauma at play which renders everything else comparatively minute and that is how the “[t]he bad 
man gets his way. The women in the way get killed. The man at the crossroads of good and evil 
reads the coin the wrong way and gets gunned away” (147). This wound of injustice coupled with 
Bell’s sorry ruminations on how things have been aggravated beyond repair compared to his 
generation, leaves him no choice but to relieve himself of this agonizing pain through monologues. 
The inability to make sense of things through plain comparisons, or incomprehensibility in 
Caruthian terms, comes to light when Lincoln asserts, “teachers in the 1930s worried about 
chewing gum, teasing, cutting class, and talking back, sheriff Bell says, and these days they list 
rape, arson, drugs, murder, and suicide on their educational checklist. Evil is relentless and 
unending…” (147). Thus, the present traumatic weight, it seems to a traumatized Bell, cannot be 
compared to that of his generation; it is beyond his ken, thus utterly incomprehensible.  
 Bearing witness to phenomenally hideous traumas of a fallen country, Bell exiles himself 
to a solitude whose only constituents, as illustrated in chapter one, are listening (more of looking 
or bearing witness here) and speaking, the latter of which reveals itself through the bitter 
monologues. This, however, seems not to be consoling him and the Caruthian incomprehensibility 
 
24 The traumatic theme of war, or anti-war in better terms, pervades McCarthy’s novel. Sheriff Bell and Moss were 
veterans of The Second World War and Vietnam War respectively, not to mention Carson and Chigurh whose previous 
history was marked likewise. Bell, apparently most traumatized by his war experience, is filled with remorse for his 
involvement in war:  
I wont talk about the war neither. I was supposed to be a war hero and I lost a whole squad of men. 
Got decorated for it. They died and I got a medal. I dont even need to know what you think about 
that. There aint a day I dont remember it. Some boys I know come back they went on to school up 
at Austin on the GI Bill, they had hard things to say about their people. Some of em did. Called em 
a bunch of rednecks and all such as that. Didn’t like their politics. (McCarthy 99) 
The war-censuring tone is felt even more stoutly in the words of Ellis as he blames “the government’s irresponsibility 
for its people, and America’s violent history” (Chen 266). Not being able to makes sense of the untimely death of his 
brother Harold, Ellis cannot but hold war accountable for all the atrocities befalling the nations and their youth. 
Framing his novel with the historical context of wars and the brutalities thereof, albeit marginally enforced throughout 
the novel, McCarthy harbors a pacifist position: “McCarthy not only explicitly reveals the catastrophic consequences 
the Vietnam War and other wars have brought to people involved via the Western crime story, but also implicitly 




still lingers on. Overrun by transition and modernity, Bell is inclined to espouse the power of 
monologues, which, in the words of O’Sullivan, “are on the one hand bitter-sweet commentaries 
on a country in decline and, on the other, reactionary, often patronizing, objections to anything 
new in the world” (219). Sullivan, too, does not fail to attribute Bell’s incomprehensible state or 
his lack of understanding to Chigurh’s monstrosity: 
 
For someone like Bell, old and close to retirement, the cognitive dissonance that 
Chigurh’s crimes have disseminated has led to pastoral-like reveries of better times 
when men were men and things had less of an inbuilt-obsolescence about them. 
This lack of understanding with what is happening in the social reality is sometimes 
starkly shown. (O’Sullivan 219) 
 
On closer inspection, Chigurh’s monstrosity is as detrimental to Bell’s incomprehensible 
desperation as the whole concept of transition, change and new traumatic phenomena. As a 
Christian traditionalist who believes in certain moral codes, Bell is deeply tormented in the face of 
such newly blatant traumatic events, to which he responds in the light of monologues, as John T. 
Arthur further comments: 
 
Sheriff Bell’s commentary (Bell’s monologues are central in establishing him as a 
traditionally moral character, and can be employed to further demonstrate 
Chigurh’s amorality by comparison) at the outset of each of McCarthy’s chapters 
serves as a series of touchstones for the novel, an overt acknowledgement of the 
changes wrought by the passage of time, presented by one to whom the changes are 
occurring. Although the removal of Bell’s addresses from the film is not complete, 
their absence diminishes somewhat the overt impact of McCarthy’s message about 
the difficult and painful nature of transition. (52) 
 
If one is to do justice to McCarthy’s intellectual ruminations and attempt to select one single most 
traumatizing monologue which captures the Caruthian rhetoric of incomprehensibility as well as 
Felman’s testimonial witnessing, no imagery can be as moving as the opening description of the 
novel and the film, where Sheriff Bell bears witness not only to the traumatic testimony of a 
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murderer who killed his girlfriend for no reason, but also doubly traumatizing gas chamber 
execution. His inability to understand (incomprehensibility) the gravity of this crime drives him 
nowhere but to the testimonial terrain of monologues; two threads of trauma discourse which 
evoke the Caruth and Felman respectively. The description begins: 
 
I sent one boy to the gas chamber at Huntsville. One and only one. My arrest and 
my testimony. I went up there and visited with him two or three times. Three times. 
The last time was the day of his execution. I didnt have to go but I did. I sure didnt 
want to. He'd killed a fourteen year old girl and I can tell you right now I never did 
have no great desire to visit with him let alone go to his execution but I done it. The 
papers said it was a crime of passion and he told me there wasnt no passion to it. 
He'd been datin this girl, young as she was. He was nineteen. And he told me that 
he had been plannin to kill somebody for about as long as he could remember. Said 
that if they turned him out he'd do it again. Said he knew he was goin to hell. Told 
it to me out of his own mouth. I dont know what to make of that. I surely dont. I 
thought I'd never seen a person like that and it got me to wonderin if maybe he was 
some new kind. I watched them strap him into the seat and shut the door. He might 
of looked a bit nervous about it but that was about all. I really believe that he knew 
he was goin to be in hell in fifteen minutes. I believe that. And I've thought about 
that a lot. He was not hard to talk to. Called me Sheriff. But I didnt know what to 
say to him. What do you say to a man that by his own admission has no soul? Why 
would you say anything? I've thought about it a good deal. But he wasnt nothin 
compared to what was comin down the pike. (5-6) 
Perhaps the lines “I dont know what to make of that. I surely dont. I thought I’d never seen a person 
like that and it got me to wonderin if maybe he was some new kind” and “Why would you say 
anything? I’ve thought about it a good deal. But he wasnt nothin compared to what was comin 
down the pike” capture the soul of this incomprehensibility. In Flory’s words referring to the same 
monologue, “Bell understands neither why nor how someone could knowingly choose to act so 
evilly. For him, such a decision is incomprehensible. From his traditionalist Christian perspective, 
to do so would be ‘to put your soul at hazard’” (119). Then, this confessional and testimonial 
monologue is all Bell has. Put differently, by dint of such confessional monologues, Bell wrenches 
himself and his traumatized psyche free of trauma’s chain or, at least, he thinks he does. This is 
precisely what testimonial criticism, as addressed in chapter one, attempts to achieve via the act of 
listening and speaking. 
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 A clear dusting of all the monologues reveals yet certain other traumatic tales which 
paralyze Sheriff Bell’s psyche, time and again, to the point of absolute incomprehensibility. Two 
of these traumatic tales are compelling. The first concerns a lady putting her baby in the trash 
compactor in the monologue of chapter two, to which the Bell’s monologue responds: “[h]ere the 
other day they was a woman put her baby in a trash compactor. Who would think of such a thing? 
My wife wont read the papers no more” (24). The second pertains to a couple who locked old 
people, tortured them, killed them, buried them in the yard and later cashed their social security 
checks. Monologue goes: 
 
Here last week they found this couple out in California they would rent out rooms 
to old people and then kill em and bury em in the yard and cash their social security 
checks. They’d torture em first, I dont know why. Maybe their television was broke. 
Now here’s what the papers had to say about that. I quote from the papers. Said: 
Neighbors were alerted when a man run from the premises wearin only a dogcollar. 
You cant make up such a thing as that. I dare you to even try. (65) 
 
Bell’s monologues, or McCarthy’s authorial voice, is starkly overwhelmed yet ostensibly 
sympathetic. The lack of understanding divulges itself lucidly through the phrases “You cant make 
up such a thing as that. I dare you to even try”. 
McCarthy monologues could also be approached through the concept of talking cure, 
which is another strand of trauma thinking whose theoretical framework I established in chapter 
one. As monologues, in essence, are a variation of talking or dialogue, their significance, in this 
realm, is felt even further. Narrating a traumatic event through time and space, Hustvedt theorizes, 
helps the victim develop a sense of agency and consciousness, thereby coming to terms with the 
unbearable state of the trauma (par. 1). Hartman, Modell and Mallot converge with the mentioned 
angle invigorating Hustvedt’s argument. Through their stance, the trauma victim rids 
himself/herself of the negativity through talking. However, the crux of the matter is whether or not 
talking (monologues within the context of No country for Old Men) helps the process of healing 
or the therapeutic path.  
That Sherriff Bell, or McCarthy, attempts to converse with his audience via the testimonial 
monologues to move beyond the absurdities or the nostalgic fix in which he has found himself 
tangled is unequivocal, yet to what extent his monologues bear fruits is what I would like to look 
into in the following lines. A rewarding achievement of the testimony, form the position of 
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Hustvedt and testimonial proponents, is the sense of agency, control and the ability to move beyond 
the futility or the meaningless web the trauma has spun around the victim, hence the ultimate 
emancipation and cure. Seemingly these monologues, albeit compelling in nature and thought-
provoking in their aesthetics, plunge the character even further down to the abyss of despair, 
nostalgia and defeat, hence another allusion to the conventional Caruthian trauma discourse vis-à-
vis paralyzing incomprehensibility of trauma: 
 
Narratively speaking, one point of Ed Tom’s confession is to reiterate his fear-
tinged incomprehension of the “new” kinds of crime and evil he faces. But just as 
crucially he reveals that he cannot even honestly profess the faith that he elsewhere 
claims (such as in the opening sequence or in his conversation with the El Paso 
Sheriff). In becoming disillusioned with his old values, Bell feels confused and 
defeated. He has lost faith in what had formerly given meaning and value to his life. 
(Flory 126) 
 
The sense of despair, loss of faith, nostalgic deadlocks, and futility, which result from the 
Caruthian discourse apropos incomprehensibility, is not what the rhetoric of talking cure expects 
to achieve. Not only do the monologues not redeem Bell of his traumatized state, but they also 
weigh further down on his psyche, causing him to move along the trajectory of defeatism, hence 
culminating in his eventual retirement. Ellis, Bell’s uncle, solemnly dismisses Bell’s defeatism: 
“[p]resented as a more thoughtful, authoritative peer who has forgiven the man who put him in a 
wheelchair and as a representative of the ‘old-timers’ Bell so reveres, Ellis dismisses Ed Tom’s 
divine self-condemnation” (127). Losing sight of such thoughtful opposition, Bell still retreats to 




The Coen Brothers’ Monologues: From the Textual Aesthetics to the Visual Aesthetics 
 
McCarthy’s monologues echo with outright resonance in the Coen brothers’ adaptation. As 
autonomous auteurs who had constantly written their own screenplays, they were exposed to their 
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first direct adaptation from a literary source (novel) via No Country for Old Men. Unlike the 
common critical thought anticipating their total subversion of the novelistic contents, which is in 
line with their passion and propensity for the subversion of the generic boundaries, the brothers 
kept true to the novel to the best of their abilities, that “satisfied most admirers of the literary source 
material” (Bergan 91).  Prior to my arguments concerning how the Coen brothers dealt with the 
monologue aesthetics, as this study attempts to unravel the visual stylistics with which these 
monologues were treated, I would like to put forth the driving force which lured the Coen brothers 
towards the adaptation of this specific novel. 
 The shared aesthetics between McCarthy’s textual world and the Coen brothers’ 
visualization know no end. Over a span of three decades, the Coen brothers have made seventeen 
feature films whose genres, stylistics and contents beat, one after the other, the classic cinematic 
stereotypes. Not only has their canon bespoken the very alarming worries of cinema today, but it 
has also happened to be in direct dialectics with the same approaches that have evinced the image 
of entertainment, “as all they really want to do is have fun” (Levine IX). The very close dialogue 
between entertainment and violence in their canon, I would like to hold, is as scintillating as their 
oblivion of cinematic or literary conventions in architecting their idiosyncratic characters and 
heroes who do not fall to the circle of archetypal super-intellectuals. Instead, “[t]hey’re bumbling 
fools always in over their heads, never able to comprehend or formulate plausible solutions. Coen 
characters emerge as anything but the quintessential hero. They are individuals who rarely 
represent a standard genre ideal” (Doom XIII). These Coenesque no heroes, and the films in which 
are meant to serve their purpose, have no morals whatsoever, at least that is what they think: 
“[n]one. None of them have messages. You see morals? Do we have morals?” (qtd. in Doom XIII). 
Last but not least, their villains, if they decide to architect one25, “live by their own sense of 
ethics…operate by their own rules…only their values and beliefs matter because they are 
destroyers without conscience” (XIV). 
 Such idiosyncratic characters and subverted genres typically require and operate in 
particular settings which, albeit real on the outside, “do not quite correspond to places and times 
in the real world” (Booker 5), or in other words, “their version of the United States resides in a 
 
25 Examining the traits of the hero and anti-hero in The Hudsucker Proxy (1994), The Big Lebowski (1998) and No 
Country for Old Men (2007), S. Roberts, through his article titled “Homeric Heroes in Ethan and Joel Coen’s The 
Hudsucker Proxy (1994), The Big Lebowski (1998) and No Country for Old Men (2007)”, interrogates how the Coen 
brothers subvert the defining elements of hero and anti-hero concepts. 
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different reality” (5), hence Booker’s term of “alternate reality” in addressing the Coen brothers’ 
canon. What renders the alienating effect of their alternate reality quite tangible is how the two 
brothers “avoid sex scenes in all their films minus the first one [Blood Simple]” (Doom XIII). 
Furthermore, their amoral characters, aberrant genre aesthetics, and fictitious settings find their 
thematic haven in portraying a mythic version of America; which is precisely why, with Booker 
steadfastly attributing the western to the brothers’ most favored genre, “[n]o other film genre is so 
centrally concerned with constructing (or later deconstructing) a mythic version of America as is 
the Western” (198). 
 Upon closer inspection, McCarthy’s canon proves to be a flawless haven in which the Coen 
brothers’ long-loved aesthetics in any conceivable front could come to fruition. In genre, 
McCarthy, too, has been long thought to favor the western in the majority of his novels, specifically 
Blood Meridian, which is believed to be an epic western. Yet, what likens McCarthy’s generic 
arsenal to the Coen brothers’ genre subverting affinities should be how McCarthy’s westerns tend 
to be anti-westerns, as Booker contends: “[h]is Westerns, however, might really be seen as anti-
Westerns that call attention to shortcomings in the genre, as when the shocking violence of his 
masterpiece, Blood Meridian (1985), reveals the violent tendencies that underlie both the genre 
and American history itself” (201).  
Thus, McCarthy invites the reader not lose sight of the defective nature of the western 
genre in much the same way as the Coen brothers subvert the same, if not all, genre(s). McCarthy’s 
foray into anti-western genre, I argue, is at its best within the context of No Country for Old Men, 
as all the stereotypical boundaries between the right and wrong, heroes (anti-heroes) and villain, 
and morality and immorality shatter. The supposed protagonist is killed in the most nebulous way, 
whereas the phenomenal villain walks away living a life by his absurd ethics. As such, McCarthy, 
with his code-breaking genre efforts in No Country for Old Men, entices, with the most forceful 
impetus, the brothers to undertake the adaptation of his novel. Added to the cited stimuli is another 
offering which the brothers seem to be obsessed with and ostensibly unable to turn down and that 
is how the novel is bereft of any erotic or sex scene. Needless to say, the explicit footprints of 
violence and entertainment or the reading thrill and the dialogue thereof cannot but be witnessed 
all throughout the novel, thereby cementing the brothers’ decision in taking the project. Last but 
not least, Chigurh’s idiosyncratic character, his absurd ethics and rules, and his amoral affinities 
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make a destroyer without conscience out of him, which utterly meets the requirement of the 
brothers. 
 The interplay between the Coen brothers’ visualization of the mythic west and McCarthy’s 
much-admired western tales is another cogent ground for the brothers to opt for the adaption of No 
Country for Old Men: “[t]his shared intention to construct and then deconstruct the boundaries of 
American cultural myths between the Coen brothers and McCarthy means that when the Coens 
situate their audiences in the world of McCarthy’s novel they lay the foundation for their own 
conversation about the implications of such myths on American identity” (Carey 22). This close 
dialogue is rendered further significant once the western “alternate reality” of the Coen brothers 
converges with the fictitious fallen west of McCarthy, namely his “alternate reality”, where the 
traumatizing villain deconstructs the whole concept of American dream and identity. 
 A retrospective of the Coen brothers’ filmography furnishes the context in which they 
would promptly approach the adaptation of No Country for Old Men. Their violent spectrum 
broadens its aesthetics from one film to the other: in Blood Simple (1984) the Coen brothers opt 
for plain murderous violence, in Raising Arizona (1987) they embark on a naturalistic or social 
style of violence, in Miller’s Crossing (1990) they reveal the professional gangster violence, in 
Barton Fink (1991) they imbue their violence with symbolism and imagination, in Fargo (1996) 
they aim at greedy and conspired violence,  in the Big Lebowski (1998) they unveil the misplaced 
violence as a result of mistaken identity, in The Man Who Wasn’t There (2001) they veer in the 
direction of existential and absurdist violence, in Intolerable Cruelty (2003) they exhibit the 
romantic defensive violence, and in Ladykillers (2004) they showcase the comic accidental and 
situational violence.  
Technically viewed, the brothers have an unequivocal mastery of their selected scenes and 
they literally sculpt their scenes, to provide us with “an amalgam of dark humor and violence, 
discretion in mise-en-scène but a highly stylized concept when the moment demands” (Massias 
100). The genres of the mentioned films, in the main, oscillate among crime, noir, neo-noir, 
comedy, thriller, drama and romance. The novel No Country for Old Men, however, completes 
their stylistic and generic affinities by offering them the opportunity to try their hands at a type of 
violent style and genre they had never tried before, in that, it, on a stylistic note, enabled them to 
not only savor the ultimately pure and unrelenting violence with no justifiable way to make sense 
of it, but also, on a generic note, delve into the genre of western, or otherwise anti-western as 
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explicated previously. This way, the novel, I argue, marks the shaping of a milestone in the 
brothers’ artistic trajectory, hence their passion for this particular adaptation. 
 The generic and stylistics of the Coen brothers aside, a glimpse into the idiosyncratic, 
mediocre and abnormal characters of their films would account for their proclivities towards 
visualizing Chigurh in No Country for Old Men: 
 
They are individuals who rarely represent a standard genre ideal: Tom Reagan, an 
Irish gangster void of emotion; Ed Crane, a non-existent barber with the personality 
of a cadaver; Marge Gunderson, a pregnant small town police chief; The Dude, a 
left over hippie who yearns for White Russians and bowling; Professor Dorr, an 
eccentric, Poe-obsessed criminal mastermind; Miles Massey, a love struck divorce 
attorney. (Doom XIII) 
 
All these abnormalities and idiosyncrasies eventually culminate in a character called Chigurh, who 
kills with an uncanny cattle gun, which makes him an epitome of emotionlessness among all the 
previous cold-blooded villain of Coen brothers’ movies. 
 Having elucidated the shared aesthetics between McCarthy and the Coen brothers, it is an 
opportune moment now to approach the visual essence of the monologues in the Coen brothers’ 
adaptation. There could have been a myriad ways by which the Coen brothers could have had their 
camera unfold the narrative of No Country for Old Men, yet the film opens with the disconsolate 
voice of Tommy Lee Jones as Sheriff Bell revealing McCarthy’s authorial voice. Should one 
divide the narrative onto two planes, the first will be thrill and entertainment of the cat and mouse 
game, from which the alleged shallowness of the film arises, and the second will encompass the 
intellectual jeremiad constituted by thirteen monologues altogether, from which the depth of the 
narrative is derived. The Coen brothers prefer to shape the outset of their film by the latter, namely 
the nostalgically intellectual ruminations of Sheriff Bell, which informs the depth of the narrative. 
The brothers, however, would not suffice to entail solely one monologue in the opening scene, but 
instead they innovatively fused three monologues of chapters I, III, and IV. This cannot but mean 
the brothers do not tend to miss out on monologue aesthetics, which shapes the salient features of 
the deep plane I previously spoke of. Below, I have dissected the opening voice-over of the film 




“I was sheriff of this county when I was twenty-five. Hard to believe. Grandfather 
was a lawman. Father too. Me and him was sheriff at the same time, him in Plano 
and me here. I think he was pretty proud of that. I know I was.” (McCarthy chapter 
IX) 
“Some of the old-time sheriffs never even wore a gun. A lot of folks find that hard 
to believe. Jim Scarborough never carried one. That’s the younger Jim. Gaston 
Boykins wouldn't wear one. Up in Comanche County.” (McCarthy chapter III) 
“I always liked to hear about the oldtimers. Never missed a chance to do so. Nigger 
Hoskins over in Bastrop County knowed everbody’s phone number off by heart.” 
(McCarthy chapter III) 
“You can’t help but compare yourself against the oldtimers. Can’t help but wonder 
how they would’ve operated these times.” (the Coen brothers) 
“There was this boy I sent to the gas chamber at Huntsville here a while back. My 
arrest and my testimony. He killed a fourteen-year-old girl. Papers said it was a 
crime of passion but he told me there wasn't any passion to it. Told me that he'd 
been planning to kill somebody for about as long as he could remember. Said that 
if they turned him out he'd do it again. Said he knew he was going to hell. Be there 
in about fifteen minutes. I don't know what to make of that. I surely don’t.” 
(McCarthy chapter I) 
“The crime you see now, it’s hard to even take its measure. It’s not that I’m afraid 
of it.” (the Coen brothers) 
“I always knew you had to be willing to die to even do this job -- not to be (sound 
in the novel) glorious. But I don’t want to push my chips forward and go out and 
meet something I don’t understand.” (McCarthy chapter I). 
“You can say it’s my job to fight it but I don’t know what it is anymore....More than 
that, I don’t want to know.”  (the Coen brothers) 
“A man would have to put his soul at hazard...” (McCarthy chapter I) 
“He would have to say, okay, I’ll be part of this world.” (the Coen brothers) 
 
 
It is irrevocably tactful of the Coen brothers to have selectively incorporated the most seminal 
McCarthy quotes into one thought-provoking voice-over in order to allow the mood of their film 
to be consonant with the very same concerns embedded in the literary source. In other words, the 
opening voice-over is an amalgamation of the majority of McCarthy’s traumatized/traumatizing 
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staples, which come alive through the utterances of Sheriff Bell. On closer inspection, however, 
once can detect a truly vast discrepancy only in the last excerpt when the Coen brothers say “He 
would have to say, okay, I’ll be part of this world.”, whereas McCarthy writes “And I think a man 
would have to put his soul at hazard. And I wont do that. I think now that maybe I never would” 
(5). This irreconcilable contrast between the two sources should be the very impetus behind Flory’s 
words in inviting the critics as well as the viewers to stave off the passive defeatism, which has 
plagued the soul of Sheriff in facing the new evil, and instead rise to the occasion (134). The Coen 
brothers, I should suggest, could have kept loyal to all the excerpt save for this, which means they, 
albeit in the awe of McCarthy’s jeremiad, tend to dismiss the tone of surrender with which the 
whole narrative is imbued. 
 The Caruthian incomprehensibility of trauma portrayed by monologues, in like manner, 
informs a great proportion of the Coen brothers’ visual aesthetics. The Coen brothers furnish the 
context for this nostalgic incomprehensibility through a certain auditory and visual arsenal. In 
doing so, the brothers employ a deeply wounded voice like Tommy Lee Jones’s voice “with a 
palpable sense of sadness, fear, resignation, and loss” (Flory 122). This auditory thread, together 
with the tepid howling of the wind, is juxtaposed with certain shots which imply not only the 
crestfallen Bell but also the fallen west. Sheriff’s disappointed voice sits akin to the utterly black 
screen on which “NO COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN” is written. The voice subtly runs in tandem 
with the howling later.  
No sooner the blackness fades away than the dark mountain shot emerges. Deeply shaded 
and motionless landscapes coupled with the dawn and the nascent sunrise follow suit. All these 
gloomy western shots are amalgamated with the traumatized and disillusioned voice-over of 
Tommy Lee Jones. The chosen shots evince a profoundly interwoven association between the 
barren non-human habitats and dark landscapes, which could imply the fallen humanity and the 
imminent evil which has already plagued the crumbled America respectively (See appendix: 
Figures 1-5). All this coded and edited imagery reinforces the inconsolable tone of Tommy Lee 
Jones in the opening scene, hence a vivid portrayal of the incomprehensible trauma: “[t]he first few 
images and sounds of the film, then, carefully augment Bell’s soliloquy on evil and its subsequent 
pairing with an example of what he is talking about by encouraging viewers to let themselves 
experience the troubled, contemplative mood exemplified by this aging Sheriff” (122). 
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 The Coen brothers’ visual architecture and the vocal mastery of Jones together give rise to 
what is called a mood of “introspection”, which is triggered efficiently by the opening scene of the 
film, as Flory further comments: 
 
Bell’s thoughtful, nostalgic monologue instantiates an ‘emotional episode’ that 
urges viewers to experience and thereby take up his overarching mood, which the 
filmmakers augment by pairing his words with carefully selected images and 
sounds that seek to enhance their affective enticement. The emotional experience 
encouraged by the opening scenes, then, aims to bring viewers into an introspective 
mood state by self-consciously exemplifying how they should approach the 
problem depicted in the narrative: reflectively, thoughtfully, as well as with a sense 
of anxious loss regarding simpler times. (123) 
 
Objectively viewed, Sheriff Bell’s mood, from which all the introspective contemplations arise, is 
the very nexus of the mood of the film. Thus, the more the Coen brothers master this mood and 
the nuances thereof in the opening scene, the better the whole mood of the film could be conveyed. 
The traumatized psyche of Bell and his lack of perceiving the new evil, in Caruthian terms, has 
been masterfully captured in the light of the Coen brothers’ thought-provokingly gloomy images 
and Tommy Lee Jones’s defeated voice.  
 
From McCarthy’s Dream Monologue to the Brothers’ Actual Dialogue  
 
Another paramount monologue which plays a quintessential role in our exegesis of not only the 
essence of trauma in the film but also the mood as well as the thematic messages conveyed to the 
audience should be the ending scene monologue, which is taken, word by word save for a word or 
two, from the novel. The monologue goes: 
 
I had two dreams about him after he died. I dont remember the first one all that 
well but it was about meetin him in town somewheres and he give me some money 
and I think I lost it. But the second one it was like we was both back in older times 
and I was on horseback goin through the mountains of a night. Goin through this 
pass in the mountains. It was cold and there was snow on the ground and he rode 
past me and kept on goin. Never said nothin. He just rode on past and he had this 
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blanket wrapped around him and he had his head down and when he rode past I 
seen he was carryin fire in a horn the way people used to do and I could see the 
horn from the light inside of it. About the color of the moon. And in the dream I 
knew that he was goin on ahead and that he was fixin to make a fire somewhere out 
there in all that dark and all that cold and I knew that whenever I got there he 
would be there. And then I woke up. (McCarthy 159) 
 
Before approaching the Coen brothers’ visual semiotics of this scene, it is crucial to shed some 
quick light on the hermeneutics of this monologue excerpt selected by the Coen brothers for their 
film. Many critical readings apropos this dream sequence unanimously aim at a nihilist dark stance 
taken by Sherriff Bell. That the father moves ahead not even noticing his son, this study suggests, 
cannot bode well and might even be suggestive of a more oblivious future. In the words of 
McFarland, “…there will be no fire in the darkness, that his father will not be waiting. It is too 
easy to say that west Texas in 1980 is no place for an old man. Bell’s recognition is deeper and 
more disturbing than that” (167). The same sentiment permeates Estes’s vision when he holds 
“[y]et the dream is decidedly melancholic when considered in light of the novel’s title” (188). All 
this melancholic voice, is, I maintain, an affirmation of the Caruthian jargon of 
incomprehensibility, Freudian repetition compulsion or acting-out, and Lacapra’s melancholy. 
 A similar proposition informs Adams’s critical interpretation of this symbolic dream. 
Noting the fact that the fire is not handed down to the son, Adams argues for Bell’s disbelief in a 
redemptive afterlife: “[w]e are left with the sense that Bell is losing his belief in an afterlife where 
he would be reunited with his father, joining him in the light and safety of his fire…” (178). 
Underscoring the significance of the sentence “And then I woke up”, the critic, in effect, argues 
for “an awakening to and acceptance of man’s absurdity in a universe indifferent to his existence” 
(178). This dark end keeps the viewer in the dark, hence a sense of bafflement which arises from 
the open-ended nature of the scene, which sits akin to all the closure-free movies of the Coen 
brothers, hence all the more reason to lure the brothers into visualizing the novel, and particularly 
this monologue excerpt. 
The exegetic account I put forth concerning Bell’s dream could be approached though the 
critical trauma thinking of Lacapra, Zizek and Onega/Ganteau, who, unanimously underline the 
significance of symbols and images for the trauma victims who have trouble coming to terms with 
the essence of the traumatic event. In the words of Zizek, the victim has to destabilize the 
devastating impact of the traumatic event through creating a symbolic web of images around 
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him/her (47). Within the context of No Country for Old Men, and particularly in interrogating the 
traumatized psyche of Sheriff Bell who constantly acts out in the face of the new evil, the figure 
of father, I argue, is the most prominent symbol Bell can resort to.  
The figure of father has been more than a simple controversy, ranging from a conniving 
thief in the Orchard Keeper to infant-abandoning father in Outer Dark to the contemptuous father 
in Suttree to the sympathetic father in All the Pretty Horses. Yet, later, in The Road, the figure 
soars to the zenith of protection, compassion and sacrifice. The father figure is beyond nebulous 
in No Country for Old Men, as Bell, the voice of McCarthy says: “[t]he other thing is that I have 
not said much about my father and I know I have not done him justice” (15). Thus, wallowing in 
his remorseful inability to understand the new evil and the world in which he lives, Bell is awed 
by his father as a larger than life person, to whom he will always be a child. This symbolic web, 
together with the Promethean fire carried in the hands of the father, gives rise to a figure more than 
solely an individual father but an archetypal one. This archetypal analysis calls for the name of 
Jung as he was the first person to be credited with archetypal criticism in literature:  
 
In Jungian terms, the image precedes all of Bell’s ideas, and the grotesquely heavy 
mythological weight of the father in his dream explains Bell’s inability to work out 
any coherent thoughts to explain an overwhelming feeling that, in comparison to 
his father, he must forever remain a child. Jung insists that before the idea comes 
the image… Because Bell cannot see an image of himself realizing his father 
potential, that potential is only available projected outside him, in the form of the 
archetypal father figure we recognize in his final dream. (Ellis 160). 
 
Thus, Bell’s father, to remind Jung’s theory of “the collective unconscious”, is not the individual 
father but an archetypal father who “represents all fathers” (163). Thus, in order to cope with the 
new face of trauma, Sheriff Bell can take shelter in Zizek’s symbolic, or Jungian archetypal father. 
Archetype or symbolic, the concept of father is the vague hope to which Bell has recourse, to cope 
with the tormenting traumas whose plague he cannot free himself of. 
 Perhaps the stark difference between the textual and visual account here is that, this 
monologue, in essence, transforms into a dialogue in the film, whose other side is Loretta Bell 
(Tess Harper). This shift, per se, is more than vital. Skillfully turning a monologue to a dialogue, 
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the Coen brothers, I purport, are, wittingly or unwittingly, practicing the “talking cure” whose 
theoretical implications have already been explicated. All throughout the novel, Sheriff Bell seems 
to be frustrated with having no caring listener for his lamenting monologues. The Coen brothers, 
against the passive solo nature of the monologues of the novel, engage Loretta in this thematically 
crucial conversation, which is occasionally interrupted by exchanging the meaningful eye contact 
or the gaze between the two. That the most passionate and compassionate, if not the only, character 
of the narrative, is profoundly engaged in a dialogue with a traumatized psyche is reason enough 
for Bell, or the audience, to, as least, grow a beacon of hope for a future heralding a fortunate 
change. The monologue to dialogue transformation, which is the creative product of the brothers’ 
adaptation, closely ties it to the therapeutic “talking cure”, whose analytical ground has been 
discussed before. 
The nature of this double-sided dialogue as opposed to the dour soliloquys of the novel is 
rendered further significant once we compare the caring listening side (Loretta) of this 
conversation to the emotionless character of Chigurh or a lost cause like Moss, not to mention all 
the other money-grubbing corrupt murderous gangsters. This is precisely the realm within which 
the testimonial acts of listening and speaking operate. What adds further to the visual aesthetic of 
this sequence, is how the brothers hold shots on both characters’ faces juxtaposing their 
expressions with each other, while the full and intermittent silence of Loretta and Bell, 
respectively, build up the tension of the unfolding dialogue. The defeated expression on the face 
of Bell, I should note, seems to be helped in a great deal by ethically concerned smile taking its 
shape on the face of Loretta; the smile which invites Bell as well as the audience to move beyond 
the nostalgia and face up to the evil (see appendix: Figures 6-7). This active engagement, Coen 
brothers should strive to convey, holds its closest analogy to their sole manipulation of the opening 
scene monologue, where the Coen brothers’ sentence “He would have to say, okay, I’ll be part of 
this world.” conquers the place of McCarthy’s “And I think a man would have to put his soul at 
hazard. And I wont do that. I think now that maybe I never would” (5). Thus, the textual passive 
defeat, I conclude, is replaced with the visual active engagement, which, by and large, came to 
fruition at the hands of talking cure or the testimonial acts of listening and speaking. 
Apart from the Caruthian dialectics of incomprehensibility, Felman’s responsive testimony 
and solitude, and Hustvedt’s taking cure, which lie behind the existential essence of McCarthy 
monologues, one might duly ask why are all these testimonial commentaries italicized? An in-
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depth examination of McCarthy monologues in No Country for Old Men reveals that these 
commentaries have nothing to do with the plot and the narration thereof. Put differently, the 
monologues, albeit bitter in essence, instill a sort of insight and prophetic tone in the narrative, 
adding nothing remarkable to the plot in terms of the twists and thrill. Hinging on the concept of 
incomprehensibility of the modern traumatic world and the testimonial ruminations thereof, these 
monologues occur on an utterly differently plane.  
If one decides to divide the narrative onto two planes, the first will be the shallow 
suspenseful cat and mouse game, whereas the second will encompass the intellectual 
contemplations constituted by thirteen monologues altogether, from which the depth of the 
narrative emanates. As cited in chapter one, with a vehement propensity for creating its own 
narrative thread, trauma shapes its own storytelling which isolates itself from the narrative. 
Informed by “memories of war, rape, near-fatal accidents”, Hustvedt argues for a separate thread 
of traumatic narration stating, “Trauma isn’t part of the story; it is outside story. It is what we 
refuse to make part of our story” (51-52). McCarthy, then, seems to unwittingly depict this 
dichotomy between the main narrative and the traumatic thread by means of italicization. And 
ostensibly, it works to the best of its magnitude, alienating the reader right at the outset of each 
chapter. 
The isolation-centered nature of traumatic thread also evokes Baer’s critical lens when he 
coins the “twofold structural disjunction” in addressing this phenomenon. Ronnel’s critical 
modality, too, incites the same dynamics for how memory functions within or without its capacity 
to incorporate the traumatic experience into its mental archives. Within the context of No Country 
for Old Men, the testimonial confessions of Sherriff Bell or otherwise monologues seem to occupy 
a place far beyond the cat-mouse chase thrill offered by the primary plotline, hence meaningfully 
italicized. The italicized deep monologues, on one plane, pit their powerful traumatizing aesthetics 
against the entertaining superficial suspense, on the other. These two planes contribute to a 
versatile joy of reading, and simultaneously warning the reader to keep track of the serious 
messages once their reading steps into the italic section, hence no obfuscation whatsoever. 
From Chigurh’s Loss/Absence to Bell’s Acting-Out 
Of profound and germane significance here is the concept of absence/loss set forth by LaCapra. 
Having delineated most of the foundational staples of LaCapra’s trauma discourse in my previous 
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chapter, I am intending to solely move towards the partial specifics from which my current 
discussions could benefit. In LaCapra’s parlance, absence/loss dichotomy should be treated with 
utmost care inasmuch as their holistic and specific temporalities, respectively, are not meant to be 
tampered with. Once the conflation of the two occurs, certain complexities with insurmountable 
barriers will arise.  
However, the movement of loss towards absence, LaCapra contends, is far more 
melancholic and irreversible compared to that of absence to loss. If one is to do justice to the 
context of No Country for Old Men in the larger scheme of absence/loss, Chigurh’s traumatic 
presence, I would hypothesize, is the closest we can get to the entity of loss, for losses are specific 
and particular and pertain more to certain types of traumatic behavior than some vague non-
existent entities. Nevertheless, Chigurh harbors some absence-oriented features such as his 
phenomenally novel nature and an unprecedented traumatic behavior, more in lines with 
“something one has never had in the first place” (LaCapra 701). Nonetheless, his mere existence, 
albeit phenomenally vile and robotically murderous, is indicative of its specific entity, hence more 
of a loss than an absence. 
 Resting assured Chigurh’s existence is the traumatic loss of the narrative, one, I suggest, 
should next approach the trajectory along which Chigurh’s traumatic behavior conflates absence 
and loss. Two courses of interpretation are open to our advance here. The first course pertains to 
how Chigurh’s traumatic behavior is inclined to have the characters, particularly Sheriff Bell, and 
the audience transform the loss into an elusive entity like absence. From LaCapra’s vantage point, 
if loss (Chigurh) mutates into absence (decaying America), an irreversibly unpleasant saga of 
melancholy, impossible mourning and nostalgia will prevail.  
This is, I would argue, precisely what we deal with in the context of No Country for Old 
Men. Since the phenomenally destructive image of Chigurh is so compelling, ghostly, and 
omnipotent, one seems to find no way of making sense of this character and consequently 
transform it into a newly born set of schemas regarding the nature of trauma, hence an utterly 
misplaced trauma culture, which cannot be coped with except through lament and misplaced 
nostalgia. Put differently, the individual and specific loss derived from Chigurh’s trauma, owing 
to its extremely uncanny yet compelling nature, is likely to transform into a wider and more 
ubiquitous culture of absence, which could be analogously likened to the decaying America. This 
transformation, as LaCapra posits, brings nothing but melancholy, lament and nostalgia, which is 
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evidently witnessed in the psyche of most of the characters, particularly Sheriff Bell. Let us borrow 
LaCapra’s precise words to describe this inconsolable state of the psyche prevailing in the 
characters of the narrative: “one faces the impasse of endless melancholy, impossible mourning, 
and interminable aporia” (LaCapra, Writing History 28). 
 Apart from being instanced as the most emblematic trauma of inhumanity in the light of 
my explications of Chigurh, Chigurh’s character becomes more prone to the loss-to-absence 
transformation through being devoid of any connection to other humans. This, I would propose, 
alienates and deepens the loss further gravitating it towards LaCapra’s jeopardizing concept of 
absence. In the words of Steakley, “[t]he absence of connection with other human beings puts 
Chigurh in sharp contrast to Sheriff Bell, whose italicized commentary is rooted in his connections 
to family and community” (160). Not only does this alienating quality serve as a catalyst in the 
loss-to-absence transformation, but it further deepens the distance between Sheriff and Chigurh. 
This gap cannot be bridged except through nostalgic laments in the guise of monologues. Thus, 
monologues are McCarthy’s way of dealing with LaCapra’s rhetoric of loss/absence, or 
particularly the irreversible process of transformation of loss to absence. Absence of connections, 
passion and compassion is vividly detected upon another purely dispassionate murder Chigurh 
commits in the Eagle Pass shoot-out. McCarthy’s crafted and innovative depiction of this ruthless 
murder, I should not hesitate to suggest, makes this murder scene the most inhumanely 
traumatizing instance of all26: 
 
The man he’d shot in the back was lying there watching him. Chigurh looked up 
the street toward the hotel and the courthouse. The tall palm trees. He looked at 
the man. The man was lying in a spreading pool of blood. Help me, he said. 
Chigurh took the pistol from his waist. He looked into the man's eyes. The man 
looked away. Look at me, Chigurh said. The man looked and looked away again. 
Do you speak English? 
Yes. 
Dont look away. I want you to look at me. 
He looked at Chigurh. He looked at the new day paling all about. Chigurh shot 
him through the forehead and then stood watching. Watching the capillaries break 
up in his eyes. The light receding. Watching his own image degrade in that 
squandered world. He shoved the pistol in his belt and looked back up the street 
once more. Then he picked up the bag and slung the Uzi over his shoulder and 
 
26 One of the elliptical instances in the Coen brothers’ adaptation of the novel, and an unjustifiable void to many, is 
the scene where Chigurh, in cold blood, shoots the Mexican gangster in the Eagle Pass shoot-out after wounding Moss. 
He stands over him while watching his eyes’ capillaries break up. Albeit pivotal to McCarthy’s intense portrayal of 
Chigurh’s psychic state, the scene is missed out in Coen brothers’ film. 
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crossed the street and went limping on toward the hotel parking lot where he'd left 
his vehicle. (64) 
 
Watching the capillaries of a dying man break up while also noticing his own image degrading in 
a squandered world leaves nothing short of a transformation, which culminates in a total absence. 
Subtly enough, McCarthy’s language nuances, wittingly or unwittingly, exhibit the same fact, 
when Chigurh’s image (as a certain loss) degrades in a “squandered world” (absence or in better 
terms the fallen or decaying America or West). This transformation becomes even further 
substantiated once we take heed of Chigurh’s state of isolation as in how he is never attached to 
any person, be they family or acquaintance, whosoever. It is as though he has landed on Earth from 
an alien world, hence once more the quote “something one has never had in the first place.” Let us 
refer to the words of Steakley once again: “[h]e is a killer, but he is also pure, having never had 
any motive other than spreading death. He is methodical and precise, and his interest in watching 
people die seems dispassionate, almost clinical…he seems to have no history and no family and 
no connection to people other than the business that allows him to fulfill his purpose” (161). 
  
Apart from the absence of human connections and compassion, which renders Chigurh 
further prone to the loss-to-absence transformation, Chigurh’s soulless character is yet another 
realm in which this process could be invigorated. Indeed, the very reason why Chigurh is looking 
the dying man in the eye in the above-portrayed scene, O’Donnell27 asserts, is that he intends to 
witness the dying man’s soul; something he is deprived of (21).This account puts Chigurh akin to 
the very person Bell sends to the gas chamber at the very outset of the novel insofar as they both 
lack soul: “according to Bell, a fundamental absence--the absence of a soul--marks the boy he sent 
to death row, who murdered his girlfriend for no reason, and also marks Chigurh, who murders at 
a coin toss” (Cooper qtd. in O’Donnell 21). Thus, through a myriad of absent characteristics, 
namely absent human connections, emotions, compassion, soul, and sexuality28, the loss is prone 
 
27 Employing George Bataille’s notion of General Economy, O’Donnel explores the roots of the phenomenal violence 
in No country for Old Men, namely Chigurh’s violence, in the “displacement of desire away from sexual experience 
and towards a violence centered on firearms” (17). Being void of sexual adventures, the novel is a clear example of 
how, from Batailles’ lens, sexual repression culminates in irreversible violence as the only alternative left for 
sublimation. 
28 Chigurh’s character is the most sexually null and the most violently occupied character in the novel. This 
disproportionate collaboration occupies the heart of Bataille’s theoreatical framework. According to his lights, the 
accumulated energy in individuals can be expended either through violence or sex. All throughout the novel, one never 
stumbles upon any occasion where Chigurh’s sexuality is discussed. 
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to transforming into absence. This transformation process is expedited once we take into account 
the catalytic agents such as his ethnically, meaningfully and historically untraceable name, and his 
utterly unknown past. Thus, Chigurh’s loss, as a specific and historical trauma within the tangible 
framework of the narrative, fades away towards the unknown untraceable and ahistorical trauma 
titled absence in LaCapra’s poetics, which, I argue, stands for a wider misplaced nostalgic fallen 
America.  
 LaCapra’s specific rhetoric of loss (Chigurh) has a propensity for transforming itself to a 
wider absence-based realm, namely the decaying America, or more specifically the west. Fusing 
the concept of trauma with mythologies of old west and American Exceptionalism, Harrison sheds 
light on how American Exceptionalism and the mythic west struggle in the face of certain novel 
traumas such as the 9/11 attacks. On Chigurh’s aberrant traumatizing approach, he writes: 
 
Chigurh constitutes the end, the terminal moment of existence for all he encounters, 
the anti-mythic force with its closing down of all futures, for those who cross his 
path, and for the country he terrorises. Chigurh represents the elemental adversary 
in the timeless trial from the past that must be overcome if the progressive march 
of history is to be sustained…His termination of everyone that he encounters and 
his seemingly indestructible nature reveal, however, the unending struggle at the 
heart of the exceptionalist narrative with its reliance on crisis, trauma and survival. 
His continued existence ‘out there’ reveals how this American narrative is not 
actually one of crisis overcome, but one of perpetual crisis and struggle sustained. 
(201) 
 
Resembling his truly indestructible nature, as something USA or West fails “to acknowledge 
existence of” (McCarthy 130), his apparatus of death is nothing short of a disillusioning or anti-
mythic force: “[e]ven Chigurh’s instrument of death, an air-powered cattle gun, reducing his 
victims to the status of beef slaughtered in vast soulless steel factories, carries with it a 
demythologising force, a sardonically twisted comment on the corruption of the heroic cowboy 
myth into mechanised violence” (202). This anti-mythic reading, in like manner, establishes its 
nexus in the contemplations of Estes contending “No Country for Old Men presents us with a world 
that is broken” (179).  
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This myth sabotaging force, embodied by Chigurh in No Country for Old Men, which tends 
to approach the irreversible border point of loss/absence conflation in LaCapra’s jargon, is 
omnipresent in most of McCarthy’s canon. Conceived of as “prophet of destruction” in No Country 
for Old Men, this vile force has permeated all McCarthy’s oeuvre from Ballard in Child of God to 
Judge Holden in Blood Meridian to Chigurh in No Country for Old Men. Ballard, in what is 
characterized as necrophilia, shoots his victims only to make love to them later, while judge 
Holden kills children, collects scalps, dances wildly and never dies. Chigurh, as the ultimate 
comfort bullet shot at the human civilization, carves out a third eye on the forehead of his victims 
using a cattle gun implying the degradation of humanity to cattle. Forty years into his prolific 
writing and having published eight novels, “McCarthy finally gives a name to a character that has 
been a core element of his writing from day one” (Steaklely 150), namely “prophet of destruction”. 
The flagrant violence and barbarity which McCarthy’s destruction prophets harbor is a concern 
without which McCarthy would not deem a narrative worthwhile. In his own words, “[t]here is no 
such thing as life without bloodshed” (qtd. in Hage 4).  
 
Death and blood pervading the mythic west and the southern wilderness of the United 
States have been the most indispensable McCarthy trademarks by means of which his destruction 
prophets operate through his narratives. Privileged and graced by biblical aesthetics29, McCarthy 
presumably opts for portraying demonic or satanic antagonists who, against the odds, survive. 
 
29 Stylistically viewed, McCarthy engineers, calculates and sculpts his texts. Surgical precision and painstaking details 
are the terms I would utilize to characterize his writing. Lincoln’s depiction aptly captures the soul of his stylistics: 
“[c]haracteristically, for McCarthy by now, there’s a page number every other page, missing apostrophes in the local 
speech, no quote marks and acres of white space around the dialogue, big gaps and jump cuts between scenes” (142). 
Later, Lincoln sheds light on the technical aspects of his storytelling:  
“How to pace a plot and set a story. ‘If the heroin is missing and the money is missing then my guess 
is that somebody is missing.’ How to draw character from single detail. A clerk looks into Chigurh’s 
eyes. ‘Blue as lapis. At once glistening and totally opaque. Like wet stones.’  Satan plays on the 
thousand-meter-stare of soldiers who have seen too much. Lapis negra cobalt eyes—you won’t look 
into them twice. The craft of all this shows in the words to tell a story clean as picked bone, brackish 
as a festered wound, ominous as desert talus obscuring a horizon of red-eyed jackals. Slow, 
accretive, local detail inches toward action with real human characters in all their working, small-
town class, or lack. The real talk is nasty, brutish, short, and deadly honest. Telegraphic sentences. 
Abrupt fragments” (143). 
Deeply indebted to Faulkner, his works have been informed by and compared to many renowned writers such as 
Hemingway. Conceived of as an idiosyncratic stylist, his “style also crystallized into a heightened language that came 
off as both timeless and antiquarian, and that seemed to draw on and ultimately sublimate Melville, the Bible, and 




Perhaps, this is McCarthy’s way of confronting with the dark humanity: no emancipation, frank 
and flat loss, detailed agony, and scarce, if not no, use of psychology. 
 The second course which is open to our advance in interrogating LaCapra’s absence/loss 
hermeneutics within the context of No Country for Old Men is through the anxiety which absence 
brings about. According to LaCapra, a sense of anxiety is attendant upon the concept of absence, 
which cannot be obliterated unless one is able to convert it to loss via seeking a specific source 
from which the sense of anxiety or fear emanates. As the victim cannot come to terms with the 
absence-fueled anxiety, LaCapra conceives, and as loss, compared to absence, can be worked 
through far more efficaciously, the victim is to find a tangible, against the horrifying ambiguity of 
absence, source for his anxiety only to later eliminate it, hence a recovery from the pitfall of 
absence. Within the context of No Country for Old Men, one, without further ado, can readily 
witness the overwhelming body of anxiety attendant upon Sheriff Bell’s psyche in the face of the 
newly evolved absence derived from the phenomenal “prophet of destruction”. The more Bell 
strives to makes sense of this phenomenon in ways of locating a source for his existence or nature, 
the more his efforts fail him. Neither able to locate a tangible source for his anxiety nor 
consequently successful in facilitating the process of transforming absence to loss, Bell, if not all 
the characters, is mired in his formless circumstance. 
Having lost his psyche to the overwhelming anxiety of LaCapra’s absence as a result of 
the transformation of loss (Chigurh) to absence (the fallen America), Sheriff Bell tries his hand at 
locating an identifiable source, namely chasing Chigurh, for this absence in order to eliminate him. 
He does not but fail here as well. Thus, the sense of absence and the anxiety thereof grows in his 
already lost psyche. Left with no choice but to “treat absence as absence” (LaCapra 707), Sheriff 
Bell faces nothing but “non-redemptive ambivalence” (707). The indeterminate absence takes over 
and the psyche is haunted and such “hauntology” (qtd in LaCapra, Writing History 33), with whose 
coinage Derrida30 should be credited, prevails. 
Inextricably laced with the current strand of arguments is the dichotomy of Freudian acting-
out and working-through, which is tantamount to melancholia and mourning respectively. Reliving 
the traumatic experience over and over in his/her memory, the victim is bound to repeat the 
moment, hence the denomination “compulsion to repeat” by Freud. However, this vicious 
 
30 See Spectres of Marx (1993), in which Derrida combines the terms “haunt” and “ontology” to introduce the 
neologism of “hauntology”, to denote the incessant ontological haunting or the haunting ontology of the past events 
whose ghostly presence would never leave the individual. 
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compulsion pits itself against the eventual understanding of the trauma, thereby allowing the 
victim to initiate the remedial or therapeutic course of mourning. 
Despite all the critical negation leveled at the Caruthian jargon of trauma censuring her for 
her fixation on the acting-out phase or the incomprehensibility barrier, one cannot help but notice 
how Caruthian parlance serves our analysis as a veritable haven within which the trauma dynamics 
of No Country for Old Men operate. Sheriff Bell’s dour pessimism, defeatism and disillusionment 
leave very little room for any progressive trend towards the efficacious possibilities of mourning 
or working-through. He seems to be regressively mired in his sorrow, as opposed to mournful, for 
the phenomenon he cannot possibly make sense of. In other words, nostalgia has overcome his 
soul; something which is absent in Chigurh as the perpetrator of this acting-out. 
An incontrovertible manifestation of Bell’s acting-out, I should suggest, is the passive 
nihilism which befalls his psyche in the face of an inscrutable phenomenon called Chigurh. His 
monologues are precisely identical to what Freudian “compulsion to repeat” has to offer, in that 
Sheriff strives to reiterate the repressed incomprehensible moments in the guise of confessions or 
testimonies in much the same way a patient in the course of psychoanalysis reveals, wittingly or 
otherwise, his unconscious. With Freudian stance in mind, this repetitive saga of symptoms, be 
they verbal or behavioral, should pave the way towards the moment of emancipation, redemption 
and mourning. Nonetheless, Sheriff sinks down to the trappings of Nietzsche’s passive nihilism: 
 
In becoming disillusioned with his old values, Bell feels confused and defeated. He 
has lost faith in what had formerly given meaning and value to his life. Such a 
collapse of belief in previously held values is what Nietzsche describes as passive 
nihilism (17–18). Of course, Nietzsche also argues that this state of 
meaninglessness could be counteracted by an active nihilism that worked to 
transform old, rejected values into new, meaningful ones, but Bell is nowhere near 
that stage. (Flory 127) 
 
This absurdist viewpoint, Flory warns, should not be identified with, notwithstanding Bell’s deeply 
wounded soul. If one does not wish to be plagued with terms such as LaCapra’s melancholia, 
Freud’s acting out or constant lament, one has to move beyond the nostalgia and face up to evil, 




The narrative implies that nostalgia leaves us where Bellis at the end of the film as 
well as the novel: dreaming of finding a better way within what he knows, but 
knowing at the same time that it won’t fit the harsh reality of evils that exist around 
him. Such a failure is, of course, passively nihilistic, and the film’s conclusion 
drives home the point that such an unimaginative perspective regarding evil can 
even assist in its continuance and proliferation by providing at best lackluster, 
misdirected responses to it. (129) 
 
At this juncture, I should wish to shed some quick light on the concept of belatedness and its 
pertinent contribution to the hermeneutics of trauma in No Country for Old Men. As detailed in 
chapter one, the traumatic experience, notes Caruth relying on Freudian tenets, is too much to be 
incorporated into the psyche of the victim in the moment of trauma, thereby urging the victim to 
accommodate this incorporation afterward, which evokes the famed “afterwardsness” coined by 
Laplanche. Later, defining elements and terms such as “unassimilated”, “impossible”, “unknown”, 
“un-interpreted”, “latent”, “deferred” and “revisionist”, which were the various interpretational 
modes of different thinkers in approaching the concept of belatedness, came to light.  
 In seeking to glean something from the belatedness of trauma in No Country for Old Men, 
I feel inclined to return to Chigurh and his cattle gun. That the moment of trauma requires a certain 
body of time to be revivified and hence re-interpreted, according to the lights of Laplanche, is the 
very principle upon which the whole concept of belatedness is grounded.  Within the context of 
No Country for Old Men, the characters are not provided with the latency period to develop a sense 
of cognition regarding the accident, hence their shock and alienation. In Caruthian terms, the 
“incubation period” is not achieved and the victim does not traverse the temporal distance to grow 
out of this alienation, and in fact, most of them meet their demise before they even know what 
traumatized them. They are exposed to an unprecedented traumatic tool such as a cattle gun whose 
owner is yet another traumatic phenomenon, yet they are never given “another time, another place” 
(Caruth 17). The only “afterwarsdness” the characters get is their demise coming at the hands of 
Chigurh or the cattle gun shortly afterward. Bell seems to be the only character who is left 
unharmed for a while to make sense of the trauma. Yet ostensibly, the temporal distance is not 
traversed sufficiently for him either, hence his sense of defeat.  
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 The emphatic intersection in which both Caruth and Laplanche meet apropos the concept 
of belatedness is the very nexus of what is not known, either at the very outset of the traumatic 
trajectory or the later moments. Taking into account the very unknown nature of Chigurh and even 
more unknown, if not defamiliarizing, nature of the cattle gun, one could readily discern the very 
vexing nature of the trauma at work here. The unknown nature of cattle gun and Chigurh aside, 
the whole novel is replete with countess instantiations of the phrase “I don’t know”, particularly 
in monologues, whose mention cannot be feasible here given the scope of this study. Sheriff Bell 
expresses his discomfort of not knowing or his inability to make sense of the new traumas upon 
many occasions, yet the occasion I would like to choose in which I can investigate the precise 
concept of belatedness is when he, in a spirit of confessions, reveals to Uncle Ellis how he left all 
his comrades behind and fled the battle field in the Second World War: 
 
So now you’re fixin to tell me what you done. 
Yessir. 
When it got dark. 
When it got dark. Yessir. 
What did you do? 
I cut and run. (131) 
 
Shamed and disdained by this trauma, Bell intended to turn down the medal, yet he was scolded 
by his superior officer: “[a]nd I told him I didnt want it. And he just set there lookin at me and 
directly he said: I'm waitin on you to tell me your reasons for wantin to refuse a military 
commendation” (129). Many years later, Bell’s traumatized psyche has not recovered from the 
blight of this wound. This is precisely why I think this traumatic memory befits my argument here, 
as the latency period seems to have lost its efficacy in helping Bell to come to terms with the 
gravity of his shameful cut and run:  
 
Come daylight I laid up in a patch of woods. What woods it was. That whole 
country looked like a burn. Just the treetrunks was all that was left…I thought after 
so many years it would go away. I dont know why I thought that. Then I thought 







Balaev’s Growth vs. Caruth’s Intergenerational Trauma 
Balaev’s thought currents find their way of engagement with the trauma framework of No Country 
for Old Men. As an opposing voice, Balaev diverged from the Caruthian parlance on many fronts, 
in that she urged trauma scholars to reconsider all the terms like “unrepresentable, unspeakable, 
timeless, repetitious, contagious and infectious”, and instead seek out for untapped alternatives 
such as rebirth, fluidity and perhaps growth. Let us, she should urge all, not treat trauma like an 
infectious disease which spreads from and individual to a community or vice versa, whose 
technical term is transgenerational trauma coined by Caruth. Rather than dissociate, dislocate, and 
shatter, the victim’s subjectivity, Balaev asserts, could be said to be exposed to further growth and 
fluidity in terms of identity, in the face of a traumatic experience. 
Barely can one, within the context of No Country for Old Men, find a tangible trace of 
rebirth and fluidity in any of the characters. Instead, the traumatic Chigurh spreads like a disease 
traumatizing the people who have not even laid eyes on him, which, for the most part, corresponds 
closely to the contagious model. Albeit not located a generation later, the trauma plagues the 
characters in the narrative so heavily as to beat the odds of fluidity and recovery. Most characters, 
particularly Bell, feel psychically broken, not to mention the ones who are immediately physically 
broken. Despite the resilience-centered tenet of Stampfl, which bears a striking resemblance to 
Balaev’s trauma model in introducing “uplifting themes to the study of trauma” (136) and setting 
in motion the “ideas of rebirth or redemption” (136), characters in No Country for Old Men are 
not only not resilient but also prone to surrender and defeat. The traumatizing agent plagues and 
wounds the psyches which have not been exposed to its threat in practice, which is completely 
against what Balaev’s model hypothesizes. 
In a society struck by a phenomenally new and young evil, the old, McCarthy should feel, 
have to fade away to defeat, thereby impeding the path of redemption and growth. What seems to 
even aggravate the case is how this new plague, once not fought or cured, is bound to precipitate 
itself into the very permanent core of the society, shaping the new ontological reality: 
 
The strategy of resolving conflicts by cognitively processing the pain and open 
wound (i.e., the trauma) is no longer available. When trauma cannot be processed, 
or “written,” it cannot be overcome. It becomes a wild fantasy that generates reality 
in the present. An ontological crack is thus opened in the foundations of the 
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contemporary world, which adopts evil as an experience of ecstasy and 
empowerment that is much more potent than the passive and feeble experience of 
good. Evil and suffering are perceived as primal elements that delineate the borders 
of a nihilistic outlook. (Gurevitz 21) 
 
 
This unprocessed, nihilistic, and ontological evil wound, then, pervades the bone marrow of the 
postmodern31 society, culminating in “the total collapse of the enlightened scientific/moral 
rationalism of the West and the conversion of trauma into a sickening cultural and marketing 
strategy of extreme potency” (22). Thus, not only Balaev’s famed “fluid process located in relation 
to new realities” (9) regarding trauma fails, but the new evil paralyses society in ways more similar 
to what LaCapra called the trauma culture wallowing in acting-out and melancholy. This is 
precisely the type of trauma Gurevitz calls “generative” as it generates “a cultural recipe for 
creating and maintaining the balance of power in society” (23). This way, trauma, to return to 
Caruth, spreads like contagious disease in a “postmodern reality in which trauma is part of Western 
rationalism and capitalism” (22-23). This newly established trauma culture, then, would not 
accommodate Balaev’s concepts of rebirth and growth.  
 In order to instantiate his hypothesis, Gurevits allows Kafka and McCarthy to serve as the 
cornerstones of his study. Opting for Blood Meridian as the most traumatic piece of McCarthy’s 
canon, Gurevits is quick to approach the very character of Judge Holden as the trauma agent who 
seems to be a new chapter in trauma discourse: 
 
McCarthy paints the sinister portrait of a pedophile, a psychopath (reminiscent of 
Chigurh in his novel No Country for Old Men) whose mental disorder and 
murderous philosophy go hand in hand in horrifying harmony with the 
“humanism,” aesthetics, education, macabre sense of humor, intelligence, and 
 
31 In “Literature as Trauma: The Postmodern Option-Franz Kafka and Cormac McCarthy”, Gurevits pits the morally 
progressive trauma realm in modernism against the ethically regressive nature of postmodernist society: 
“In contrast to the modernist outlook, which sees trauma as an instrument of wisdom and an 
opportunity to redefi ne human destiny, in the postmodern world we are enveloped in radical 
fatalism and pessimism that lays bare the perilous seductiveness of trauma—the total collapse of the 
enlightened scientifi c/moral rationalism of the West and the conversion of trauma into a sickening 
cultural and marketing strategy of extreme potency” (22). 
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fondness for rhetoric that he displays to a band of mad death-defying outlaws as 
they make their way through life in total darkness. (18-19) 
 
 
Interestingly enough, Gurevits does not miss out on the analogy between judge Holden and 
Chigurh’s character in No Country for Old Men, which facilitates the reasoning of this study to a 
great extent. Anton Chigurh, in like manner, horrifies the characters with his fetish killing 
stylistics, imposes his psychopathic intellectuality, defies death upon many occasions, and 
eventually obliterates the harmony of humanism. The characters, to worsen the matter, are 
incapable of facing up to him, thereby allowing him to spread like a disease (Caruth), generate a 
new chapter of trauma reality (Gurevits), and impede the progressive path of growth (Balaev). 
Eventually, in LaCapra’s terms, the society is doomed to fall into the abysmal chasm of 
melancholy. 
Dissolution of identity and collapse of selfhood are some of the bitter consequences of 
trauma, particularly war trauma, as Mackinon declares in his thesis “the experience of combat 
precipitates both the dissolution of the identity and the rejection …of subjectivity and 
individuality” (133). Taking into account the fact that both Bell and Moss are war veterans, one 
could argue that their psychic traumatization, in the face of a trauma far worse than their war 
trauma, is further deteriorated. This is particularly evident in the sorrowful words of Bell saying 
“I was supposed to be a war hero and I lost a whole squad of men. Got decorated for it. They died 
and I got a medal. I dont even need to know what you think about that” (94). Later, on the same 
page Bell speaks of the traumas of the previous generations:  
 
Two generations in this country is a long time. You’re talkin about the early settlers. 
I used to tell em that havin your wife and children killed and scalped and gutted 
like fish has a tendency to make some people irritable but they didnt seem to know 
what I was talkin about. I think the sixties in this country sobered some of em up. I 
hope it did. (94). 
 
That Bell is sympathetic with and deeply touched by the gravity of the traumatic accounts depicted 
above, which befell the lives of previous generations, is vividly an instance of how one’s trauma, 
Caruth’ intergenerational model should suggest, is not his/her own. Albeit repudiated by the new 
thought streams of trauma thinkers such as Balaev, intergenerational trauma is instantiated anew 
every moment within the context of No Country for Old Men. Sheriff Bell, as the central figure of 
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the novel, moves back and forth in time ruminating constantly over how things, specifically 
traumatic events, went and how they might go. These sympathetic ruminations range from the 
victims of the Second World War, to which he bore witness, to previous generation, to eventually 
later generations. An occasion upon which, Bell sympathizes with the traumas of future is how 
some parents would not be responsible for raising their own children in future: 
 
What we thought was that when the next generation come along and they dont want 
to raise their children neither then who is goin to do it? Their own parents will be 
the only grandparents around and they wouldnt even raise them. We didnt have a 
answer about that. On my better days I think that there is somethin I dont know or 
there is somethin that I’m leavin out. But them times are seldom. (77) 
 
Apart from identifying with his victimized war comrades, the early settlers, and the irresponsible 
would-be parents, Bell suffers from, on an intergenerational mode, the traumas which plague his 
family, particularly Harold Ellis’s brother, who died is the World War I: 
 
You ever think about Harold? Bell said. 
Harold? 
Yes. 
Not much. He was some older than me. He was born in ninety-nine. Pretty sure 
that’s right. What made you think about Harold? 
I was readin some of your mother’s letters to him, that’s all. I just wondered what 
you remembered about him. 
Was they any letters from him? 
 No. 
You think about your family. Try to make sense out of all that. I know what it did 
to my mother. She never got over it. I dont know what sense any of that makes 
either. You know that gospel song? We'll understand it all by and by? That takes a 
lot of faith. You think about him goin over there and dyin in a ditch somewheres. 
Seventeen year old. You tell me. Because I damn sure dont know. (127) 
 
The state of Bell’s traumatized psyche reveals itself simply by how the inception of the 
conversation was triggered on his behalf. This, I argue, has a lot to do with how Bell is 
sympathetically remorseful for Harold’s death and how, by means of talking, he feels an urge to 
inform his uncle of how one’s trauma is not solely his own. What runs beneath this feeling of 
remorse, and perhaps shame, must be what Abraham calls the “transgenerational phantom”, 
“which returns to unsettle the present with respect to crimes or transgressions that have not been 
worked through (or in his preferred concept, “introjected” in contrast to incorporated…)” 
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(LaCapra, “Trauma, History, Memory”, 379). This state of being trans-generationally haunted is 
expected insofar as Bell’s traumatized soul has not gone through working through. 
 LaCapra’s “Trauma, History, Memory, Identity: What Remains?” provides new insight to 
the study of intergenerational trauma. Predicating his exegesis upon Schwab’s Haunting Legacies: 
Violent Histories and Transgenerational Trauma, he concurs with her thesis of the transmission 
of the feelings of guilt and shame to the descendants of both perpetrators and victims (378). These 
descendants, Schawb notes, have a face “that is frozen in grief, a forced smile that does not feel 
quite right, an apparently unmotivated flare-up of rage, or chronic depression” (qtd in LaCapra 
379). LaCapra, however, underscores the role of giving testimony in working through this stage 
as well as the urge to tell ones’ story in order to overcome this transgenerational melancholy (381). 
Within the context of No Country for Old Men, one barely witnesses any trace of a genuine smile 
on the face of Bell. This frozen flat affect leaves no room for the likelihood of the initiation of a 
mourning trajectory for Bell. Bell, in order to dilute the dense melancholy of his transgenerational 
traumas, resorts to testimonial monologues. This, to his chagrin, fails, as well.  
The Coen Brothers’ Carla Jean: A Growing Beacon of Hope 
 
In juxtaposing Coen brothers’ adaptation and their intellectual trauma-oriented engagement with 
the recent progressive and constructive voice of trauma, with Balev at its heart, once can discern 
certain discrepancies from the novel. As I previously delineated the Coen brothers’ somewhat 
innovative dynamics in visualizing the monologues, a rather similar trend informs their approach 
apropos the dialectics of the recent voice of trauma. To lay bare trauma’s novel dialectics, Balaev’s 
model in the main, in the Coen brothers’ adaptation, I would like to opt for the character, and the 
Coen brothers’ characterization of, Carla Jean Moss (Kelly Macdonald), Moss’s wife. To initiate 
my argument, it is of utmost significance to entail one of the most seminal dialogues of the film 
between Carla Jean and Chigurh, when he shows up at her residence to kill her. 
 No sooner had she dried the tears of mourning his husband’s death than she saw the spectral 
figure of Chigurh seated at her bedroom desk awaiting her arrival. Dumfounded by the uncanny 
encounter, she uttered “I knowed you was crazy when I seen you settin there, she said. I knowed 
exactly what was in store for me” (121). Earnestly and sturdily tied to his words, Chigurh divulges 
to Carla that he is “at the mercy of the dead, in this case your husband” (121), which means Chigurh 
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gave his word to Moss that he would kill Carla. Unable to make sense of Chigurh’s distorted ethics 
and principles, Carla tries to reason with him only to be shocked with the coin trick: 
 
He watched her, his chin in his hand. All right, he said. This is the best I can do. 
He straightened out his leg and reached into his pocket and drew out a few coins 
and took one and held it up. He turned it. For her to see the justice of it. He held it 
between his thumb and forefinger and weighed it and then flipped it spinning in 
the air and caught it and slapped it down on his wrist. Call it, he said. 
She looked at him, at his outheld wrist. What? She said. 
Call it. 
I wont do it. 
Yes you will. Call it. 
God would not want me to do that. 
Of course he would. You should try to save yourself. Call it. This is your last 
chance. 
Heads, she said. 
He lifted his hand away. The coin was tails. 
I’m sorry. 
She didnt answer. 
Maybe it’s for the best. 
She looked away. You make it like it was the coin. But you’re the one. 
It could have gone either way. 
The coin didnt have no say. It was just you. 
Perhaps. But look at it my way. I got here the same way the coin did. 
She sat sobbing softly. She didnt answer. (121) 
 
The interplay between the coin’s lifeless existence, yet decisive authority, and how Chigurh instills 
a sense of agency to the very absurd flip of the coin, albeit paradoxically tossed by him in the first 
place, give rise to the very philosophical mode of this conversation. What renders this conversation 
even further vexing is how Chigurh conflates the moment of fate and will through uttering: 
“[e]very moment in your life is a turning and every one a choosing. Somewhere you made a choice. 
All followed to this. The accounting is scrupulous. The shape is drawn. No line can be erased” 
(122). Humans, utters the philosophical Chigurh, who is thought to be the intellectual voice of 
McCarthy, architect their lives freely only to be alienated by how they cannot escape the ending 
which they paradoxically and knowingly designed. And in arriving at the pre-destined and 
unalterable fate, Chigurh “perceives his role only as a blind instrument in the hands of fate, having 
absolutely no scruples about murdering people, as if he had no say in this matter…” (Ligor 78). 
Traumatized by the unfathomable murder of her husband and the death of her chronically 
cancer-stricken mother, Carla Jean is plagued with her eventual traumatization, namely beholding 
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the spectral “prophet of destruction”. Upon hearing all Chigurh’s philosophy, and perhaps 
sophistry in her eyes, Carla is left with one option which is “calling it”, but, much to her chagrin, 
she calls her death. All the philosophy, traumas, and the game of fate/will, precipitate her into 
bursting into sobbing. Not being able “to second say the world” (123) and asking her to see what 
he sees, Chigurh shoots her while she is sobbing. Carla, resembling Chigurh’s other victims who 
quickly rush to utter the words “you don’t have to do this”, implores Chigurh to “second say” the 
situation, before closing her eyes. 
The traumatized sobbing Carla is portrayed somewhat differently in the Coen brothers’ 
adaptation. The directors elide the majority of the fate/will dialogue and solely leave untouched 
one thread of their conversation including “I got here the same way the coin did” in response to 
Carla’s “The coin didnt have no say”. This thread captures, with great economy and pithiness, the 
soul of the thematic messages McCarthy might have intended to convey. Bardem’s stunningly cool 
performance and poised postures obviously add to the visual aesthetics of the scene. Macdonald’s 
apt facial expressions achieve, with perfect delicacy and subtlety, the requisite feel of the scene. 
Yet, the brothers, expectedly, exert their power as well as their liberty in eliding one more thread 
of the conversation, which is staunchly meaningful. Carla, in this scene, refuses to give in to the 
absurd yet compelling coin toss game of Chigurh. Furthermore, she neither cries nor sobs. Even 
though the brothers portray a dolorous Carla, they do not grant her the right to sob. 
That Carla in this intellectually significant dialogue decides to disqualify Chigurh’s 
philosophical face should run in tandem with the same subtle shift of McCarthy’s “And I wont do 
that. I think now that maybe I never would” to brothers’ “He would have to say, okay, I’ll be part 
of this world.” By deciding not to call, not only does Carla infuriate Chigurh, but she also calls 
into question her long-cherished principles. Albeit, traumatized by a long and incomprehensible 
saga of traumas, she decides, the Coen brothers innovate, not to surrender. By uttering “No, I ain’t 
gonna call it”, Carla succeeds at even enraging him to an extent that Chigurh’s constantly poised 
affect is fairly distorted (see appendix: figures 8-9). Chigurh’s hubris in clinging to his esoteric 
principles and “the existential arbitrariness of human existence… that has experienced a 
particularly grim manifestation” (Holtz 41) should jolt Carla into yielding his demand of calling 
the coin toss, yet she defies him. The Coen brothers, once more in ways analogous to Bell’s “I’ll 
be part of this world.”, take their liberty to diverge from the docile submissive path on which, by 
and large within the context of No Country for Old Men, most victims fall. 
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This bizarrely rebellious and resilient state of Carla in the Coen brothers’ portrayal, which 
is contrarily tenuous and docile in the novel, should catapult us into Stampfl’s resilience model, 
on which the Coen brothers, most probably unaware of all the theory running beneath their elision, 
ground their elliptical mode. Apparently, Carla is the first person in the narrative not only to 
repudiate Chigurh’s corrupt ideology by saying “The coin didnt have no say. It was just you”, but 
also to defy Chigurh by deciding not to call, not to mention the extent of her ease and intrepidity 
in calling him “crazy”. The Coen brothers, it seems, perceive this resilience and add to it by 
removing how she is cajoled to calling the toss. Thus, they unwittingly strive to exhibit traumatized 
characters on whom the incomprehensible nature of traumatization falls short of power, hence 
facing up to evil with all they have. They, to add to their elliptical aesthetics, refuse to visualize 
how Chigurh shoots her only to reveal it later by having Chigurh raise his foot to make sure his 
boot is not stained by her blood. This, once more, should be rooted at the brothers’ sympathetic 
stance with Carla’s resilient psyche, whereas they have no compunction whatsoever in visualizing 
how Chigurh victimizes all the rest of the characters. 
Most germane here is the commentary of Gilmore whose analysis attributes to Carla not 
only a sense of integrity but also a sense of morality, which is transparently consonant with the 
concerns of the recent trauma voice. Gilmore’s analysis, I am led to infer, is not informed by the 
delicate comparative discrepancies between the literary source and the visual source, insofar as he 
is solely aiming at the filmic critique rather than the literary one: 
 
She will not give her life over to chance and insists that the responsibility for her 
death lies with Chigurh, not the coin. She forces him to make the choice. In so doing 
she restores moral judgments to the situation. She will not, in short, speak of 
“expediency apart from justice.” She defies the irrational flip of a coin and retains 
her integrity. She hurls Chigurh’s ironic perversity back into his face: “I knew you 
was crazy.” Although Carla Jean is neither an existential nor a tragic hero, she is, 
nevertheless, heroic in her unwillingness to abandon the human need to construe 
the world in moral terms. (174) 
 
LaCapra’s remarks apropos the interplay between the identity forming power of the traumatic 
experience as otherwise opposed to the identity shattering impact of the same experience could be 
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a very pertinent ground upon which the character of Carla runs counter to the character of Bell: 
“[t]raumatic experience has dimensions that may threaten or even shatter identity and may not be 
‘captured’ by history…Yet it may paradoxically become the center or vortex-like hole of identity-
formation” (391). This argument captures, in perfect economy and tact, the soul of the majority of 
the trauma arguments I have developed so far, in that trauma either breaks the victim (the old 
school) or helps the victim grow (the new school). Within the context of No Country for Old Men, 
it is the opposition of a growing resilient Carla to a broken or shattered Bell which showcases this 
dichotomy to the best of its magnitude. 
 
The Haunting Uncanny Traumas: Death, Silence, and Repetition 
 
I should like to draw this chapter to a close by shedding some light on “the uncanny” and its 
uncanny implications on the novel and film “No Country for Old Men”. Without s a shred of doubt, 
No Country for Old Men, is a horrendous condensation of “the uncanny”, in the full sense of the 
term, inscribed into the literature of “the uncanny”. A myriad of elements could be readily adduced 
instantaneously, yet, my foray into the realm of “the uncanny” will initiate with the concept of 
death. Death is written all over the novel as well as beheld all throughout the film. It ranges from 
an individual officer, strangled to death by a pair of handcuffs, to a naively trusting driver, whose 
forehead gets blown away by the cattle gun, to a massacre in the middle of desert. What, however, 
renders all this spectrum of “the uncanny” is that a number of these deaths come at the hand of an 
uncanny cattle gun. It is worth noting how countless critics have inadvertently turned to the word 
uncanny in addressing this killing apparatus without even alluding to the literary or psychological 
implications, nor could they have been even aware of the concept, in the first place. Apart from 
this uncanny device, the narrative, is, in effect, seething with death, blood and violence. 
Perhaps the uncanniest death-centered scene of the narrative is the very outset of the 
narrative unfolding how Moss walks into the crime scene, or massacre scene preferably, where an 
alleged drug deal seemed to have gone awry. Nothing but McCarthy’s words can capture the 
severity of the uncanny air of this scene: 
 
In the first vehicle there was a man slumped dead over the wheel. Beyond were two 
more bodies lying in the gaunt yellow grass. Dried blood black on the ground. He 
stopped and listened. Nothing. The drone of flies. He walked around the end of the 
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truck. There was a large dead dog there of the kind he'd seen crossing the floodplain. 
The dog was gutshot. Beyond that was a third body lying face down. He looked 
through the window at the man in the truck. He was shot through the head. Blood 
everywhere. He walked on to the second vehicle but it was empty. He walked out 
to where the third body lay. There was a shotgun in the grass. The shotgun had a 
short barrel and it was fitted with a pistol stock and a twenty round drum magazine. 
He nudged the man’s boot with his toe and studied the low surrounding hills. (10) 
 
To all the textual nuances of McCarthy’s description comes another innovative addition by the 
brothers, namely silence, with which the uncanny state of the scene is fortified beyond one’s ken. 
The silence of the sequence juxtaposed with Moss’s slow paces incorporated into relatively long 
takes, which exhibit the corpses and particularly a vexing shot of a blood-soaked corpse whose 
eyes were left uncannily unshut, augments the intense density of the scene (see appendix: figures 
10-12).  
On an auditory note, nothing is heard but the sound of Moss’s footsteps, wind and flies 
feeding on the corpses. That the brothers opt for some particular long takes and the lingering of 
the camera should be indicative of allowing the viewer to pause and take in the intended 
devastation. This inherent slowness is meant to reinforce the power of silence through which the 
uncanny state is consequently amplified. In Semenza’s words, “[d]espite being a thriller, most of 
No Country for Old Men is rather static” (26). The brothers, to underline this uncanny state of 
silence, prefer to forego the pleasure of entertaining their audience with music. 
 I find it opportune to shed some quick light on the Coen brothers’ avoidance of music in 
this picture. Having scored most of the brothers’ pictures, Burwell boldly declares too much music 
is due to “either lack of confidence on the part of filmmakers or a tradition of scoring things” (qtd 
in Krossner 8). The silence aims at augmenting the tension, heightening the drama and making the 
viewer feel uncomfortable, which are all implicitly in line with the aesthetics of “the uncanny”, as 
noted by Krossner: 
 
Not only is there very little music, but the characters themselves often remain silent 
for long stretches of time, thus forcing the audience to listen to either ambient 
sounds in the environment, or nothing at all. The audience thus receives few (if 
any) aural clues for plot development, which makes any event that much more 
surprising when it occurs. Silence heightens the drama by making the audience feel 
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uncomfortable and by taking away a safety net for the audience, in that music makes 
the movie feel more artificial, less like reality. (9) 
 
Thus, it is through an amalgamation of the silence embedded in the scenes and the characters that 
the visual aesthetics of the Coen brothers intersect with the psychological and literary subtleties of 
the “the uncanny”. In lieu of soundtrack, the brothers prefer to utilize the environmental diegetic 
sounds, as Krossner puts it: 
 
The idea was to use diegetic sounds as much as possible, especially those that sound 
like they emanated from the environment; this meant that vocal or instrumental 
sources are kept to a minimum due to their clear musical associations. The sounds 
heard during the movie are drones of various sorts, many coming from extra-
diegetic Buddhist singing bowls and the sound of air streams from the compressed 
air gun used by the psychotic Anton Chigurh (Javier Bardem). The rest of the sound 
comes from diegetic traffic, crickets, and air ducts. (9) 
 
An apt complement to this organized diegetic instrument-free silent uncanniness is the innate 
slowness with which the brothers trim their visual craftsmanship, as a trademark of their static 
style specifically in No Country for Old Men, as Semenza puts forth “the frequently static 
cinematography and mise en scèéne of No Country for Old Men is bolstered by the silence that 
often accompanies it” (37). This static uncanny slowness is not something the brothers had never 
ventured into in their previous oeuvre. This had been one of their oft-used stylistics in Fargo 
(1996) and True Grit (2010). Holistically viewed, the uncanny bloodshed scene at the very outset 
of No Country for Old Men seems to benefit as much from the death fright as the very silence 
within context of which this fright lies. Bereft of the accompaniment of music, the scene makes 
the viewer discern the non-entertaining and highly dramatic tone of the sequence, hence the 
ultimate uncanny sense. All the aforementioned auditory aesthetics, posits L. Beadling, are even 
at the service of a higher purpose, namely magnifying the role of voice and voice-overs, enhancing 
the realist atmosphere, and eventually deepening the narrative and thematic facets of the film (3). 
 Death and silence of this particular scene aside, Chigurh’s spectral presence in “a web of 
predator and prey” (Peebles 168), is another salient feature of “the uncanny” which repeats itself 
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over and over traumatizing the characters in an unprecedented fashion. This repetitional facet of 
“the uncanny”, Whitehead suggests, “mimics the effects of the trauma” (86), through alluding to 
the haunting and spectral returns to the traumatic experience. The repetitive nature of Chigurh’s 
spectrality, his murderous acts and the shocking cattle gun should be how the effects of trauma in 
the narrative reach its frightening peak. This uncanny repetition wreaks further havoc on the 
psyche of the characters through some further abnormalities such as the cattle gun. As the very 
definition of the uncanny holds the role of the incidence of a familiar event at the heart of 
something unfamiliar accountable for the shaping of “the uncanny”, my account of the cattle gun’s 
uncanny role is further substantiated, as a familiar cattle gun is used to kill humans, which is 
completely unfamiliar and unprecedented. 
 The nuances by which this apparatus operates as a fetish at the hands of Chigurh instill 
further uncanny fright in the characters. McCarthy’s thoroughgoing depiction of this apparatus, 
when he says “[t]he pneumatic hiss and click of the plunger sounded like a door closing”, likens 
this device to a fetish at the hands of an automaton or a machine32. As Ellis contends, “[t]his 
attention to sound, and the fact that Chigurh wears this apparatus in a nearly cyborg fashion, recalls 
Frank Booth in Blue Velvet. It feels like a gimmick” (136). At the same time, Chigurh himself 
evinces some particular robot-like features, closer to the uncanny element of anthropomorphism33, 
which puts him akin to the character of the Terminator in James Cameron’s picture: 
 
The Coens seem to encourage associations with the iconic character of the sci-fi 
cyborg the Terminator─ the similarity between the two characters becomes 
apparent during the self-surgery scene, closely reminiscent of the analogous 
sequence in James Cameron’s picture, when Chigurh, unlike ordinary mortals, 
fastidiously removes a bullet from his leg without feeling any pain. Both of them 
are indestructible killing machines, devoid of normal human emotions, that have 
come from parallel worlds to strike terror into the hearts of humans. (Ellis 75) 
 
32 “[A]utomatism” is another salient feature of “the uncanny” characterized in An Introduction to Literature, Criticism 
and Theory: “[t]his is a term that can be used when what is human is perceived as merely mechanical: examples of 
this would be sleepwalking, epileptic fits, trance-states and madness” (Bennet and Royle 36). Chigurh’s mechanical 
and emotionless motions converge very closely with the concept. 
33 Anthropomorphism refers to “the rhetorical figure that refers to a situation in which what is not human is given 
attributes of human form or shape: the legs of a table or the face of a cliff would be examples of anthropomorphism, 
though they might not immediately or necessarily provoke a feeling of uncanniness” (Bennet and Royle 36). However, 




All these human-machine similitudes, together with the nuances of the automatism and 
anthropomorphism as the salient features of “the Uncanny” pave the way towards the hermeneutics 
of “the uncanny”. Moreover, this uncanny behavior is more repetitive than death itself. At times, 
we do not clearly witness the death scene, yet the brothers do not miss out on the hissing or the 
plunging sound. More at play is how this cattle gun is exploited calmly to punch a hole on the 
forehead of its victims with his operator having a sadistic smile shape on his face uttering: “Would 
you hold still please, Sir?” (see appendix: figure 13).  
This psychopathic and uncannily emotionless killing pattern can only be matched by the 
character of Judge Holden in McCarthy’s Blood Meridian. Portrayed as a child molester and a 
rapist, “the Judge is devoid of pity, affection, and morality” (Hüseyin Altındiş 95), while he is 
otherwise “a well-educated, charismatic, and compelling character” (95)34. The same “striking 
duality and ambiguity” (Ligor 5) holds true in Chigurh’s case, for he is fond of engaging his victims 
in philosophical dialogues and explicating his absurd principles prior to punching dehumanizing 
holes on their foreheads or shooting them. This duality and its recurrence all throughout the 
narrative, which is indicative of a bipolarity and severe mania, adds to the uncanny “manifestation 
of insanity”35 in the character.  
What instills a further morbid sense of “the uncanny” in this repetitive insane killing drive 
attendant upon Chigurh’s robotic psyche, thereby severely traumatizing the characters and 
audience alike, is how inimical every character’s condition is to the imminent death-driven traumas 
of Chigurh. In other words, barely can one escape the tragic fate, to which Chigurh finds himself 
committed and at whose hands he pretends to operate, Chigurh will plague them with. One should 
be reminiscent of Whitehead’s words asserting, “[t]he uncanny is a source of dread because it acts 
as a mode of involuntary repetition and forces upon us the idea of something fateful and 
inescapable” (128). Chigurh fatefully kills anybody he lays his eyes on, sparing only the very few 
 
34 Instancing Judge Holden as McCarthy’s most philosophical character, Frye, in “Histories, Novels, Ideas: Cormac 
McCarthy and the Art of Philosophy”, enquires into the most important philosophical streams with which most his 
literary works are imbued, including but not limited to: “the ancient Gnosticism of the first-century Mediterranean 
and Middle Eastern regions, Platonism and Neo-Platonism, Nietzschean materialism, and existential Christianity” (5). 
35 Cf. The Uncanny which is the first book-length analysis of the concept of “the uncanny” written by Nicholas Royle. 
The book includes a chapter titled “Manifestation of Insanity”, in which Royle writes a great deal on the implications 
of insanity and the uncanny effects thereof. 
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lives of the people who beat the odds against pure coincidence36 or the luck of the coin. Thus, it is 
either the fateful death or the coincidental victory, both of which fit the profile of “the uncanny”. 
The most coincidental sparing in the narrative happened to the lucky station man who was verbally 
and intellectually challenged by Chigurh: 
 
Chigurh uncovered the coin. He turned his arm slightly for the man to see. Well 
done, he said. 
He picked the coin from his wrist and handed it across. 
What do I want with that? 
         Take it. It's your lucky coin. (30) 
 
The uncanny fateful/coincident toss of the coin tends to recurrently traumatize the psyches of the 
characters as gravely as the omnipotent spectral presence of the Chigurh does. It is as if Chigurh, 
the coin, and the cattle gun are everywhere and nowhere. More like a phantom, he is there a 
moment and quickly gone the next. This should remind us of the “surreal nature” of death put forth 
by Royle, which I detailed in the first chapter. Omnipotently witnessed everywhere, Chigurh 
remains an unknown figure all the same, as nobody who has seen him stays long enough to utter 
a word about where he is or what he looks like. Indeed, the characters know he exists in person 
through the atrocities he leaves behind, yet he does not exist to many as he constantly vanishes. 
He is as surreal as death itself. At the risk of sounding repetitive, I shall return to Royle’s words 
once more: “[w]e might try to elucidate the death drive’s capacity to be everywhere and nowhere 
in terms of what is called surrealism” (97). Among all the surreal disappearances of Chigurh, as 
the emblem of death along the narrative, the uncanniest one should be in the most haunting 
encounter between Moss and Chigurh at the hotel shoot-out.  
 Having wounded Moss, he was in his final pursuit to make the kill, only to find himself 
ambushed and shot at four times by Moss. This was the closest Moss got to killing Chigurh. 
Approaching the point where he thought to have killed Chigurh, he was only disillusioned by the 
uncanny and surreal disappearance of Chigurh into the darkness. The only thing this vanishing had 
 
36 “Odd Coincidences” are, according to the lights of Bennet and Royle, another staple of “the uncanny” aesthetics: 
“[o]dd coincidences and, more generally, the sense that things are fated to happen. Something might happen, for 
example, that seems ‘too good to be true’” (36). Within the context of No Country for Old Men, the oddest uncanny 
coincidence could be explored in the shocking car crash, too good to be true, happening and severely injuring Chigurh. 
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left behind was the blood trail which Moss followed to darkness. One could wonder how a severely 
wounded Chigurh could vanish into nothingness in a matter of seconds. Both the pursuit and the 
disappearance are imbued with a heavy sense of surreal uncanny spectrality, which is portrayed 
with utmost visual tact and care by the Coen brothers. Some seconds prior to the ambush, the 
stylistics of Chigurh’s placid steps, not having batted a single eyelid after all the shooting, were 
portrayed to the best of spectral aesthetics, namely the dark dim ghostly figure approaching Moss. 
Last but not least, even some seconds prior to Chigurh’s pursuit, the shots aimed at the driver of 
the car and the rear windows were deeply uncanny as the viewer could see the shots yet not have 
the faintest clue where they were coming from. All such images coupled with the eventual surreal 
vanishing leave Moss as well as the audience aghast (see appendix: figures 14-18). 
 All this spectrally uncanny and surreal account in the Coen brothers’ visual innovations, 
starting with Chigurh’s ominous pursuit of Moss and ending in his surreal vanishing, seems to 
derive its original thread from no more than a paragraph in the book: 
 
He loped wincing down the sidewalk past the Aztec Theatre. As he passed the little 
round ticket kiosk all the glass fell out of it. He never even heard that shot. He spun 
with the shotgun and thumbed back the hammer and fired. The buckshot rattled off 
the second storey balustrade and took the glass out of some of the windows. When 
he turned again a car coming down Main Street picked him up in the lights and 
slowed and then speeded up again. He turned up Adams Street and the car skidded 
sideways through the intersection in a cloud of rubbersmoke and stopped. The 
engine had died and the driver was trying to start it. Moss turned with his back to 
the brick wall of the building. Two men had come from the car and were crossing 
the street on foot at a run. One of them opened fire with a small caliber machinegun 
and he fired at them twice with the shotgun and then loped on with the warm blood 
seeping into his crotch. In the street he heard the car start up again. (57) 
 
Closely inspected, neither the ominous ghostly images of Chigurh’s foot approach towards Moss 
nor the surreal vanishing of Chigurh to the darkness belong to McCarthy’s pen in this excerpt, not 
to mention the omission of the two men crossing the street and firing at a run. The Coen brothers’ 
account, to a large extent, diverges from McCarthy’s text, in that they trim their visuality with 
further uncanny aesthetics such as the ghostly walk, silence, repetitive shootings (compared to the 
literary source), death of an additional driver while gurgling blood, and eventually the surreal 
disappearance of Chigurh. All this spectrum of uncanny staples utilized by the Coen brothers in 
this particular sequence transcend the text’s uncanny nature to its imaginable apex. The suspense 
and macabre fear affiliated with uncanny links such as “silence, compulsive repetition [of death] 
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and the urge to die, solitude, the demonic and diabolical and ghostly ubiquity” (Royle 99) are some 
of the elegant uncanny links the brothers have employed not only in this particular sequence but 
also all throughout the narrative. 
 
 
Epilogue: A Promising Ethical Moss and a Mortal Chigurh 
 
Can the onslaught of all this new evil’s phenomenal traumatization and its uncanny haunting be 
worked-through? Could one find a frail strand of positivity or a pale beacon of hope in the midst 
of the havoc the “prophet of destruction” wreaks upon the people of this narrative and the people 
reading or viewing this narrative? Will things in our future civilization go as awry as what the 
narrative and the themes thereof offered? And eventually should humanity succumb to the 
superiority of any evil rising above them and fall on the nihilist trajectory of defeat and distance 
themselves from the altruistic ethics and morality in much the same way as Bell did? These are 
some of the queries that might spark any concerned thinker’s curiosity. Bell, the voice of 
McCarthy, should not think of an easy affirmative yes to the above-raised questions. A survey of 
ethical encounters in No Country for Old Men reveals that there is more to the traumatized ethics 
than meets the eye. The narrative is, with McCarthy’s intention or otherwise, deeply imbued with 
a myriad ethical moments whose existence might bode well to any thought stream seeking hope, 
altruism, and moral obligation, which all lean against the very irreversible negativities of trauma. 
In the lines yet to come, I will explore how the deeds of Moss are tangential to the ethical circles 
of the narrative. 
I have not delved into the character of Moss in detail so far in this study only to keep him 
intact for this occasion. As a protagonist who loses his integrity and logic to the seductive power 
of the money37, Moss seems to be “searching for authenticity in the context of betrayal and moral 
 
37 In a lengthy essay titled “‘You see, my wife’s dad is real well off’ – Money Obscured in the Coen Brothers”, Fleming 
investigates the ambivalent role of money in three of the Coen brothers’ films Fargo, The Big Lebowski, and No 
country for Old Men. Instancing No Country for Old Men as the most violent of all and consequently predicating this 
violence on the brutally seductive role of money, Fleming goes so far as to examine the motivation of Moss in taking 
all the risk to steal the money: “Despite Llewelyn’s seemingly contented lifestyle, he jumps at the opportunity to 
experience upward mobility. As he is sending Carla Jean to her mom’s, he reassures her that she is now retired. 
Llewelyn is not desperate for cash like Fargo’s Jerry. Instead, Llewelyn accepts the risk and the danger for the chance 
to transcend into an upper class that does not rely on work, and yet he only receives violence and death” (23). 
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hypocrisy” (McFarland 167). Traumatized by the bloodshed of the crime scene, he is resilient 
enough to look for the “last man standing” (12). In the process, he stumbles upon a dying man 
imploring him to give him some “Agua” or water, to which he responds: “I aint got no water” (10). 
Once he finds the “last man standing” or ironically the last man lying dead, he opens the case. At 
this moment, McCarthy elegantly describes his inner voice: 
 
It was level full of hundred dollar banknotes. They were in packets fastened with 
banktape stamped each with the denomination $10,000. He didnt know what it 
added up to but he had a pretty good idea. He sat there looking at it and then he 
closed the flap and sat with his head down. His whole life was sitting there in front 
of him. Day after day from dawn till dark until he was dead. All of it cooked down 
into forty pounds of paper in a satchel. (13) 
 
This moment, I argue, was the very inception of his fall, even more fatal than how he missed the 
antelope. This moment gave rise to the very reason why the “prophet of destruction” was unleashed 
in the first place. Knowing a robotic destroyer is after him, he does not even bat an eyelid. On a 
phone call with Chigurh, he, in reaction to Chigurh’s threatening words, bravely says: “I’m goin 
to bring you somethin all right, Moss said. I’ve decided to make you a special project of mine. 
You aint goin to have to look for me at all” (89). He even managed to hurt the so-called invincible 
or the immortal Chigurh in a gun fight, which seemed to be an epiphany to Chigurh: “[g]etting 
hurt changed me, he said. Changed my perspective. I’ve moved on, in a way. Some things have 
fallen into place that were not there before. I thought they were, but they weren’t” (84). 
Unlike Bell whose Second World War traumas have shriveled him down to an avatar of 
Caruthian incomprehensibility and defeat, Moss decided to grow, in tandem with the recent trauma 
model, out of his Vietnamese traumatic experience channelizing all those brutalities into 
intelligence, passion, stamina, discipline and military confidence. McFarland’s description of 
Moss while hunting the antelope goes: 
 
The position of his body and the routine he goes through suggests, however, 
something other than recreational hunting. He lies on his stomach, apparently 
keeping himself hidden from the herd, and carefully judges distance and wind speed 
in preparation for taking a shot. He has the appearance of a sniper and the aura of a 
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military veteran. And, indeed, later in the film we learn that he had served two tours 
of duty twelve years earlier in Vietnam. (168) 
 
An overqualified war veteran who decided to hunt rather than weld, Moss seems to be a notch 
above a hypocrite who is consumed only by the power of money. He goes home to Carla and 
caches the case, yet the traumatic scene of the dying man asking for water haunts him. This is the 
ethical epiphany that strips him of his logic, prompting him to fill a jug of water and head back to 
the crime scene only to find him dead: “[t]he door of the Bronco was open. When he saw that he 
dropped to one knee. He set the water jug on the ground. You dumb-ass, he said. Here you are. 
Too dumb to live.” (17). Traumatized initially by the horrid bloodshed of the crime scene, he is 
not afraid to return to the traumatizing scene as long as his return is the reason for the man’s life. 
Knowing he was “fixin to go do somethin dumbern hell” (16), he never exposed himself to any 
misgivings or second thoughts about his ethical decision. Robison’s words verify this ethicality 
further: “Moss’ humanity cannot just let the man die. He gets up at 1:06 AM, and goes back out 
with intentions of bringing the dying man water…Moss returning to the scene was an act of 
compassion that his conscience could not allow him to avoid” (36). 
 Taking into account the fact that he saw the face of the man only once, yet he felt the moral 
obligation to return to the scene can only remind one of the Levinasion “face of the other”, and 
how “alterity” is the very scope of the human capabilities in expressing their sympathetic behavior 
towards each other even at first sight. In a similar vein, Moss’s ethical decision here should evoke 
the dicta of Onega and Ganteau underscoring the role of “risk-taking over noninvolvement” in the 
discourse of trauma. Moss decided to take action rather than passively feel indifferent to the demise 
of the face of the other, namely the moribund Mexican. This decision is analyzed efficiently in the 
words of McFarland: “[t]wo aspects of his decision are important. First, he does not base it on self-
interest. And secondly, it is not conditional on the outcome. It is not a question of ‘If I do not go, 
the Mexican will die,’ but rather, ‘If I do not go, I will not be able to live with myself’” (169). 
 Another encounter which closely ties Moss to the ethics of the narrative is when he 
establishes a platonic relationship, or friendship, with the hitchhiking lady. This fleeting bond, 
albeit short and doomed to end soon with the demise of both, seems to have secured its most 
significant place in the narrative (including approximately 15 pages), for it encompasses elegant 
descriptions of myriad terrestrial and celestial deeds such as eating, drinking, and engaging in 
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many philosophical38 dialogues. Seeming to be seduced by the charismatic character of Moss upon 
many occasions, the lady offers herself several times, yet Moss is never tempted. Furthermore, he 
keeps his integrity to the inquisitive nature of the girl’s questions telling him the truth regarding 
his marital status and his job as a welder. Equally generous and barely some hours past their 
friendship, he bestows the girls a thousand dollars to help her go to California: 
 
Then he reached in his pocket and took out the roll of hundreds and unfolded 
them. He counted out a thousand dollars onto the formica and pushed it toward 
her and put the roll back in his pocket. Let's go, he said. 
What’s that for? 
To go to California on. (106) 
 
Later, Moss trusts her with the car keys pretending to have left them on the table at the restaurant 
by which the girl herself is shocked uttering: “I could of just slipped off like I was goin to the 
ladies room and took your truck and left you settin there” (107). Aside from the money, he urges 
her to stop hitchhiking as it exposes her to strangers’ sinister accompaniment: “[y]ou got money. 
You dont need to be out here hitchhiking” (111). All this Levinasion ethicality reaches its zenith 
once we know how Moss puts his life second to the girl’s, when he put his gun down once he saw 
the Mexican’s gun pointed at the girl: “[h]e says the Mexican started it. Says he drug the woman 
out of her room and the other man come out with a gun but when he seen the Mexican had a gun 
pointed at the woman’s head he laid his own piece down. And whenever he done that the Mexican 
shoved the woman away and shot her and then turned and shot him” (113).  
 
38 One of the renowned McCarthy quotes, “The point is there aint no point”, came into being through a lengthy 
conversation between Moss and the hitchhiking lady. Evoking many literary philosophical schools such as absurdism 
and existentialism, the sentence, in the main, reflects the tenets of Nihilism where people and things are left with 
nothing but very little choice to change things or instill meaning in them: 
She looked at him. I guess I aint sure what the point is, she said. 
The point is there aint no point. 
No. I mean what you said. About knowin where you are. 
He looked at her. After a while he said: It’s not about knowin where you are. It’s about thinkin 
you got there without takin anything with you. Your notions about startin over. Or anybody’s. You 
dont start over. That’s what it’s about. Ever step you take is forever. You cant make it go away. 
None of it. You understand what I’m sayin? 
I think so. 
I know you dont but let me try it one more time. You think when you wake up in the mornin 
yesterday dont count. But yesterday is all that does count. What else is there? Your life is made 
out of the days it’s made out of. Nothin else. You might think you could run away and change 
your name and I dont know what all. Start over. And then one mornin you wake up and look at the 
ceilin and guess who’s layin there? 
She nodded. (108) 
McCarthy’s ruminations favoring how one can never start over, run away, or change the yesterday in this conversation 
is elegantly consonant with the tenets of meaninglessness and futility of Nihilism. 
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He died trying to save a stranger’s life, whose Levinasion face he had barely seen and for 
whom he could have felt no moral obligation. What shocked the witness and the reporting officers 
was how Moss did not give up even after he was fatally shot, thereby turning and shooting the 
Mexican: “[a]ccordin to this witness the old boy fell down the steps and then he picked up his gun 
again and shot the Mexican. Which I dont see how he done it. He was shot all to pieces. You can 
see the blood on the walkway yonder” (113). His ethicality seems to have pervaded and 
strengthened his physicality, hence not succumbing to defeat or death before witnessing the demise 
of the person who devalued his most cherished face. 
In the Coen brothers’ adaptation, all the ethical aesthetics comes down to a sunbathing lady 
flirting with Moss, to whom Moss shows the ring finger implying his marital status. Smiling at the 
proposition of the beer, Moss’s conversation is immediately cut and is instead replaced with Sheriff 
Bell’s arrival at the chaotic shooting of some Mexicans fleeing the scene, whose aftermath includes 
the floating body of the flirting lady in the pool, another Mexican bleeding and struggling with his 
life, and shot-to-death Moss (see appendix: figures 19-23). Many things are amiss here. The 
audience are left with their own subjective interpretation as to whether anything has happened 
between Moss and the propositioning lady, apropos which McFarland assumes that “[a]lthough 
the location of the bodies suggests that nothing did follow the beers, there is the impression that at 
the very least Llewelyn has let down his guard” (171).  
Thus, the Levinasion ethicality Moss offers in the novel is replaced with a sort of moral 
failing in the film. All the intellectual dialogues, the financial help, the moral caring advice, the 
life sacrifice and the resilient reactionary shooting are replaced with a chaotic scene, whose 
existential and random absurdity should be that which the Coen brothers aim at, resembling the 
accidental and situational violence in Lady Killers or the absurdist violence in The Man who 
Wasn’t There. Perhaps this is the Coen brothers’ way of showing how the villain escapes and the 
protagonist falls, which pits itself against McCarthy’s characterization of Moss. 
By choosing to keep the audience in the dark and not revealing the details of Moss’s death, 
the Coen brothers, I should suggest, opt for their exclusive creativity in urging the audience not 
only to resist judgement but also venture to the very random existential chaos by which a 
protagonist’s thematically ambitious journey is abruptly obstructed. The audience, aghast and 
clueless, have to only rely on their subjective interpretations, which could not lead to the ethics 
this study pursued. To the brothers, at this point, what matters is the subversion of not only the 
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long-standing cliché of the protagonist’s lofty journey to eliminate the evil but also the hero’s 
noble and courageous death. This must be why the flaw of character development has been 
attributed to the brothers in the first place, as Adams states: 
 
These absences seem to consist of gaps in character credibility and the 
unceremonious elimination of Moss without the dignity of a proper death scene. 
Stephen Hunter was completely unimpressed, admitting bluntly, ‘I just don’t like it 
much’, although like many he praised the film for its flawless cinematic 
craftsmanship. Hunter’s main complaint concerned character development, of 
which he thought there was very little. (165) 
 
Character development has never been one of the Coen brothers’ pivotal concerns and I must 
assume, to this critical review, they might say they need their characters, or their heroes, as 
imperfect, mediocre and flawed as possible. After all, the brothers have always been iconoclasts 
of an unparalleled type, as Semenza’s assertion verifies this as well: 
 
A typical Hollywood thriller would likely show a climactic showdown between 
Moss and Chigurh, with a slow-motion shot of Moss dramatically dying as his foe 
bests him. The movie would probably then end at this point, with a brief epilogue 
showing how Moss’ wife, Carla Jean, copes with the death of her husband. But the 
Coens instead cut this scene out, and allow Chigurh to continue on his rampage. 
(32) 
 
Moss’s death, whether in McCarthy’s ethically brave account or in the brothers’ idiosyncratic 
visuals, leaves the “prophet of destruction” more prone to victory, invincibility and further brutal 
liberty. No one will stand in the robot’s way and he will thrive to the best of his malice. McCarthy 
does not think so. Having tossed the coin to Carla’s death and watched the soles of his shoes lest 
they would be smeared by her blood, he drives away reveling in his new psychopathic victory only 
to be disillusioned by an abrupt startling accident. He has waited all this while to lose his 
narcissistic invincibility only to a random idiotic crash. A chink in his armor is found. He is not 
immortal after all. Paying the young witnesses a hundred dollars for their shirt as a sling as well 
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as their silence, he limps away with a bone sticking out of his hand and a cut on his head. The 
same randomness whose power he covets and abides by disempowers him, leaving him perhaps 
edified for a second time after the first epiphany wound inflicted on him by Moss.  This is where 
McCarthy might intend to instill a beacon of hope in the hearts of the traumatized victims implying 
that nemesis could be as random as fate, as Robinson aptly states: “Chigurh learns the hard way 
that he is not as powerful as he believed. It turns out that he is subject to the forces of nature that 
he thought he could control…Randomness is not a force that any human will ever control, and 
although Chigurh dedicates his existence to such a futile concept, even one with his persistence 
fails in the end” (40). 
 All the while Chigurh was tormenting Carla, the accident had been waiting to happen. 
Perhaps, when he decided to toss the coin to Carla’s death, the drivers of the car who smashed into 
his car and consequently his ribs had already drawn the lines of Chigurh’s fate; the lines, which, 
in his assumption, can be barely erased. These lines, however, were drawn for justice, this time. In 
the words of Gilmore, “the accident suggests that justice may eventually assert itself into human 
affairs” (174). Even if we lose sight of justice, randomness, nemesis, and fate, we can never turn 
a blind eye on the fact that we can be traumatized the same way we traumatize. One might try to 
find a thousand ways to dismiss any principle as invalid, yet one can never dismiss the power of 
trauma so. Chigurh or any other monster, they need to learn they might, if not must, get inflicted 
by the same traumatizing wound they inflict on others. This, then, can be an outlook to be 










































“No lists of things to be done. The day providential to itself. The hour. There 
is no later. This is later. All things of grace and beauty such that one holds 
them to one's heart have a common provenance in pain. Their birth in grief 
and ashes. So, he whispered to the sleeping boy. I have you.” 
– McCarthy, The Road 
 
McCarthy’s wasteland in The Road is but a brave epitome of nothingness and void. Everything 
comes to naught. Ash is all there is. Barely could a shimmer of hope shine upon the drained hearts 
of the survivors of the apocalypse whose genuine nature no one is entitled to know or inquire into. 
The underlying traumatic event is hard to single out. Indeed, one could dare to claim that trauma 
makes very little sense as all one witnesses is but the post-traumatic era whose effect confuses the 
cause. To fortify the aesthetics of his thematic message, McCarthy has even annihilated his 
methodic traumatic characters. Chigurh and Holden are no more, or perhaps they have lost their 
lives to the unmentioned cataclysmic event. No Indians to scalp, nor any cattle gun to punch a hole 
to the foreheads. Cattle gun and the fetishes of No Country for Old Men might be, on an ironic 
note, among the things the father (Viggo Mortensen) and son (Kodi Smit-McPhee) would be 
nostalgically searching for. The void overshadows the plot as well, for the soul of narrative hinges 
upon the survival pursuit of a father and son scavenging for food and clothes. Nothing but.  
All the hallmarks of civilization such as states, cities, books, machinery, socio-intellectual 
codes of conduct, intra-personal and inter-personal dynamics, families, affection, mercy, ethics, 
and many others, whose mention seems to be outside the scope of this study, have ceased to exist. 
The whole world is at the mercy of “Second Law of Thermodynamics…meaning that all energy 
will in time disperse and fizzle out” (Graulund 60). The only token of civilization standing strong 
is the road which might not linger on for long: 
 
But the roads are still there. 
Yes. For a while.  
How long a while? 
I dont know. Maybe quite a while. There’s nothing to uproot them so they should 
be okay for a while. (McCarthy 18) 
 
The road and its temporarily evanescent promises will not stave off the insufferable inhumanities 
at whose heart stands cannibalism. Cannibalism, as dehumanizing as it sounds, seems to surpass, 
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in profundity and rigor, all the rest of the traumatic tropes of the narrative. The apocalypse and the 
ashen world as the collective trauma plane of the narrative mesh with the individual trauma plane 
of the narrative such as the suicide of the mother, terminal illness of the father, and the abject 
survival efforts of the pair. Nonetheless, the resultant traumatic weight is diminutive compared to 
that of such lines concerning cannibalism: “Oh Papa, he said. He turned and looked again. What 
the boy had seen was a charred human infant headless and gutted and blackening on the spit. He 
bent and picked the boy up and started for the road with him, holding him close. I’m sorry, he 
whispered. I’m sorry” (74). Traumatized from every conceivable angle, father and son still aspire 
to go South, in the hopes of finding hope. They are the “good guys” who will never stop “carrying 




Cauterized by a cataclysmic event, a nuclear disaster as the best hunch, the world has shriveled to 
solely a road on which the fire-carrying pair are treading. McCarthy offers very few clues as to the 
very underlying cause of this vast destruction. Yet, in the light of the phrase “[a] long shear of light 
and then a series of low concussions” (McCarthy 21), insinuations such as “[a] global weapon, a 
nuclear meltdown or an asteroid” (Peters 86), or an ecological disaster rush to mind as the most 
plausible cases. Very little, likewise, is uttered regarding the temporal state in which the narrative 
unfolds. Put differently, time and space have met their demise in much the same way the majority 
of world’s population are lumbering towards their gradual death, as Graulund asserts: “[a]s with 
place, so with time, for though history is still present in The Road, it is only as a fading memory. 
It is not a totally static world, yet it is one that obviously soon will be, a world in which time has 
stopped and a world in which progress and evolution are no longer to be found” (60). 
  History of a traumatized/traumatizing narrative is essentially inaccessible. To return to the 
arguments of non-referential nature of trauma delineated in chapter one, historical truth or the true 
history is in an untenable state. Taking her cue from Moses and Monotheism and the shameful 
slaying of Moses, which gives rise to a traumatically and chronologically distorted history, Caruth 
claims, “[f]or history to be a history of trauma means that it is referential precisely to the extent it 
is not fully perceived as it occurs; or to put it somewhat differently, that a history can be grasped 
only in the very inaccessibility of its occurrence” (18). In other words, the traumatic history is not 
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only non-referential but completely tangential to an area of fiction, imagination and perhaps 
distortion.  
 Within the context of The Road, the more the audience focus on gleaning something from 
the temporal, or the historical, plane of the narrative, the more this plane beats them. Nobody could 
even venture a guess as to whether where, when and how the original trauma or the apocalypse 
has occurred, much less the temporal details of the event. All we are entitled to know is “[t]he 
clocks stopped at 1:17” (McCarthy 21). The rest of the interpretation rests on the shoulders of the 
audience, hence the above-mentioned fictitious area in which all these interpretations apropos the 
reality of the traumatic event readily distort the reality of the traumatic event. In other words, the 
audience, each with a different figment of imagination, conjure up their own version of the event 
which gave rise to the post-traumatic trajectory in The Road, hence the ubiquity of the non-
referentiality.  
This non-referentiality lies on the same plane on which past and present converge to and 
diverge from each other. This way the historical memory or the factual history is replaced with 
distorted fiction or the traumatic repression. Repressed to the unconscious of the characters or the 
audience, not much of this temporality can be uttered only perhaps to be revealed by later 
generations, when the genuine authenticity of the event has already transformed into legends. This 
must be precisely why the characters, with the astute intention of the McCarthy, do not or perhaps 
cannot reveal any clue as to the historical references or the facts around which the apocalypse 
occurred. This annihilated sense of temporality and its ensuing non-referential history are best 
noted in the words of Rambo: 
 
The quest that McCarthy sends us on in The Road is one in which temporal markers 
of past, present, and future no longer hold. At the beginning of the novel, the man 
wakes up in the night, and we are immediately told that there is no distinction 
between night and day. All, it seems, is an eternal middle; there is nothing to 
anticipate, and the past is what haunts the father, reminding him of a world he can 
never get back. McCarthy catches the reader in a schizophrenic, and distinctively 




The lost temporality, which in turn gives rise to the non-referentiality of the traumatic event, 
informs much of the plot and characters as well. Not being able to make sense of the trauma, the 
characters offer very little regarding what happened, and even if they do, their accounts, according 
to the lights of Caruth, cannot be reliable, hence the non-referentiality. What adds to this non-
referentiality is how the leading characters themselves are deprived of any name. This must be 
McCarthy’s witting nuance in trimming the characters with the same referential vagueness which 
has likewise grown around the traumatic event itself. This non-referentiality is explicated in the 
words of Stifflemire: 
 
Additional referential ambiguity is created through the language which identifies 
the father and the son. By remaining nameless, the characters, like the states, lack 
unique identification. The lack of unique identifiers also means that they are both 
inevitably referred to by masculine pronouns, and by nature of McCarthy’s style, 
the narrative does not clearly demarcate shifts of focus between the father and the 
son from paragraph to paragraph. (197) 
 
This ambiguity has pervaded the soul of McCarthy’s plot structure in much the same way his ashen 
scabland has infected everything and everybody it has come in contact with. Precisely and 
objectively viewed, there is no plot or element of an ideal storytelling, as Lincoln holds “[t]here 
are no chapter reliefs for 241 pages, no plot line or story arc of character development, just two 
shrouded figures walking the road and running for their lives, dark figures on a darkling plain” 
(165). Bereft of any structured plot and sensible characters, the narrative has to only hinge upon 
an amalgamation of an absent past and an uncertain future, which, in turn, intensifies the nature of 
the vague temporality, not to mention the already lost sense of spatiality, which is clarified in the 
words of Stifflemire: 
 
Temporal ambiguity in McCarthy’s novel disconnects the past from its meaning—
the past has become an absent referent—and the synchronic world of The Road 
offers only offers uncertainty in the future. In addition to such disruption of the 
meaningful connections between past, present, and future, the postmodern interest 
in questioning, undercutting, and eliding referents from their signifiers is 
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manifested in other ways in the novel—including ambiguity of space, character 
identification, and artifacts of the lost world. While time has lost its markers, spatial 
demarcation has also become meaningless. (197) 
 
Turning to the film, one can assert that at the heart of Hillcoat’s visual aesthetics resides the very 
same traumatic non-referentiality, which is couched in delicate articulation and layering. Having 
excelled at directing a poetic and violent The Proposition (2005), Hillcoat’s artistic ambition 
ventured into an apocalyptic realm with The Road, whose critical output oscillated between two 
stark camps whose members either called the film an “extremely faithful, disturbing but deeply 
moving adaptation” (Roddick qtd in McSweeney 43) or “a long, dull slog” (Hoberman qtd in 
McSweeney 43) that fell “dispiritingly short on every front” (T. McCarthy qtd in McSweeney 43).  
Critically ambivalent and financially lackluster, the film, however, garnered great 
proponents as well. It is not the intention of this study, however, to examine the aesthetics of inter-
disciplinary fidelity or discussions belonging to that category, insofar as each work lives its 
autonomous life within its pertinent medium. Nor is this study bent on judging the claims made 
apropos the merit or demerits of the filmic adaptation compared to its literary source. Instead, this 
study sets out to unravel the critical moments of the narrative, shared by both works, which run 
the hermeneutics of trauma or the traumatic moments to the best of their abilities. One such critical 
plane of which both the novel and film seem to be appreciative is non-referentiality or how this 
concept operates within the logic of both. 
 The film The Road abides by the tropes of non-referentiality in many fronts. All throughout 
the film, one cannot witness or hear a particular name, date, or place. No geographical or historical 
reference is made whatsoever, save for the symbolic “south” whose details are as ambivalent as 
the apocalypse itself. This non-referential plane is more visually trimmed by Hillcoat’s choice of 
gray color aesthetics, as touched upon by Mcsweeney: 
 
It is perhaps the color of the film, or the lack of it, that becomes the defining aspect 
of its mise-en-scène. The overall effect of the bleached palette is one of decay: the 
world of The Road is dying—abandoned skyscrapers are crumbling, discarded 
ATM machines spill once revered but now useless cash on the floor, machines are 




Lack of color, I argue, strikes a close chord with the lack of temporality and space, as colors have 
constantly been referred to as agents which imbue differentiation and meaning to things and object. 
Low-key gray is all one can lay eyes on, except for the pre-apocalyptic moments, to which I will 
revert later. 
 Against this non-referentiality pits Hillcoat’s eccentric choice of space, which, I argue, is 
utterly at adds with McCarthy’s non-referential ideals. And this should be where Hillcoat’s 
portrayal of trauma diverges from McCarthy’s textual aesthetics apropos the concept of temporal 
ambiguity. While McCarthy has gone to great lengths to keep most his narrative as non-referential 
as possible, Hillcoat, on the contrary, believes he had to refer to particularly real places to instill 
the same awe in the film which was instilled in himself by the book, hence his choice of real places.  
Calling it “heightened realism”, Hillcoat succeeded in bringing into life an atmosphere of 
believability, as he personally notes: “[w]hat’s moving and shocking about McCarthy’s book is 
that it’s so believable. So what we wanted is a kind of heightened realism, as opposed to the Mad 
Max thing, which is all about high concept and spectacle. We’re trying to avoid the clichés of 
apocalypse and make this more like a natural disaster” (qtd. in Mcsweeney 46). Hillcoat, to render 
things more real, includes a footage of destruction of World Trade Center and the marooned ships 
after Hurricane Catrina (see appendix: figures 1-2). But, are these not pure references to time and 
places? Something which McCarthy himself has remained mysteriously silent on, which runs in 
tandem with the principles of the traumatic non-referentiality. Hillcoat’s heightened reality, albeit 
plausible and appealing in visual terms, runs counter to the trauma discourse of non-referentiality. 
 Albeit at odds with the traumatic non-referentiality, Hillcoat’s painstaking exploitation of 
“heightened reality” is not unfounded. Deliberately opting for “America’s real apocalyptic zones” 
(Hillcoat qtd in Peebles 11) such as “abandoned stretches of freeway, deserted coalfields, a burned-
down amusement park” (Peebles 11, see appendix: figures 3-5), not to mention the post-Katrina 
landscape and allusion to the Twin Towers’ destruction, Hillcoat aims somewhere beneath the 
surface of the narrative, which, I wish to argue, could serve as his innovative directorial trademark. 
Perhaps, Hillcoat, as a personal mission of his own, attempts to make the non-referential 
referential, in order to make his foray into transforming McCarthy’s fiction into reality. Trauma, 
Hillcoat should imply, has already happened and we can refer to it historically and geographically 
whatsoever, despite whatever the non-referentiality of a traumatic history might hold against it. 
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This stance is substantiated once we take into account his words when he comments “these places 
were not hard to find. There’s a fair amount of devastation already in the American landscape” 
(qtd in Peebles 11). 
 Another visual traumatic staple whose portrayal is tangential to the non-referentiality trope 
and whose visualization is of remarkable significance is how McCarthy’s underlying apocalyptic 
event escapes clear utterance. Solely allowing the reader to know when the clocks stopped, 
McCathy’s tactful and non-referential maneuvers, henceforth, embark on their adventures 
abounding the whole narrative. The very pithy description of the night of the apocalypse is as 
follows: 
 
The clocks stopped at 1:17. A long shear of light and then a series of low 
concussions. He got up and went to the window. What is it? she said. He didnt 
answer. He went into the bathroom and threw the lightswitch but the power was 
already gone. A dull rose glow in the windowglass. He dropped to one knee and 
raised the lever to stop the tub and then turned on both taps as far as they would go. 
She was standing in the doorway in her nightwear, clutching the jamb, cradling her 
belly in one hand. What is it? she said. What is happening?  
I dont know.  
Why are you taking a bath? 
I’m not. (22) 
 
The audience have their own wits to interpret the very reason why the man is running a bath at the 
time of an apocalypse, namely saving water before it turns to be a rarity in a post-apocalyptic era. 
McCarthy obscures the reason for this forward-looking act leaving it to the interpretive shoulders 
of his audience in much the same way he is hazy apropos the very apocalyptic event. He neither 
refers to the apocalypse nor the man’s reaction to it, in an obtrusive way. 
Hillcoat’s directorial aesthetics abide by the same enigmatic haziness concerning the 
traumatic temporality. To add to the anxiety and the gravity of the moment, Hillcoat transposes 
the scene to a series of mad shouts and screams in the auditory background of the scene, which is 
more than noticeable. The complexion of the mother aghast in the face of such noise and the man’s 
hasty bathtub filling are Hillcoat’s way of visualizing or capturing the soul of the scene (see 
appendix: figures 6-7), as noted by Mcsweeney’s description: “[a]s screams come from outside, a 
raging fire casts a crepuscular light that reflects on the heavily pregnant Woman’s skin as she gazes 
in disbelief through the window” (48).  
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The director’s camera, all the while, never strays away from the domestic space of the 
house. Put simply, outside is off-limits as it might reveal what it is not meant to be revealed. 
Trauma remains visually unreferred in much the same way it was not directly mentioned textually, 
as explicated in the words of Mcsweeney: “[y]et the camera never moves outside their house in 
the flashbacks (except for once much later in the film), and we never directly see or are told the 
nature of the event that caused the end of the world” (48). 
This haziness, which conforms to McCarthy’s equally vague and provocative narrational 
stylistics, brings up yet another trademark in Hillcoat’s oeuvre, namely the challenge he poses to 
the audience in interpreting the scenes and sequences rather than simply providing the audience 
with the resolution: “[o]ne of the strengths of Hillcoat’s film is its erotetic nature, a refusal to 
continuously explain and reaffirm the actions and motivations of the characters, a stark contrast to 
a Hollywood cinema characterized by its goal-oriented narratives of action and reaction” (48-49). 
Then, McCarthy’s furtive non-referentiality and his provocative mysteries which overshadow the 
underlying traumatic event of the narrative sit well with Hillcoat’s erotetic style and challenging 
interpretational expectations. 
In the face of such irrefutable elusive temporality, what should, one might wonder, the 
narrative turn to? What could be the best alternative(s) to a plot and characters? One could not help 
but notice how McCarthy has his leading characters touch, wrap, unwrap, fix, unscrew, and 
perhaps use things or objects eventually. Things or objects are omnipotently felt all throughout the 
narrative in much the same manner as the lost temporality is pervasively sensed. Description of 
things is overwhelming as noted by Lincoln: “[a] scavenger hunt in an abandoned house dredges 
up a sugar-grape drink packet, a spoon, a boxcutter, a screwdriver. These things mean things, or 
will—the possibilities of tools, human ingenuity” (169). “Things” and their concreteness seem to 
be the only alternative to the subjectivity of a lost temporality, as held notably in the words of 
Hardwig: 
 
By imagining the unrealized and destroyed future, The Road reverses McCarthy’s 
tendency to remove from his narrative the entanglement of modern objects. In this 
speculative novel, he swivels his orientation towards, rather than away from, 
cultural artifacts, towards ‘things.’ McCarthy’s intense treatment of human- made 
things in The Road, the proliferation of his use of the term ‘thing’ in the novel, and 
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the tender treatment of these things by the book’s narrator, so different from 
McCarthy’s desire to shed his narrative of frivolous objects of civilizations, can 
best be accounted for by thinking about the aesthetic choices he makes when 
imagining the future. (39) 
 
McCarthy’s narrative, privileged with the tangibility of “things” and their nostalgic aesthetics, 
signposts thematic trajectories by which the lack of all the clichés and archetypes could be 
accounted for. The objects of the past afford the narrative the same body of traumatic concreteness 
whose counterpart, namely the ambiguous temporality, equally lacks. The author details every 
single thing the fire-carrying pair get their hands on with as much precision as possible, while there 
is not even an iota of connotation or denotation of the time in which all these “things” and the 
descriptions thereof surface. On an ironic note, even if such descriptions did exist, once could 
doubt their reliability in the light of the non-referential nature of the trauma the whole world has 
been exposed to. Out of many thing-based descriptions in McCarthy’s text, I have opted for a 
particular excerpt in which the father intends to uncap a gas can: 
 
On the top shelf were two cans of motor oil and he put the pistol in his belt and 
reached and got them and set them on the bench. They were very old, made of 
cardboard with metal endcaps. The oil had soaked through the cardboard but still 
they seemed full. He stepped back and looked out the door. The boy was sitting on 
the back steps of the house wrapped in the blankets watching him. When he turned 
he saw a gascan in the corner behind the door. He knew it couldnt have gas in it yet 
when he tilted it with his foot and let it fall back again there was a gentle slosh. He 
picked it up and carried it to the bench and tried to unscrew the cap but he could 
not. He got the pliers out of his coat pocket and extended the jaws and tried it. It 
would just fit and he twisted off the cap and laid it on the bench and sniffed the can. 
Rank odor. Years old. But it was gasoline and it would burn. He screwed the cap 
back on and put the pliers in his pocket. He looked around for some smaller 
container but there wasnt one. He shouldnt have thrown away the bottle. Check the 
house. (51) 
 
Why should a canonical author like McCarthy take heed of how the leading character unscrews a 
gas can? In layman’s eyes, all the countless descriptive instances of “things” and their tangible 
depictions, which are solely targeted at the aesthetics of the survival of the rummaging pair, would 
be tedious and redundant. And expectedly, many such critical views have been pervasively heard 
in the recent literary criticism. Yet, when the underlying reasoning of this thing-based substitution 
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is revealed, one could reverse this severe judgement. This particular dimension of fetishism in 
describing “things” is not only an approach to compensate for the lack of temporality but also a 
decent scheme to display the irreversible gravity of the traumatic loss and how the “things” of the 
past could not be retrieved under any circumstance, which is illuminated in the words of Hardwig 
again: 
In The Road, there are several moments during which things are endowed with such 
an aura that at first seems inexplicable in a novel written by McCarthy. Whether it 
is the still- standing gas pumps that remain in the ruined land (6) or the specter of 
a dam towering over polluted waters (19) or the child’s bicycle, formica table, and 
Kool- Aid in an abandoned house (119), the remnants and memory of things 




Should “things” constitute half McCarthy’s ashen narrative, flashbacks and dreams constitute the 
remaining half. Underscoring the sensory and emotional dimension of the flashback, Hustvedt 
believes flashbacks need to be preserved in a locus other than the linguistic repertoire of the 
victim’s psyche (pars 5-6). Ironically, words are the body of the flashbacks in literature but not 
their soul, in that their mission is to lay bare the emotionality of traumatic encounter. In other 
words, words are instrumental in helping the victim revisit the traumatic image which has not been 
properly incorporated into the psychic memory of the patient. This way, the flashbacks 
coincidentally serve as the catalysts for the notorious purposes of the haunting agent. Briefly, the 
overwhelming traumatic encounter keeps haunting the victim via the repetitive raid of the 
flashbacks which reflect the emotional and sensory dynamics of the traumatic moment.  
Within the context of The Road, flashbacks could be construed as the traumatic plane on 
which the leading characters converse with the pre-apocalyptic era. In other words, characters, 
through the indelible power and finesse of the flashbacks, enter into dialogues with the nostalgic 
past. This ubiquitous pervasion of dreams and flashback inform a substantial portion of the father’s 
psychic malaise. Perhaps the most moving and emotional flashback, out of whose vortex he cannot 
think of a proper way, is the conversation which preceded the suicide of his wife: 
 
You’re talking crazy.  
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No, I’m speaking the truth. Sooner or later they will catch us and they will kill us. 
They will rape me. They’ll rape him. They are going to rape us and kill us and eat 
us and you wont face it. You’d rather wait for it to happen. But I cant. I cant. She 
sat there smoking a slender length of dried grapevine as if it were some rare cheroot. 
Holding it with a certain elegance, her other hand across her knees where she’d 
drawn them up. She watched him across the small flame. We used to talk about 
death, she said. We dont any more. Why is that?  
I dont know. It’s because it’s here. There’s nothing left to talk about.  
I wouldnt leave you.  
I dont care. It’s meaningless. You can think of me as a faithless slut if you like. I’ve 
taken a new lover. He can give me what you cannot.  
Death is not a lover.  
Oh yes he is.  
Please dont do this.  
I’m sorry. (23) 
 
Having left its heinous mark on the psyche of the father, the flashback is just a harbinger of all the 
saga of the dreams that flood over his wounded psyche. The suicide of his wife is the trauma whose 
compulsion39 the father cannot wrench himself free of. It is as though the sensory or the emotional 
image of the suicide, as set forth by Hustvedt, is the only tale he has and the only tale he can never 
make sense of: “[i]n his dream she was sick and he cared for her. The dream bore the look of 
sacrifice but he thought differently. He did not take care of her and she died alone somewhere in 
the dark and there is no other dream nor other waking world and there is no other tale to tell” 
(McCarthy 14). The inconsolable weight of this trauma gives rise to the repetitive dreams by which 
the victim, father in this context, is irreversibly haunted. Flashbacks and the dreams thereof, within 
the context of The Road, are best explicated from Caruth’s position when she asserts that 
flashbacks showcase “the absolute inability of the mind to avoid an unpleasurable event that has 
not been given psychic meaning” (59). As such, the father’s soul has not gone through the 
Caruthian psychic meaning process, hence the frequent returns to the traumatic moment in order 
to come to terms with it. 
Another excessively traumatizing thought which keeps possessing the psyche of the father 
is how he will bring himself to kill his son if they are caught by the cannibals, lest they rape, torture 
 
39 Even if the repetition compulsion of the apocalyptic world is worked-through in the light of the father’s resilient 
psyche, the traumatic compulsion of his wife’s suicide seems to be as Caruthianly incomprehensible as possible, hence 
the omnipresent state of flashback to the wife all throughout the novel. In other words, he seems to work thorough the 




and eat him. All throughout the narrative, he is intensely preoccupied with this horrific thought 
and the scene of a trauma which has not even happened. This intensely feared trauma is revealed 
as McCarthy describes the dying moment of the father:  
 
I cant. I cant hold my son dead in my arms. I thought I could but I cant. 
You said you wouldnt ever leave me.  
I know. I’m sorry. You have my whole heart. You always did. You’re the best guy. 
You always were. If I’m not here you can still talk to me. You can talk to me and 
I'll talk to you. You’ll see. Will I hear you?  
Yes. You will. You have to make it like talk that you imagine. And you’ll hear me. 
You have to practice. Just dont give up. Okay?  
Okay. (103) 
 
The dilemma of choosing to euthanize his own son or otherwise allowing the cannibals to rape and 
eat him stands as close as possible to the traumatic suicide of his wife, as Peters remarks: 
“[b]ecause the Man invests so much significance in the Boy, the central drama of the story is 
whether he would be able to kill the child if necessary─ and in a world in which roving groups of 
cannibals roam the roads, it may well be necessary. With only one bullet left in his gun, the man 
constantly wonders if he would be able to kill his son to spare him worse pain” (91).   
The nightmarish flashbacks take their toll on the psyche of the child as well. Traumatized 
by the loss of a mother and the world standing on the verge of annihilation, the boy is but broken 
beyond repair. Mired in his traumatic compulsion, he seems to have no way of being redeemed: 
 
It’s okay, Papa. I just want to have a little quiet time.  
What about dreams? You used to tell me dreams sometimes. 
I dont want to talk about anything.  
Okay. 
I dont have good dreams anyway. They’re always about something bad happening. 
You said that was okay because good dreams are not a good sign. Maybe. I dont 
know. (100) 
  
All the haunting flashbacks, dreams, and nightmares address the very incomprehensibility of the 
traumatic event, either the suicide of the mother or the crumbling world, which are otherwise called 
the PTSD by Caruth, by which “overwhelming events of the past repeatedly possess, in intrusive 
images and thoughts, the one who has lived through them” (Trauma, Explorations 151). This 
“singular possession by the past”, which touches upon the spectral haunting of the traumatic 
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experience, fits the bill here too, as the father and son seem to be incessantly possessed by the 
gravity of the traumas imposed on them.  
However, there is no clear flashback or dream revolving around the apocalyptic event itself, 
which is because McCarthy constantly strives to obscure this particular event with a certain haze 
of uncertainty. As such, the traumatic event is missed and one witnesses only the signs. This 
“missed encounter” evokes the “Lacanian real” in which one can never ascertain the true shape of 
the traumatic event. The more one delves into the very core of this encounter, the more one finds 
out it is beyond the world of signification. Within the context of The Road, the audience, as 
traumatized by the crumbling world as the father and son, are craving a thread of knowledge as to 
what set in motion the very apocalypse whose aftermath is nothing but ash. Yet, the “tuché” or all 
the search for the cause and the “missed encounter” escapes them insidiously. To repeat myself, 
through Lacan’s lens, “real” is not only traumatic but also un-assimilable, hence its being missed 
and mysteriously non-existent. The mysteriously non-existent nature of the traumatic even in The 
Road, efficiently meshes with the implication of the “Lacanian real”. 
 Traumatic flashbacks and dreams of The Road plan their incursion into the realm of the 
technical aesthetics of the narrative as well. McCarthy has his characters scavenge for food one 
moment, and leads them towards a flashback to the suicide, the other. Paragraphs are short, 
characters are nameless, and the memories are alienating and intense. No particular line of 
narration, linear or non-linear, is pursued. All such stylistic amalgamation, this study should infer, 
aids not only the fragmentation of the narration but also the very non-referential nature of the 
narrative, as explicated in the words of Hardwig: “McCarthy presents the reader with clumps of 
memories, scenes, and events that seem almost random. Paragraphs are short and intense, like 
telegrams, and are separated, not by chapter titles or dividing symbols, but only by space” (43). 
Referring to the hypotheses of Whitehead regarding the fragmented narrative voice, Bueno, in like 
manner, attributes the narrative’s haunted state to “the dreams, flashbacks, repetitions, and 
intrusive memories, which are proof of the fact that McCarthy drew his main characters as 
suffering victims of a traumatized psychological condition” (80). 
 Time is utterly titular in The Road. It is an agent with no authority nor meaning. This titular 
essence of temporality discommodes the memories of the characters who are in constant quest of 
reality or truth. However, encountering a “missed encounter”, their memory, too, fails them, hence 
the unreliable or the non-referential state of their remembrance. To add to the gravity of the non-
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referentiality, the flashbacks and dreams step in as they are what is left of their past. This argument 
seems to be validated by Butler when he mentions: 
 
Time, especially in The Road, becomes an increasingly arbitrary concept. The man 
‘hadnt [sic] kept a calendar for years’, which raises questions about what happens 
to memory when time collapses and ceases to be important. ‘The child would ask 
him questions about the world that for him was not even a memory’ and the man 
tries to answer but recognises in doing so that if he tries to tell the ‘truth’, it will 
still be fiction because memory is unreliable, because ‘there is no past’. The idea of 
‘reality’ is also troubled by this, for if there is no past, no secure sense of time, then 
there is also no present. Dreams and memories intrude to the extent that the 
boundaries are blurred and nothing can be trusted. (7) 
 
Even if the father had wished to enlighten his son and his inquisitiveness on the nature of the truth 
behind the ashen world, his traumatized, and consequently non-referential, memory would have 
failed him, the son and his query.   
The visual world of Hillcoat has been more than attentive to the aesthetics of traumatic 
flashbacks. Yet, what haunts even the haunting body of the flashbacks is the sequential flashback 
to the wife (Charlize Theron) and the memories whose nostalgia pervades the psyche of the man. 
It is as if this flashback or the chain of flashbacks to the wife, in Hillcoat’s logic, represent all the 
other traumas and their corresponding flashbacks. Hillcoat’s flashbacks to the wife outnumber 
those portrayed by McCarthy, including scenes and sequences such as the birth of the baby, the 
suicide dialogue, the piano duet scene, her wandering off to the darkness and the concert and bed 
scenes. Some of these flashbacks (birth of the baby, the concert, the piano duet scene, and the car 
scene) are non-existent, or pale in comparison with those in McCarthy’s novel (see appendix: 
figures 8-11). Other flashbacks and dreams such as the fishing trip, trout, and the family house, 
however, escape Hillcoat’s adaptation, as noted in the words of Luce: “[t]he film’s exclusive 
representation of memories of the wife and rejection of all the man’s other memories suggest far 
more than the novel that the loss of her overshadows for him all other losses” (qtd in Peebles 13). 
Despite an overarching presence, the wife does not exert as much an intellectual influence 
on the film as she does on the novel. Therefore, she is voluminous and numerically remarkable but 
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insignificant. McCarthy puts a lot of his soul into the character of the wife making her and her 
suicide look cogent and intellectually solid in various fronts: “[a]nd she was right. There was no 
argument. The hundred nights they’d sat up arguing the pros and cons of self destruction with the 
earnestness of philosophers chained to a madhouse wall” (23). In the film, however, the character 
solely represents what I call a blank trauma─ a lost entity whose loss is not imbued with anything 
more than a psychic malaise. Peebles duly expounds on this gap: 
 
McCarthy himself clearly considers the mother’s character and actions significant 
and labels many pages of an early draft concerning her decision to commit suicide 
“The Mother.” How and why she makes her choice are as important as its effects. 
In the film her decision is stripped of the bulk of that reasoning and rather appears 
as an inability to properly care for or about her family. (13) 
 
One way to justify Hillcoat’s stylistics in trimming the flashback of the wife could be how he 
emphasizes the role of haunting and its divorce from the intellectual or exegetic background it was 
once exposed to. Put simply, the director is more concerned with the traumatic awe of the haunting 
flashback than the intellectuality it can equally offer. Let us treasure his own words then: 
 
The flashbacks in the film will make memories feel more like a haunted dream, 
haunted by both the father’s own ghosts and the ghosts of a collective American 
past. They will be subtly heightened to create a magical and eerily mournful quality. 
The most ordinary of things will be focused on . . . These dream memories will 
briefly undo the death that has been dealt but also in contrast, emphasize all that 
has been lost, especially the smallest of things we take for granted. (48) 
 
Apart from intellectuality, the adaptational discrepancy also entails the ellipsis of McCarthy’ dark 
comedy and existential despair, to which he frequently refers throughout the narrative: “[i]t is 
McCarthy’s dark comedy that Hillcoat misses altogether, not that there’s a lot of it, but it’s there, 
and it functions the same way that comic interludes do in Shakespeare’s tragedies. You gotta’ give 
the audience a break. And while his style is utterly different, McCarthy on occasion evokes that 
Beckettian blend of verbal wit and utter existential despair” (Hawkins 57). The amalgamation of 
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this wit and despair is best seen in the words of Ely, “the parody of a prophet (Ely possibly short 
for Elijah?) or as a ‘prophet’ for the new, godless present (‘There is no God and we are his 
prophets’)” (57), whose role is masterfully played by Robert Duvall, the oracle-like omniscient 
looking seasoned man of the decaying world who has survived thus far not by coincidence. Duvall 
in the guise of Ely, the only name to be chosen for a character in the plot, wittily and darkly utters 
“[w]here men cant live gods fare no better” and “[b]eggars cant be choosers” in response to man’s 
questions and sentences like “[w]hat if I said that he’s a god” and “[o]r you might wish you’d 
never been born”, respectively (64-65). While artfully shedding tears and exchanging deep 
conversations with the man, Duvall, or Penhall and Hillcoat at root, sadly miss out on such dark 
witty staples, which could be, partly suggested by this study, some of the most famed and 
significant philosophical dicta of McCarthy’s text. 
Another innovatively distinct thread of flashbacks employed by Hillcoat, whose essence 
can be only attributed to Penhall’s screenplay rather than the novel, are the opening flashbacks of 
the film which nostalgically and traumatically run between the prelapsarian and postlapsarian 
moments. These preapocalyptic aesthetics, which are shot using vibrant and lively colors, mainly 
revolve around the wife’s innocent beauty and the unblemished verdant nature, mainly trees and 
flowers here; the very same two things which, by their consequent loss, become the major traumas 
of the narrative for the man, and by extension all humanity, namely the wife and nature respectively 
(see appendix: figures 12-14). Hillcoat astutely and innovatively captures the soul of these two 
traumas right at the outset of his film via the use of touching flashbacks. A thorough account of 
these nostalgic images is presented in the words of Mcsweeney: 
 
Held close to the camera, the first shots of the film are of the natural world: the 
leaves and branches of a blossoming tree, bright and beautiful flowers.  The colors 
are vibrant and alive, almost bursting from the screen. A close-up of a beautiful and 
unnamed Woman (Charlize Theron) lingers as she turns shyly away from the 
camera. A man tenderly strokes a fine chestnut-brown horse, the wedding ring 
prominent on his hand. The lighting is soft and otherworldly, giving the sequence 
a mystical, glowing aura that is considerably enhanced by the melancholy score 
composed by Nick Cave and Warren Ellis, softly lilting in the background 




This flashback to the prelapsarian era lingers on to the bathtub scene, whose nuances have already 
been illuminated previously, and swiftly tethers itself to the postlapsarian era where a disillusioned 
traumatized man is lying next to a Godly messianic son, with no wife or the lush nature to be found 
anywhere. Mcsweeney’s description offers the following: 
 
His face is contorted by the juxtaposition of his nostalgic dream world and the 
harshness of reality. …The Man is almost unrecognizable: gaunt and with a full 
beard and sunken eyes, he has aged a lifetime in the ten years that have passed; he 
looks like a concentration camp victim. As he looks out over the desolate landscape, 
dying forests creak, an icy wind rushes, and the ground quakes with huge groans. 
The bright colors of the flashbacks have been replaced by a bleached-out palette of 
browns and grays that will dominate the film’s present. The boy wakes up and 
worriedly calls for his father. ‘It’s just another earthquake,’ the Man says. ‘I’m right 
here, right here.’ The title of the film materializes: The Road. (49) 
 
The once lush and green trees have fallen, the landscape has withered away, and the wife has 
joined them. All these were portrayed through the creative directorial arsenal of Hillcoat, namely 
flashbacks, in matters of seconds to the best of its visuality; the very same thing which might have 
taken McCarthy a hundred pages of painstaking efforts.  
Furthermore, Hillcoat differentiates all the prelapsarian era from the postlapsarian era by 
means of color, in that all the prelapsarian scenes are shot in vibrant colorful photography whereas 
the postlapsarian scenes are shot in nothing but dark or gray color, to signify nothing but death. 
This dichotomy should instantly evoke the Torok’s concept of split psyche and Baer’s “twofold 
structural disjunction between an experience and its integration into narrative memory, 
understanding, and communicability” (10), save for the fact that what is split here is not the psyche 
of the victim, but the narrative. Thus, Hillcoat’s split narrative with the grace of initial flashbacks 
of the film wavering between the preapocalyptic and postapocalyptic moments, aims at displaying 





An Apocalyptically Wounded Child  
 
The traumatic themes of The Road reach their apogee in the character of the boy. Not having 
breathed any pre-apocalyptic air, the boy is a traumatized product of the apocalypse, yet he has an 
immaculate record of survival as most his likes have already perished. Grave times like an 
apocalypse do not but demand figures of hope, grace and grandeur, and the boy is all passion and 
hope incarnate. Wounded to his bones, he has not still lost his faith in the power of goodness, 
wondering all throughout the narrative if they are the “good guys.”  
Suffering from an unrelenting ordeal of motherlessness, he is also poignantly traumatized 
by a post-apocalyptic crumbling world which puts him on an abject trajectory of survival whose 
denouement, given the severity of his father’s health condition, does not bode well. All the 
mentioned saga of traumas seems to be diminutive compared to an image of the traumatizing 
scenario, where he has lost his father, yet is imperatively obliged by him to euthanize himself by 
the only remaining bullet, lest he should be torturously raped and eaten by the marauding cannibal 
gangs.  
Having gone through all such traumas and many others which are rapidly approaching him 
on their survival trajectory, he maintains his angelic integrity trying to be benevolently generous 
to even strangers and even thieves. All such features make him merit the title of a messiah or the 
word of God40 (Hage 51-52) or the only “warrant” the father had: “[h]e knew only that the child 
was his warrant. He said: If he is not the word of God God never spoke” (McCarthy 3). Thus, the 
boy, to father and the audience, is the voice of God in a world which was “looted, ransacked, 
ravaged” (50). 
 One should never lose sight of the fact that messiah or God cannot be eleven years old and 
the boy is solely a child after all. Integral to my arguments of childhood trauma in chapter one was 
how the notions of self, self-image, and schema shatter owing to an early traumatic experience, as 
 
40 The concept of God has been more than controversial in McCarthy’s canon. Yet, what, at root, characterizes his 
picture of God is what could be termed as pessimism or agnosticism. Shattering the traditional notions of God, 
McCarthy has constantly been bent on distancing his characters from such notions. However, one can never deny the 
ubiquitous presence of an almighty energy, God or otherwise, throughout his canon. This is duly noted in the words 
of Hage: “[n]evertheless, this has not prevented God from being a pervasive subject matter throughout McCarthy’s 
novels, and the author’s characters are typically great believers in an almighty entity—even in their heresy” (89). This 
paradox is readily visible in the character of the man in The Road, as, on the one hand, he curses the God uttering 
“[a]re you there? he whispered. Will I see you at the last? Have you a neck by which to throttle you? Have you a 
heart? Damn you eternally have you a soul? Oh God, he whispered. Oh God” (6), but on the other hand, he believes 
his son the “word of God”. 
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Revier posits: “[i]f trauma is encountered during childhood at a time when schemas and beliefs 
about the self and world are forming, traumatic experience may interface with development of 
subordinate, general schemas that create a sense of continuity in self, memory and meaning” (37).  
Consequently, the child will suffer from disrupted schema formation and dubious or 
distorted self-image; hence a shattered identity. Within the context of The Road, the deficient self-
image and the shattered identity of the boy is manifestly detected upon many occasions, yet the 
most transparent case is how the boy lacks the very simple diagnostic verdict of telling the “good 
guys” from “bad guys”. This missing diagnostic staple is rendered further significant once one 
takes into account the fact that the boy is not even aware of his own position as to whether or not 
he belongs to the good guys’ camp. This body of uncertainty can only be accounted for through 
the lack of self-image and disrupted schema formation process. Frequenting most of the pages of 
the novel, the dubious question of being bad or good on the part of the boy, which is indicative of 
his shattered self-image as the result of the overwhelming traumas, seems to be one of pivotal 
concerns of McCarthy: 
 
He sat there cowled in the blanket. After a while he looked up. Are we still the good 
guys? 
He said. 
Yes. We’re still the good guys. 
   And we always will be. 
   Yes. We always will be. 
  Okay. (30-31) 
 
This diagnostic lack is closely allied with another staple of childhood trauma, namely the inability 
to interpret the reality or make sense of it. As Reviere notes, the child will encounter a “disruption 
in the ability to interpret reality in terms of existing schemas, failing to build on a personal narrative 
and to develop a capacity for flexible adaptive action” (37). This inability in teasing out the truth 
or reality is all over the boy’s character. Perhaps the most vivid feature of this concept is the naivety 
of the boy which made him trust anybody, thereby his insistence on helping the good and bad 
equally. The deficient reality sense in the traumatized child reveals itself when they are robbed of 
their food and supplies by a thief (Michael Kenneth Williams) whom is later caught by the father 
who demands not only the reclamation of the clothes but also a retribution. He asks him to remove 
his clothes to a point of total bareness and leaves him mercilessly. Relenting and rushing back to 
the scene a while later, the father finds out the thief is no more. Not being able to interpret the 
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reality of what the thief had done, the boy starts sobbing and opposes the biblical “eye-for-an-eye 
style” (Peebles 8) of father’s revenge, imploring him to stop: 
 
I’m begging you. 
Papa, the boy said. 
Come on. Listen to the kid. 
You tried to kill us. 
I’m starving, man. You’d have done the same. 
You took everything. 
 Come on, man. I’ll die. 
I’m going to leave you the way you left us. 
Come on. I’m begging you. 
 He pulled the cart back and swung it around and put the pistol on top and looked 
at the boy. Let’s go, he said. And they set out along the road south, with the boy 
crying and looking back at the nude and slatlike creature standing there in the road 
shivering and hugging himself. Oh Papa, he sobbed. 
Stop it. 
I cant stop it. (95) 
 
However, viewed differently, this reactionary sobbing could also be an indication of the boy’s 
intact and compassionate soul. In the words of Peebles, “[t]father worries about their survival, but 
the boy worries about their morality, their goodness. ‘I am the one,’ he says, a Christlike statement 
that is appropriate considering his advocacy of mercy and forgiveness” (8). However, in the large 
scheme of things, mercy to an immoral thief in a post-apocalyptic world could again emanate from 
the lack of reality sense, objectively viewed. 
 Perhaps the most fatal wound to the psyche of the boy, which murdered his soul beyond 
redemption, was bearing witness to infanticide: 
 
He was standing there checking the perimeter when the boy turned and buried his 
face against him. He looked quickly to see what had happened. What is it? he said. 
What is it? The boy shook his head. Oh. Papa, he said. He turned and looked again. 
What the boy had seen was a charred human infant headless and gutted and 
blackening on the spit. He bent and picked the boy up and started for the road with 




The outcome of this unspeakable malice inherent in the scene is nothing short of a psychic cul-de-
sac, which, in turn, culminates in the child’s total silence and shock. From an innovative position, 
Godbout argues that “the threat or representation of infanticide deployed in language can kick 
readers back to a state of silenced infancy, with a feeling of anxiety and fear as if one were 
abandoned to a violent and ancient postlapsarian, Hobbesian state of nature” (1). Instancing 
McCarthy’s Blood Meridian and The Road as two seminal works grounded in the concept of 
infanticide, Godbout sheds some quick light on the infanticide scene asserting: “[t]he boy, 
traumatized by the sight, refuses to speak for a period after this incident. McCarthy capitalizes on 
this fear. These passages from McCarthy’s novels present infanticide as obscenities, with the intent 
to shock the reader” (3). The child is not himself from now onwards. As McCarthy himself 
describes “He didnt know if he’d ever speak again” (74). This moment, once more, evokes the 
Lacanian real insomuch as the trauma is unassimilable and mysteriously muffled to the very 
unconscious of the child. In Caruthian parlance, he will be possessed and haunted by this 
encounter, and flashbacks and nightmares will replace his spoken language, hence Godbout’s 
“anxious silence” (1).  
 The boy’s adaptive measures fail him in much the same way the crumbling world fails his 
morality. As mentioned in chapter one, trauma, from the position of Reviere, “may affect adversely 
the ability of the child to make future assimilations and accommodations and thus may reduce 
cognitive and behavioral flexibility, impairing the child's ability for adaptation” (37). The boy’s 
traumatized lack of adaptive skills, however, runs in favor of his sense of ethicality. In a world 
where people are not taken aback by infanticide or cannibalism, the boy can neither conform to 
the status quo nor neglect brutalities committed by the survivors of the apocalypse. Even the 
thought of becoming a cannibal or adapting himself to the new ruthless world, even if he is on the 
verge of death as a result of starvation, revolts him: 
 
No. Of course not. 
Even if we were starving? 
We’re starving now. 
You said we werent. 
I said we werent dying. I didnt say we werent starving. 
But we wouldnt. 
No. We wouldnt. 
No matter what. 
No. No matter what. 




  And we’re carrying the fire. 
  And we’re carrying the fire. Yes.  
  Okay. (50) 
The boy’s lack of adaptation to the new world phenomena, this study suggests, instead transcends 
his ethical state, thereby making a prophetic messiah out of him in whom all his father’s hope rests. 
The father is not the only person who is in the awe of the boy and his emblematic purity. To the 
middle of the novel, they run into an old man41 (Robert Duvall) walking along the road, who “cant 
see good” (63). Taking up approximately fifteen pages of the narrative and involving the most 
thought-provoking dialogues apropos God and existence, this encounter, I argue, is the most 
transcendental encounter of the novel. Shocked by the sight of a child, the old man says: 
 
I’ve not seen a fire in a long time, that’s all. I live like an animal. You dont want to 
know the things I’ve eaten. When I saw that boy I thought that I had died. 
You thought he was an angel? 
I didnt know what he was. I never thought to see a child again. I didnt know that 
would happen. 
What if I said that he’s a god? (64) 
 
Looking askance at the attitude of the father and his seemingly idiotic question, the old man, whose 
voice seems to be McCarthy’s, replies: “[w]here men cant live gods fare no better. You’ll see. It’s 
better to be alone. So I hope that’s not true what you said because to be on the road with the last 
god would be a terrible thing so I hope it’s not true” (65). Thus, the old man’s existential position 
regarding God diverges in great length from the sacred spiritual attitude of the father who invests 
so much significance in the boy as to call him God. Peters elaborates on this divergence: 
 
The Man doesn’t view the Boy as a god in the sense that he has supernatural powers 
or an omnipresent aura. The Man’s thinking is loosely existentialist. In a world 
where he is completely responsible for everything in life, the Man chooses the Boy 
as the entity through which he will make sense of things. Establishing a relationship 
 
41 As an omniscient oracle who utters the very words which befit an oracle, the old man is the only named character 
(Ely), whose name, once more, is food for thought, for Ely could probably stand for Eli or Elijah, the Hebrew bible 
prophet. This omniscience is substantiated through utterances like “I knew this was coming… This or something like 
it. I always believed in it” (64), which strikes a close chord with McCarthy’s persona when he later says “[t]here is no 
God and we are his prophets” (64), as this utterly sits well with McCarthy’s agnostic or pessimistic view apropos God. 
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with the Boy and protecting the Boy from the dangers of their world gives meaning 
to his life. (90) 
 
With respect to Shengold, a soul murdered child’s psyche will feel vulnerable in arenas 
and dimensions such as the identity, joy, deprivation, family, and the perpetration of crime. 
Furthermore, the survivors of such abuse, thus, sustain a self-destructive path, which eventually 
creates in them a strong, conscience-distorting need for punishment (2-20). Within the context of 
The Road, the child develops a myriad of self-destructive behaviors, among which, one can 
mention the suicidal tone of the boy when he wishes to be with his mother: 
 
I wish I was with my mom. He didnt answer. He sat beside the small figure wrapped 
in the quilts and blankets. After a while he said: You mean you wish that you were 
dead. 
Yes. 
You musnt say that. 
But I do.  
Dont say it. It’s a bad thing to say.  
I cant help it.  
I know. But you have to. (22) 
 
The implicit suicidal tendency or the death wish of the boy runs in favor of the concept of lack of 
adaptive measures once more, as the survivors with the adaptational skills would be flexible 
enough to conform to the status qua and live on, no matter what happens around them. However, 
the boy finds himself unable to come to terms with the heinous reality of the crumbling world, 
hence finding shelter in the dead mother’s sanctuary. All said, all the staples of childhood trauma 
do not detract from the immaculate innocence the child possesses or the prophetic hope he 
symbolizes in the eyes of not only the father and the old man but perhaps the faith dreamers. 
Hillcoat’s visual world does not fall short of merit in portraying the child’s traumatic 
moments. Majority of the childhood trauma features and their textual aesthetics have been duly 
translated to the screen, with the least modification possible, including the boy’s bafflement 
regarding his camp, the lack of adaptive measures and the ethical state he is graced with. Yet, 
Hillcoat loses, or has to lose, sight of two extremely violent and traumatizing scenes. These two 
scenes are not merely about childhood trauma, but the traumas that are imposed on children which 
could traumatize any psyche particularly the children.  
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The first scene is the one on which the present study has already shed light, namely the 
infanticide whose witnessing traumatized the child’s psyche irreparably: “[w]hat the boy had seen 
was a charred human infant headless and gutted and blackening on the spit” (74). The second 
insufferable scene whose visualization Hillcoat and Penhall decide to lose sight of is “where a 
cannibal gang is shown to be keeping pregnant women captive in order to consume their babies” 
(Mcsweeney 45). The scene is simply too much to shoot. I shall need to refer to the pertinent lines 
even if the readers, against my will, find themselves traumatized by such lines: 
 
The boy lay with his face in his arms, terrified. They passed two hundred feet away, 
the ground shuddering lightly. Tramping. Behind them came wagons drawn by 
slaves in harness and piled with goods of war and after that the women, perhaps a 
dozen in number, some of them pregnant, and lastly a supplementary consort of 
catamites illclothed against the cold and fitted in dogcollars and yoked each to each. 
All passed on. They lay listening. (36) 
 
One might rightly wonder how these scenes could ever be visualized. There must be a reason why 
no director has dared to film Blood Meridian whose traumatizing violence, albeit not as 
apocalyptic as The Road, is nowhere beneath that of The Road. This way McCarthy seems to be 
hard to film, or “unfilmable”, as held by the Roger Ebert review: “[h]ow could the director and 
writer, John Hillcoat and Joe Penhall, have summoned the strength of McCarthy’s writing? Could 
they have used more stylized visuals, instead of relentless realism? A grainy black-and-white look 
to suggest severely limited resources? I have no idea. Perhaps McCarthy, like Faulkner, is all but 
unfilmable” (3). By the same token and in an effort to accentuate the adaptation of McCarthy’s 
words, Hoberman opines “[p]erhaps only a visionary genius like Andrei Tarkovsky or a heedless 
schlockmeister like Michael Bay could have handled the book’s combination of visceral terror and 
mystical reflection” (2). One might assume Hillcoat has already done enough without shooting 
two more scenes, both of which center on children. Witnessing the only beacon of hope, namely 
the child, roasting on a spit42, Hillcoat should assume, will not contribute to the constructive tone 




42 Some further explanation apropos the controversial state of this scene states: “[i]n the commentary Hillcoat reveals 
that the baby-on-a-spit sequence was filmed but cut out because it ‘didn’t work.’” (Mcsweeney 56). However, the 
sentence “it didn’t work” is open to interpretation and the present study offered its own stance above. 
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Testimony: Listening, Speaking and Muteness 
 
Testimonial threads of No Country for Old Men, which were mostly conceived by Sheriff Bell, 
lent themselves to a tone of jeremiad, for McCarthy felt an inexpressible pain upon witnessing the 
phenomenal “prophet of destruction”, his clinical brutality, and his archetypal murderous drive. It 
might have taken him just a retirement to survive the traumatic shock, not to mention the soothing 
effects of some remedial conversations with his sweet loving wife, the scholarly talking cure 
incarnate. On closer inspection, Bell is complaining, or in trauma-oriented terms, he is acting-out 
as he feels overmatched by a dark phenomenon whose shadow is utterly cast on his lamenting 
psyche.  
In The Road, things are beyond what a monologue or a tone of jeremiad can convey. There 
is no country for anything in the first place, let alone old men. Ash, dust and the weeping sky are 
hardly the language or the entities upon which the dialectics of testimonial criticism could be built. 
What should one listen to or look at? Can a fallen world serve as the testimonial plane on which 
bearing witness to its ashen sorrows could relieve the traumas, or help its survivors work-through 
their traumas? 
 Teasing out the effects of a traumatic event through listening to the voice of survivors is 
what Marder underpins in the process of post-traumatic survival: “[but] the most urgent and 
essential claim of Testimony is to show that even though we do not ‘recover’ from our traumatic 
past, nor can we ‘cure’ it, ‘overcome’ it, or even fully understand it, we can and we must listen to 
it and survive it by listening to its effects as they are transmitted to us through the voices of its 
witnesses and survivors” (Marder 4). Within the context of The Road, there are barely any 
witnesses left and the very few ones who are left have either metamorphosed into marauding 
cannibals wreaking havoc on what is left of humanity, or have no referential or reliable memory 
of the precise nature of the apocalyptic event. Thus, this study suggests three possible testimonial 
approaches by which the surviving pair could arrive at a release from their trauma: talking to each 
other, talking to the dead, and talking to the past (flashbacks). 
 Despite the tenuous father-to-son bonds McCarthy had shaped in some of his previous 
novels, the father-to-son bond in The Road is at the pinnacle of its kind, unbreakable and 
everlasting. Other than the dialogues between the father and the old man or the wife, the majority 
of the dialogues occur between the father and the son, as, in fact, there are no other characters. 
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Calling the boy a God, the father feels deeply enamored of his son’s existence. All throughout the 
narrative, he has proven how stoutly he depends on his son’s words, voice and the therapeutic 
effect thereof, hence his steadfast dedication to his protection: 
 
You have to talk to me. 
Okay. 
You wanted to know what the bad guys looked like. Now you know. It may happen 
again. My job is to take care of you. I was appointed to do that by God. I will kill 
anyone who touches you. Do you understand? 
Yes. (31) 
 
Mutually, the son feels lost without hearing the father’s words. This compulsive dependency on 
talking to his father is readily discerned when the father is on his last gasp: 
 
I know. I’m sorry. You have my whole heart. You always did. You’re the best guy. 
You always were. If I’m not here you can still talk to me. You can talk to me and 
I’ll talk to you. You’ll see. 
Will I hear you?  
Yes. You will. You have to make it like talk that you imagine. And you'll hear me. 




Calling these dialogues “quicksilver conversations”, Ibarrola-Armendariz acknowledges the same 
stating: “[q]uicksilver conversations of this kind make evident not only the two main characters’ 
mutual dependence, but also their incapacity—due to the pressure of the events—to express in any 
cogent way even their most basic emotions and ideas” (10). Apart from this dialogue dependency 
or the talking cure which has shaped most of the textual weight of the narrative, the pair, in ways 
of responding to or releasing themselves from the traumatic blight, in which they find themselves 
tangled, bear witness to the dead. Once all the witnesses have faded away, the survivors, Felman 
notes, need to trust the voices of the dead in coming to terms with their traumas: 
 
Felman’s notion of testimony teaches us that we must open our ears, hearts, and 
minds to the voices of the dead as they continue to speak through the voices of the 
surviving witnesses. She also shows that in opening ourselves to these voices from 
the past that live in the present, we may also be able to open ourselves to the 
possibility of a future that might escape being overly determined by, or ensnared 
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in, the (unwitting) traumatic repetitions of its (unknown) traumatic past. (Marder 
4). 
 
Given the dead traumatic space of the narrative in The Road, Felman’s notion of opening “our 
ears, hearts, and minds to the voices of the dead” acquires further significance. All throughout the 
narrative, the pair do but converse with the dead, not only by listening but also by the painful act 
of beholding. Instantiation of two dead entities abounds in McCarthy’s narrative: the trees as the 
emblem of the nature and the dead bodies as the emblem of the humanity, which are respectively 
outlined below: 
 
Then another. It’s just a tree falling, he said. It’s okay. The boy was looking at the 
dead roadside trees. It’s okay, the man said. All the trees in the world are going to 
fall sooner or later. But not on us. (15) 
The mummied dead everywhere. The flesh cloven along the bones, the ligaments 
dried to tug and taut as wires. Shriveled and drawn like latterday bogfolk, their 
faces of boiled sheeting, the yellowed palings of their teeth. They were discalced to 
a man like pilgrims of some common order for all their shoes were long since stolen. 
(11) 
 
The nature has been “cauterized” by the unknown apocalyptic event and “there are practically no 
landmarks to indicate what region of the country the pair are traveling in. Trees are charred and 
limbless, buildings wrecked and blackened, meadowlands stark and gray, rural roads and rivers 
covered with a thick layer of ash that makes them look frozen and deadly” (Ibarrola-Armendariz 
4). To accentuate the gravity of the traumatic dead space, McCarthy writes: 
 
The world shrinking down about a raw core of parsible entities. The names of things 
slowly following those things into oblivion. Colors. The names of birds. Things to 
eat. Finally the names of things one believed to be true. More fragile than he would 
have thought. How much was gone already? The sacred idiom shorn of its referents 
and so of its reality. Drawing down like something trying to preserve heat. In time 
to wink out forever. (35) 
 
Then, not only do things die, but also the tenuous nature of their names becomes extinct too, hence 
McCarthy’s delicate way of saying “[t]he sacred idiom shorn of its referents and so of its reality” 
(35). Stated differently, the entities and the reality to which they refer, “signifiers and signified” 
respectively, die out. Nobody will even or ever know what birds were or what they meant. Colors 
159 
 
and food, among many other things, would follow suit. The father and son plumb the depths of 
this traumatic dead pace as they bear witness to all the dead bodies, trees and animals. 
 All this traumatic space pits itself against the nostalgic past, its living memories, lively 
meaning, and vivacious colors, which brings up the third course of the pair’s testimonial approach, 
namely the flashbacks and their recurrent nature.43The haunting and spectral nature of flashbacks 
has previously come to light in this study and I would like to suffice to shed some quick light, via 
the words of Koçak, on how the liminal mode of this flashback, which runs back and forth in the 
memory of the father, torments his already traumatized psyche:  
 
Traumatic moments unfold for the father as he finds this new sunless world hard to 
accept as a place to live in. Although while talking to the boy, the lack of sunshine 
and fetid air add to the heavily depressing atmosphere, there are awakening 
memories of sunny days in the father as he waits for the sun to reappear some 
day…The man’s recollection of sunshine prompted by the light of the fire is for 
him like a mental reviver as he continuously expects and looks for an exit from the 
terrain they tragically inhabit. Indeed the father is constantly remembering things 
from the past even while remaining ever vigilant. (91) 
 
This painfully liminal trope, facilitated by the power of flashbacks, reaches its nadir as my 
arguments suggest, when the father’s memories return to his childhood, upon stumbling into his 
parental house, through a compelling flashback which fuses the past and present: 
 
They slipped out of their backpacks and left them on the terrace and kicked their 
way through the trash on the porch and pushed into the kitchen. The boy held on to 
his hand. All much as he'd remembered it. The rooms empty. In the small room off 
the diningroom there was a bare iron cot, a metal foldingtable. The same castiron 
coalgrate in the small fireplace. The pine paneling was gone from the walls leaving 
just the furring strips. He stood there. He felt with his thumb in the painted wood 
of the mantle the pinholes from tacks that had held stockings forty years ago. This 
is where we used to have Christmas when I was a boy. He turned and looked out at 
the waste of the yard. A tangle of dead lilac. The shape of a hedge. On cold winter 
 
43 The recurrent nature of the flashbacks within the context of The Road is closely allied to the Caruthian abreactive 
model and the Freudian repetition compulsion, both of which, in the main, characterize the recreation and the re-
enactment of the traumatic moment in the narrative memory of the victim. This immediately invokes the process of 




nights when the electricity was out in a storm we would sit at the fire here, me and 
my sisters, doing our homework. The boy watched him. Watched shapes claiming 
him he could not see. We should go, Papa, he said. Yes, the man said. But he didn’t. 
(McCarthy 11) 
 
That the warm fire, Christmas and the cozy company of the family have been replaced with void, 
peeled strips and “dead lilac” place the father in a state of limbo, in between and stagnant. This 
should evoke Abraham and Torok when they addressed how a traumatic event splits the person’s 
psyche, hence creating a dysfunction in the victim’s mind or a “twofold structural disjunction 
between an experience and its integration into narrative memory, understanding, and 
communicability” (Baer 10). The father’s psychic split can also be explained through Green’s 
concept of “secondary thinking”, in that the father is at pains striving to reveal the unspoken, no 
matter how hard he tries, as Green notes: “[t]he more the analysand speaks, the more he says; the 
more he speaks without quite saying entirely what he has on his mind, the more he says and reveals 
that there are things he is not saying” (qtd. in Rapaport 44). 
 Unable to verbalize the traumatic event, the suicide of his wife for instance, the father 
precipitates his psyche into an irrevocably elusive and fragmented silence, which as Green notes, 
has in part to do with the break-down of the victim’s discourse in his/her flashbacks to the very 
event of the trauma: “[secondary thinking] threatens to break the thread of the discourse” (qtd. in 
Rapaport 45). In like manner, all the flashbacks could amount to Bion’s “Beta bits” signaling the 
inability to utter something when it has already happened on a traumatic plane. As “split off 
psychotic elements that don’t link in order to form coherent and consistent thinking” (Rapaport 
44), Father’s flashbacks strike a chord with the “Beta bits” insofar as most his dream or memory 
bits are not coherent nor consistent by any logic. They simply appear and disappear all throughout 
the narrative with no particular pattern or order, hence their complete accordance with the random 
non-linear de-hierarchicised nature of Green’s “Secondary Thinking”. 
 Another traumatic trope which paves the way towards an efficient testimonial motion is 
Hartman’s visuality and imagery. Awed by Wordsworth’s poetic narrative “Boy of Winander”, 
Hartmans’ visuality could boil down to his fascination with the particularity of places and the 
images thereof: “I was interested in how Wordsworth drew his stories and fictions out of his 
fascination with particular places. These highly charged images, I tried to show how the poet 
unblocked them, how he developed them” (Caruth and Hartman 632). All this imagery is processed 
and fortified through the irreplaceable power of nature. Stated differently, “the movement from 
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charged individual image to visuality is parallel to the movement from specific and haunting places 
to Nature. Nature is his most generous concept” (633). Thus, the staples of Hartman’s visual 
imagery as a traumatic trope encompass the spatial particularity and the emancipating nature. 
Hardly can one witness a vestige of space or nature within the framework of The Road. 
Both have lost their signification to the apocalypse. Having shed sufficient light on the loss of 
nature, I should wish to approach the concept of space and spatiality, in the realm of which, the 
father’s map could be deemed a meaningful token, which, likewise, loses its significance owing to 
the apocalyptic blight, as Kaminsky posits 
 
It becomes increasingly evident throughout the novel that the map the father holds 
and the road the father and the son travel through are incompatible on several levels. 
First, the gap between the map and the road is manifested by the deterioration of 
the map as a referent…Second, the gap presents itself on the linguistic level, as the 
novel does not include names of locations, forcing the reader to imagine a new 
world… Third, on the level of meaning, the road becomes a form of blank slate… 
Fourth, the map is also deteriorating on the material level, an assortment of shreds 
that need to be reassembled every time the protagonists wish to use it. (2-3) 
 
With nature running out of its generosity and the places falling short of their spatial 
signification, the father and son step into a traumatic chapter of muteness, in much the same way 
as the boy in Wordsworth’s poetry moves obscurely from a point to another, seeking out even a 
more obscure response on the part of nature, without uttering a single word. This mute traumatic 
discourse between the pair and nature is duly defined as apocalypse from Hartman’s lens: 
 
That if the human mind does not live fully, responsively, within nature, or nature 
does not respond to us, then the end-result, projected forward, is apocalyptic. The 
death is like a hyperbole of this moment, a hyperbolic act of an imagination that 
leaps down not up, taking off from a simple failure of response. Should this failure 
of response accelerate, then we will have no habitat, no mutuality of nature and the 




Thus, if nature does not reciprocate, it will be the beginning of an end. Through Hartman’s poetic 
angle of trauma with the “Boy of Winander” constituting its core, nature is integral to the 
realization of the shocking images one comes across. Then, Hartman’s notion of apocalypse, which 
is grounded in the non-existent reciprocation between man and nature and the ensuing loss of 
habitat, holds quite true within the framework of The Road, notwithstanding its brutal narrative 
opposing the soft poetic context of the Boy of the Winander. Lost in translation of the compelling 
images of the nature, he can only make a “pastoral pipe” blowing the unsaid into it, as he cannot 
utter a word. To this boy, the traumatic is mute and the mute is traumatic. The dying nature, 
equally, casts its doomed shadow on the psyche of McCarthy’s boy, save that the boy in The Road 
cannot process the fading nature, its extinct animals, and fallen trees. McCarthy’s boy, resembling 
Hartman’s boy who blows his traumatized psyche into a pipe, expresses the inexpressible through 
a flute: 
 
He’d carved the boy a flute from a piece of roadside cane and he took it from his 
coat and gave it to him. The boy took it wordlessly. After a while he fell back and 
after a while the man could hear him playing. A formless music for the age to come. 
Or perhaps the last music on earth called up from out of the ashes of its ruin. The 
man turned and looked back at him. He was lost in concentration. The man thought 
he seemed some sad and solitary changeling child announcing the arrival of a 
traveling spectacle in shire and village who does not know that behind him the 
players have all been carried off by wolves. (31) 
 
The music of McCarthy’s boy, however, seems to be the last of its kind in much the same way the 
music of Winander’s boy served as an elegiac epilogue whose nature mimicking tone stood for the 
lyrics he never uttered. 
Hillcoat’s testimonial space in The Road, be it in visual or auditory terms, is informed by 
certain particular aesthetics, among which I prefer to elaborate on the reality of the death, 
diminished descriptive tone or the poetic tone, organized pace of the editing, and the masterful 
voice of Vigo Mortensen. For the testimonial act of speaking and listening to the dead to come 
alive in the framework of The Road, Hillcoat refrains from opting for special effects or computer-
generated imagery. Through choosing naturally dead spaces, Hillcoat drives a certain point home, 




The director urges us to talk to the dead, the truly dead nature here, in much the same way 
the postlapsarian pair, on a testimonial plane, talked to the dead. For this to be realized, he assumes 
he does not need to rely on the poetic or mystical tone44 of McCarthy, as in reality, most of the 
apocalypse has already occurred in some parts of the world, hence adopting real locations, as 
mentioned by Hawkins: “[r]ather Hillcoat and his team shot the film in four states (50 locations), 
utilizing as the director puts it, ‘An apocalypse we’ve already seen’ (DVD commentary): post-
Katrina New Orleans, Mt. St. Helens, abandoned mines in Pennsylvania. The desolation is 
established” (54). In another reading by Travers, the same genuine atmosphere is exalted: “[b]ut 
Hillcoat keeps it as real as the blood the father chokes out of his lungs. Computer effects are 
minimal. Desolate parts of Pennsylvania, Oregon and Louisiana filled in for the barren, silent, 
godless road, presumably to the horror of their tourist bureaus” (2). 
Many critics have censured the film The Road for being slow, eventless and dull. One such 
critic is Hoberman who holds: 
 
The Road, Cormac McCarthy’s Pulitzer Prize–winning, Oprah-endorsed, post-
apocalyptic survivalist prose poem—in which a father and his 10-year-old son 
traverse a despoiled landscape of unspeakable horror—was a quick, lacerating read. 
John Hillcoat’s literal adaptation, which arrives one Thanksgiving past its original 
release date, is, by contrast, a long, dull slog. (1) 
 
Such critics, I should remark, lose sight of some essential trauma principles. For a testimonial 
narrative to come alive, the victims need to come to terms with the very essence of the traumatic 
event through bearing witness, listening and speaking in the main, to what is left of the traumatic 
thread. In doing so, the victims, I should add, act like chronic beholders, in that they might need 
even generations to successfully work through their traumas. Reiterating the first chapter, I should 
add, the psychoanalyst has no other choice than to be patient here, as “[t]his working-through of 
 
44 To substantiate this study’s thesis apropos the fall of McCarthy’s poetic finesse in Hillcoat’s visual world, it is best 
to turn to Hawkins’s words: 
“The elegiac poetry of McCarthy’s evocative prose, employed to express the father’s memories not 
only of his wife but also of various animals, trees, flowers, his childhood home, an uncle he worked 
with as a boy—all of this is dispensed with. Hillcoat and Penhall consciously eliminate McCarthy’s 
poetic prose (one way McCarthy breaks up the utter bleakness of the present) beginning with 
Mortensen’s first voice-over” (56). 
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the resistances may in practice turn out to be an arduous task for the subject of the analysis and a 
trial of patience for the analyst” (155). The course of therapy, Freud warns, can neither be avoided 
nor hastened.  
 A quickly edited narrative, Hillcoat shows, stands against a temporally organized and 
stable narrativization whose aim is to reveal the gravity of the process of working-through. 
Visualizing the testimonial space of an apocalyptic narrative, whose literary source is mainly 
targeted at the traumatizing concept of the death on a mysterious and mystical scale, needs to allow 
its traumatized characters and the audience to bear witness to every single traumatic space as 
mystically as possible. In so doing, the resultant picture cannot be another fast paced action packed 
zombie film, for instance.  
Hillcoat has a profound propensity for illustrating all threads of the testimonial space, 
particularly the scenes embodying the act of bearing witness to the dead landscape, such as the 
deserted gas stations, looted grocery stores, burning-down-to-ash landscapes, industrial ruins, to 
name but a few, with utmost tact and care (see appendix: figures 15-18). Expectedly, such tactful 
illustrations cannot run parallel to the other quick entertaining camp of apocalyptic or dystopian 
films such as 2012 (2009), Land of the Dead (2005), and World War Z (2013), or as Peebles 
contends “The Road was clearly not going to be Mad Max or The Terminator” (5).  
To create more meaningful threads of testimonial discourse, the shots could have even been 
longer in order to allow the audience to identify with the pain through which the pair go in bearing 
witness to the postlapsarian traumas. Barely do the shots, even the longest ones, extend to more 
than fifteen seconds, which means Hillcoat was already aware of the consequence of long takes 
and the monotonous air they could provide the film with. However, losing sight of such testimonial 
rhetoric and the necessity of its intentionally unhurried editing, critics like Hawkins censure the 
film acerbically for its monotonous pacing45: “[d]espite a strong opening and any number of 
successful scenes, the film’s pacing, which is to say its editing, falters, lacks tension. The film’s 
tone both visually and aurally, becomes largely monotone” (57). 
 
45 Apart from the film’s pacing, Hillcoat’s visual aesthetics are potentially criticized for being eventless. This, too, 
seems to originate from the lack of familiarity with or the knowledge of the testimonial and traumatic space which 
pervades the whole narrative. Both McCarthy and Hillcoat, I argue, aim at nothing but the testimonial discourse of the 
narrative experienced by the pair in abject efforts to come to terms with insufferable traumas imposed on them. In 
other words, the narrative has to be eventless as the event, whose true nature is missed like the Lacanian real, has 
already happened, and all Hillcoat does is to ask us to bear witness to what follows the “missed encounter”, hence an 
efficient testimonial process. 
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 Cramping the style of critics like Hawkins, Hoberman and similar critics opine that 
Hillcoat’s mission was to maintain a coherent narrative, which closely favors the very thesis of 
this study at this juncture, namely the necessity of such unhurried visual features in order to 
revitalize the testimonial discourse of the narrative: 
 
One can either embrace McCarthy’s laconic tone or ignore it—Hillcoat does 
neither. For all the added bad-guy assaults or earthquake-induced Attack of the 
Falling Trees, his Road never eludes its weighty pedigree—pale by comparison to 
an action thriller like Children of Men or gross out eco-catastrophe like Land of the 
Dead, squandering its ready-made zombie scenario. Where McCarthy was free to 
focus on how a post-human world might feel, Hillcoat is compelled to illustrate 
these impressions and organize them into a coherent narrative. (2) 
 
Should one decide to choose two testimonial planes for the traumatic aesthetics of Hillcoat’s visual 
world, specifically in terms of the cast, they should be the visual (acting) and the auditory(voice-
over) dimensions of the film. Unlike all the controversies regarding the editing and the pace of the 
film, barely has a fair critic spoken ill of the Mortensen and Smit-McPhee. This unanimous 
admiration is most evident is the words of Peebles: 
 
The shoot received positive press coverage, which often focused on the devotion 
that Mortensen and the eleven-year-old Smit-McPhee were bringing to their roles, 
as the two actors appear in nearly every scene in the film. No one was surprised by 
Mortensen’s dedication, which had already been noted in coverage of The Lord of 
the Rings trilogy (2001–2003), A History of Violence (2005), and Eastern Promises 
(2007). Child actors, however, have generally been cause for more anxiety. But 
although he was a relative unknown at the time, people were also praising Smit-
McPhee. (5) 
 
As the testimonial and traumatic space of the film utterly hinges upon the artistic subtlety of the 
pair’s performance in bringing an air of believability to the eyes of audience and the genuine 
process of bearing witness to all the post-apocalyptic elements of the narrative, it is more than 
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lucid that their stellar performance would be tantamount to the success of the film. All the 
testimonial witnessing which McCarthy has tasked the pair with, including bearing witness to 
cannibalism46, falling trees, and death on a broad sense, comes alive quite efficiently at the hands 
of Mortensen and McPhee, at the behest of Hillcoat47. 
On an auditory note, Mortensen’s voice-over seems to be intrinsic to the aesthetics of the 
testimonial tropes of the film, namely speaking and the listening. The more the traumatized voice-
over of Mortensen is heard, the more the audience are exposed to the gravity of the traumas which 
have befallen his psyche. To elaborate on the power of testimonial listening, I shall fall back on 
the first chapter: “[but] the most urgent and essential claim of Testimony is to show that even 
though we do not ‘recover’ from our traumatic past, nor can we ‘cure’ it, ‘overcome’ it, or even 
fully understand it, we can and we must listen to it and survive it by listening to its effects as they 
are transmitted to us through the voices of its witnesses and survivors” (Marder 4). Thus, the 
stronger the testimonial voice, or voice-over here, the better the testimonial listening travels to 
one’s psyche. Mortensen’s unparalleled pitch, tone and harmony are all indicative of a successful 
testimony in the film. The paragraph below written by the playwright Penhall provides us with the 
details as to how Nick Cave (credited with the original score) and McCarthy himself 
accommodated Mortensen’s voice-over: 
 
The first thing he said he liked about the film was the voiceover. This had been a 
source of consternation for some time. Initially, I wanted to write one to fully 
capture McCarthy’s coruscating lilt─ but Hillcoat didn’t want it. Then, once it was 
filmed, the producers wanted the voiceover. Hillcoat reluctantly agreed but our star, 
Vigo Mortensen, was dead against it. Nick Cave, who was scoring the film, was all 
 
46 Perhaps the most paramount portrayal of the cannibalism in both the film and the novel occurs when the pair, in an 
expected effort to explore food, stumble upon a cellar, which, to the father’s hunch, might be a precious food 
storehouse. And ironically it was, save that it was a storehouse of human slaves whose flesh was meant to be consumed 
gradually for the man-eaters. McCarthy’s portrayal is spine-chilling: “[h]uddled against the back wall were naked 
people, male and female, all trying to hide, shielding their faces with their hands. On the mattress lay a man with his 
legs gone to the hip and the stumps of them blackened and burnt. The smell was hideous” (43). Hillcoat’s version of 
this atrocity falls nowhere beneath this depiction in the light of the pair’s stunning performance in the face of the 
dismembered slaves. McPhee’s gasping face covered automatically with his hands to avoid laying his eyes on the 
dismembered slaves and their desperate escape are some of the most memorable scenes ever shot in the film (see 
appendix: figures 19-21). 
47 Hillcoat does not miss out on any major testimonial space in the film. The testimonial space of death is visually 
touching on many fronts. Yet, the only testimony Mortensen and McPhee, at the behest of Hillcoat, lose sight of is the 
infanticide and the pertinent scenes thereof, namely the charred infant on a spit and the pregnant ladies kept captive 
for their potential children as the food source. 
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for it. Meanwhile, Robert Duvall, who is in arguably the best scene in the film, had 
taken to improvising his own extraordinary dialogue, which some of us thought 
might make a fine voiceover. When I finally sat down in my Sunset Strip hotel 
room to finish writing it, with eight worried people on a conference call chewing 
over every word, the voiceover was beginning to look doomed. Now we had it from 
the horse’s mouth: ‘It’s very successful. It really works.’ I wanted to lift McCarthy 
off his feet and give him a bear hug. (19) 
 
 
Apart from the voice-over, the whole film seemed to appeal to McCarthy upon his first opportunity 
to view it in the presence of Penhall and Hillcoat, which made “America’s greatest living writer” 
utter phrases and sentences like “it’s really good”, “very powerful”, and “a film like no other film 
I’ve seen…” (qtd in Penhall 19). The inspirational words of McCarthy, despite “four hand-typed 
pages of [critical] notes”48, seemed to valorize not only both Hillcoat and Penhall but also the film, 
in and of itself. Even though Penhall’s screenplay, and Hillcoat’s visualization thereof, seem to be 
a literal transposition49 of the novel, the modest author would not like to take the credit for the 
screenplay, when asked to sign it by Penhall, uttering “…it’s got nothing to do with me” (qtd in 
Penhall 19). This trio bond, I should assume, left its undeniable mark on the final construction 
pillars by which the film hauled itself up. 
 
Survival: Too Good to Be True in the Face of the Ashen Traumas 
 
All the testimonial staples explored so far, such as conversing with the dead, flashbacks and 
traumatized imagery and muteness, seem to be at the disposal of a teleologically larger aim which 
 
48 Among the several notes McCarthy wrote down for the director and the screenwriter, one stood out distinctly: 
“Hillcoat had cut perhaps the loveliest and harshest exchange in the film: ‘What would you do if I died?’ the boy asks 
his father. ‘I'd want to die, too,’ he replies, with the blunt tenderness which characterises the book. 'This exchange,’ 
McCarthy insisted with exquisite understatement, ‘is important.’ Hillcoat hastily restored it” (Penhall 19).  
49 I am referring to the three most primary, if not primitive, adaptational categories put forth by Cartmell as follows: 
(I) transposition: a direct transition from fiction to film with as little modification in the source text as possible; (II) 
commentary: a source text is taken and the flight from the fiction realm to the visual realm, herein, entails some certain 
alterations in some respects as seen fit by the adapter; (III) analogy: a distinct deviation from the source text occurs 
here as if another work of art has been created (Leitch 93). Linda Hutcheon’s voice in A Theory of Adaptation (2006), 
which emphasizes the novel and creative interpretation of the adapted work beyond the original text, should be of high 
significance and pertinence herein. 
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cannot be but survival. Survival seems to be a misnomer for the context of a narrative whose 
elements have all perished in one way or another. McCarthy’s narrative seems to cause strong 
consternation regarding ecological state of the world and how the same could be said of mankind. 
Looking at his son’s face, the father painfully utters “something was gone that could not be put 
right again” (52).  
All throughout the narrative, the father’s consternation regarding his son’s life, and by 
extension the life of the planet, resonates through and through. The narrative in which McCarthy 
places his “fire-carrying” pair is in no state to help the odds of their survival. Indeed, the narrative 
itself, on an ironic note, seems to have suffered a blow or two from the atrocious apocalypse as 
well, duly noted in the words of Kollin: “like an ancient text exhumed from the desert in bits and 
pieces, as if the narrative itself did not quite survive the catastrophe in full form” (166). In the lines 
yet to come, I will intend to investigate three paths through which the narrative leans towards the 
concept of survival and how it fares within the grave aftermath of an apocalyptic trauma. I have 
titled them as follows: the traumatic wasteland, the emancipation, and in-between mystery. 
The more the “fire-carrying” pair journey into death and ash along the road, the more their 
psyches are traumatized by the rummaging marauders, cannibals, charred infants, dead animals, 
earthquakes and falling trees. In the forlorn hope of finding a sanctuary, they trudge towards south 
only to be further disillusioned by the likes of what they have already witnessed. Emaciated in the 
body and wounded in the heart and mind, they still fight for a better place or a utopia, unaware of 
the endless dystopian terrain awaiting them. This sentiment is rightly noted by Kollin: 
 
Even though they are in search of a better place, the father and son do not arrive at 
a new Eden, as the contemporary American road novel often promises. Instead, 
they are stuck with a fallen world that appears beyond redemption. There is no 
certainty of a return to a paradise or any assurance that they can remake life to 
resemble how it once was. At one point, McCarthy explains that the man realized 
he was keeping up a false front in the face of great doom. (162) 
 
This disillusioning path, which brings nothing but despair and doom, is the path of trauma, as I 
would like to use my liberty to call it so. It is more in line with the Freudian “repetition 
compulsion”, insofar as the pair wallow in further recurrent traumas bearing witness to traumas as 
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diverse as death, violence, starvation, isolation, and soulless nature, as they journey to the depth 
of darkness. To sustain this path, violence, among all the mentioned traumatic constituents, seems 
to be the centerpiece, as addressed in the words of Harrison: 
 
In The Road the future revolves around surviving the present and the possibility of 
a better chance of survival later on, and all survival in that world, as we have seen, 
relies upon the use of violence. At the same time, the consequences of survival 
through sustained violence are extended to an extreme and globally destructive 
level in this novel, where the country is reduced to the physical wasteland… (243). 
 
This traumatically violent path, which might approach the destination of survival, sets in motion 
the very devastating split between the man and the wife, for what the man calls “survivor” is 
frowned upon by his wife who conversely calls it “walking dead in a horror film”: 
 
We’re survivors he told her across the flame of the lamp. 
Survivors? she said. 
Yes. 
What in God’s name are you talking about? We're not survivors. We’re the walking 
dead in a horror film. 
I’m begging you. 
I dont care. I dont care if you cry. It doesnt mean anything to me. (22) 
 
Perhaps the logic behind the suicide of all the other families to whose bodies the pair bore witness 
resembles the very same logic which made the wife fade towards her own death. This suicidal 
preference over further traumatization, whose only gift is survival, is not just a post-traumatic 
response but instead stems from an ideological ground: 
 
The woman’s decision to kill herself and forego the journey comes not from some 
post-traumatic response, but from having a different set of embodied experiences 
that have provided her with a different knowledge and understanding of what the 
future might entail…In some ways, the woman’s assessment of what the future 
might hold may in fact be more accurate than the man’s. Life on the road is full of 





The philosophical stance against this survival path, which encompasses further traumatization, is 
what intensifies the gap between the man and his wife. Basing his rationality on the question of 
“If they [we] are not survivors, who are they [we]?” (Gwinner 142), the man opposes his wife’s 
stance, on which Gwinner expounds: 
 
The man acknowledges the “madness” of such philosophizing, especially of 
arguing the “pros,” presumably, and so the woman’s suicide effectively denies the 
need for more of such debates. With her death, the novel dismisses explicit 
philosophical inquiry into notions of being as a “dead end.” If “she was right,” then 
the man and the boy are survivors without the benefit of secure self-identification 
as such. (142) 
 
Calling the whole concept of emancipation and redemption into question and seeing nothing but a 
mirage of salvage at the end of the road, the man’s wife, and by extension a great many who fall 
into the same camp, dismiss this traumatizing arduous journey as irrational, hence taking their own 
lives. The suicidal camp of the narrative take their lives, heedless of its repercussions for the 
surviving camp, namely further traumas imposed on the survivors and further impossibility of 
lingering on the road. Put differently, the suicidal camp unwittingly renders the traumatic survival 
even further traumatic for the survivor, hence lowering the odds of the emancipation for the ones 
who choose to walk the road to the very end. Philips’s concluding interpretation duly converges 
with this thread of argument: “[t]hus to read The Road for signs of hope and redemption is to 
misread it, and worse: it is to miss the boat not by an hour or a day, but by an epoch or even an 
era. In The Road, there is no boat: all boats have been sunk” (188). 
The non-redemptive path of survival, then, can be closely allied to Caruthian jargon of 
impossibility of growth or recovery and Freudian compulsion to repeat, in that the trauma victims, 
the father and son here, cannot salvage their psyche from the traumas imposed on them every 
moment of way. This should also evoke the dichotomy of acting-out and working-through, 
founded by Freud and later adopted by LaCapra, the former of which seems to fit the bill better 
than the latter, as the pair, in the logic of the non-redemptive path, seem to be compulsively 
hovering around the very same traumas, if not new ones, which paralyzed their psyche in the first 
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place (apocalypse). Not only can they not reverse the traumatic repercussions of the past, but they 
also seem to deteriorate their psychic condition by exposing it to new traumatic phenomena all 
along their harsh journey, hence caught in the horrifying traumatic wasteland, as titled at the outset 
of my analysis, for eternity. Edwards’s words seem to capture the soul of this path quite efficiently: 
“The Road, in the end, is a prophetic hieroglyphic of horror, an American jeremiad more terrifying 
than even the Puritan imagination could conjure” (60). 
The second course open to our trauma-oriented exegesis is what I call emancipation. Before 
I set about shedding light on what I mean by this path, it is my preference to elucidate how 
McCarthy allows his narrative to approach its ending moment. The son eventually loses his 
resilient yet mortal father to the chronic disease whose name was kept from the audience as 
furtively as the very nature of the apocalyptic accident. Imploring his father to take him with 
himself, the son is turned down yet urged to carry the fire after him and to be the voice of the 
messiah he thought he was: 
 
I want to be with you.  
You cant. 
Please.  
You cant. You have to carry the fire. 
I dont know how to. 
Yes you do.  
Is it real? The fire? 
Yes it is. 
Where is it? I dont know where it is. 
Yes you do. It’s inside you. It was always there. I can see it. 
Just take me with you. Please. 
I cant. (103) 
 
Highlighting the paramount importance of “the fire” and how the lofty mission of protecting “the 
fire” lands on his shoulders from then on, he leaves his son with his cold body; the same “gift of 
coldness” his wife bestowed upon the man was bestowed upon the son as “the final gift”: “[h]e 
slept close to his father that night and held him but when he woke in the morning his father was 
cold and stiff. He sat there a long time weeping and then he got up and walked out through the 
woods to the road” (104). 
The monumental and symbolic fire, or the hope and emancipation incarnate, is ultimately 
handed down. The archetypal father who obliviously moves past his son in Bell’s dream in No 
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Country for Old Men, trusts his son with the fire wholeheartedly, signposting hope, life force, and 
the redemption. In No Country for Old Men, Bell is awed by his father as a larger than life person, 
to whom he will always be a child. In The Road, or an apocalypse later, the state of the play is 
reversed. Not only do the archetypal father and son meet one another in a bond, as unprecedented 
as the very apocalyptic narrative into which McCarthy breathes the life of his life work, but the 
Promethean fire, or the beacon of hope in a wasteland, meets the destined hands of the messianic 
hands. It is through this exegetic account that the aesthetics of the second path, this study puts 
forth, favor the redemptive stance as utterly opposed to the traumatizing destructive path. 
Having gone through a long saga of traumatic ordeals, the son gets the last traumatic blow, 
namely the father’s death. How can such a drowned psyche ever revitalize itself now that it has 
lost the only hope it ever had? How can the audience, in like manner, find a way out of the 
traumatizing cul-de-sac the narrative has put them up against?  
The duet has changed to solo, yet the emancipation lingers on. Hardly three days after the 
fathers’ death and a mysterious man, who had long been watching the boy, “hove into view” 
(McCarthy 104). Seeming to have gone through so much, given the smashed and scarred state of 
his face, the man enters into a dialogue with the boy: 
 
Where’s the man you were with? 
He died. 
Was that your father? 
Yes. He was my papa. 
I’m sorry. 
I dont know what to do. 
I think you should come with me. 
Are you one of the good guys? 
The man pulled back the hood from his face. His hair was long and matted. He 
looked at the sky. As if there were anything there to be seen. He looked at the boy. 
Yeah, he said. I’m one of the good guys. (104) 
 
Resting assured he is one of the good guys, he equally enquires into whether he carries the fire or 
not: 
 
Are you carrying the fire? 
Am I what? 
Carrying the fire. 




Just a little.  
Yeah. 
That’s okay. 
So are you? 
What, carrying the fire? 
Yes. Yeah. We are. (104) 
 
That in the midst of an apocalypse, goodness and fire find the boy is nothing short of a miraculous 
emancipation, or in the words of the father in an effort to console his son’s consternation 
concerning the little boy, and all the little boys by extension, whom they could not help earlier: 
“[g]oodness will find the little boy. It always has. It will again” (104). Later, the mysterious man 
reveals that the goodness and the fire are accompanied by his son and daughter, namely a family. 
Running a family through an apocalypse is yet another sign of hope whose seed McCarthy intends 
to plant. This is not the first time McCarthy’s apology for the concept of family is revealed. In No 
Country for Old Men, not wanting to raise one’s children50constitutes a major jeremiad of a 
monologue of chapter VI.  
Given the critical stage in which McCarthy was writing this novel in terms of raising his 
own son and all the fatherly affection he felt for his son, these threads of authorship seem to be 
autobiographical as well51. Then, the familial moral compass which McCarthy utilizes to 
ameliorate the pains of apocalyptic traumas seems to mesh well with the redemptive path this study 
has set forth. Peters manifestly brings to light how McCarthy underscores the role of the 
redemptive unit of family: 
 
We know almost nothing of the family The Boy joins, and for a novel that has been 
almost unrelentingly pessimistic, The Boy’s sudden good fortune is jarring. But the 
point, here, is that while the conclusion underscores the thematic significance of 
small family units in dystopian literature. …McCarthy is signaling that the family 
unit is not only a survival method in a dystopian world, but also a grounding point 
 
50 Refer to my arguments of Balaev’s Growth vs. Caruth’s Intergenerational Trauma in chapter two. 
51 McCarthy clearly calls his son the co-author of the book as he was deeply inspired by his character: “McCarthy has 
said that his young son John, born in 1998 and eight years old when The Road was published, was very much his 
inspiration for the story and the character of the boy. ‘[A] lot of the lines that are in there are verbatim conversations 
my son John and I had,’ he told John Jurgensen of the Wall Street Journal. ‘I mean just that when I say that he’s the 
co-author of the book’” (Peebles 13). 
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for the existential struggle endemic to it. He closes the novel by re-affirming the 
one reliability in a crisis: families. (92) 
 
The profoundly revered concept of family and its instantly urgent essence in the narrative is 
interpreted through a further activist modality, which extends its nature towards other children and 
other humans. This interpretive mode is tangibly witnesses in the words of Johns-Putra: “[t]he 
conclusion to the plot refines the definition of what it is to care for and about children…A closer 
reading of The Road suggests an alternative ethos, that doing the best by our children, inasmuch 
as they stand for the generations of the future, requires more than simply caring about and them 
alone. It requires a reaching out to others—to other children and, indeed, other humans” (21). 
Losing sight of this altruistic mode of thinking towards children and other humans is as 
detrimentally life-devastating as losing sight of nature and the ensuing apocalypse. Shortly put, 
both are equally apocalyptic. 
All the symbolic threads and images, namely “the fire”, “the good guys”, and “the family” 
which are incorporated into the arguments of the second path (emancipation), are indicative of 
hope and redemption and sustain the power of symbolization through the critical lens of Zizek and 
Onega/Ganteau in coping with the traumas of the narrative. In the words of Zizek, the victim has 
to destabilize the devastating impact of the traumatic event through creating a symbolic web of 
images around him/her (47). The father and the son find their only beacon of hope through 
indoctrinating themselves to rely on the aforementioned themes in order to grow out of their 
apocalyptic traumas, unaware of the significant hope they themselves instill in the audience. Thus, 
while father and son seek refuge in the images and symbols, the audience, equally, take refuge in 
them as the only threadbare entities upon which the fate of the narrative vitally hinges. 
 It now transpires that McCarthy’s “south” is another redemptive trope by which the trauma 
of the barren wasteland of The Road could be tackled. No matter how many trees fall or how 
deeply the trauma of cannibalism and infanticide penetrates their psyche, the father and son, do 
not, even for a moment, think of straying away from the route towards “south”: 
 
Are we going to die? 
Sometime. Not now. 
And we’re still going south. 
Yes. 






Construed as the utopian salvation out of the apocalyptic ash, “south” provides the pair with 
dreamy outlooks and ideal fantasies of “other children” (22) living peacefully. This constructive 
impetus behind trudging towards “south” is explicated in the words of Walsh: “one of the most 
symbolic themes of the novel is that the South as physical space, imaginative entity and narrative 
focus acts as a redemptive agency when all else seems to have vanished. The motivation behind 
this may be that the father believes that the climate will be marginally better there or that some 
kind of life may have prevailed…” (McCarthy Journal 52). Later, Walsh, as his conclusive axiom, 
combines the utopian role of the “south” with the symbol of “fire” upon which I have shed light 
previously: 
 
Although ashen, wasted and ostensibly dystopian, The Road succeeds in reviving 
the most cherished geocentric American myth of the frontier, of a new physical, 
imaginative and spatial beginning. In what is a major symbolic gesture McCarthy 
re-inscribes this national myth; in so doing, he reverses the westerly spatial 
movement of his own characters, and we leave the boy as he continues to carry his 
light into the South. (54) 
 
Another unwaveringly traumatic image which barely steps away from McCarthy’s fallen 
world is the shopping cart. Reminiscent of the pre-apocalyptic days of consumerism, abundance 
and affluence, the cart, now, is nothing but an outdated container for the very essentials which 
barely suffice for survival. Excoriating humanity for consumerism, ingrained in their insatiable 
sense of greed, and ungratefulness, the cart does portray a stark line between the prelapsarian and 
postlapsarian eras, as illustrated in the words of Wilhelm: 
 
The shopping cart, one of their most treasured material helpers, is also both a 
physical and symbolic container. Its core function in the once prosperous society 
from which it was created was to carry surplus groceries by the abundance, 
foodstuffs, of such abundance one literally had to cart them away. Now, it remains 
as a stark reminder of plenty, but like so many objects it is an unstable sign, for 
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fitted with a sidebar motorcycle mirror, the cart also functions as post-apocalyptic 
roadster, its “trunk” loaded with the precious items necessary to their desperate 
existence, and serves as a testament to human creativity and determination in the 
face of catastrophe (132).  
 
Similarly referred to as “transcendental homelessness” (qtd in Walsh. 281), Ellis points out, 
through a highly symbolic image, that “the only people we see perpetually pushing shopping carts 
on our own streets are the homeless” (281). This, in the rhetoric of trauma, evokes Baer’s “twofold 
structural disjunction” once more. The shopping cart, indeed, facilitates the formation of a liminal 
space in the narrative which serves the characters and the audience as a limbo: somewhere in-
between. This way, the already split psyche of the surviving pair, and more possibly the audience, 
falls down to the very pitfall of liminality out of which they seem to have a hard time climbing. 
The purgatory into which the cart plunges the characters, and the audience alike, is as haunting as 
all the other trauma tropes such as the infanticide and cannibalism. In a broader sense, this liminal 
purgatory is even worse than the infanticide and cannibalism, in that the pair seem to find a way 
of fighting the mentioned traumas as they are tangible, concrete and touchable. In contrast, the 
abstract limbo the cart has created can neither be fought nor forgotten insofar as it is nothing but 
an image whose haunting shadow will prevail. 
The bunker scene of The Road, as another symbolic image, is nowhere beneath the 
shopping cart in terms of the traumatic gravity. Offering “Crate upon crate of canned goods” 
(McCarthy 54), the bunker was a shelter inside which the pair took refuge for a few days. Lavishly 
feasting on the bunker’s magnanimous supplies, the pair soon realize this could not be more than 
a sweet bitter memory, as they had to leave it behind. A flashback to the preapocalyptic era, the 
bunker scene could also be a reflection of McCarthy’s censuring of the consumerist habits where 
a bunker filled with tons of tinned goods will not do the pair any good; in much the same way as 
the preapocalyptic habits of waste did not but hasten the speed towards the apocalypse. The bunker 
scene, displayed as refreshment at first sight, is not but a page of melancholy and nostalgia in the 
trauma book of the father, as noted in the words of Koçak: “[n]otwithstanding the agreeable 
atmosphere and happy discovery of a well-stocked larder in a luxurious temporary abode, he needs 
little by way of incentive to continue his life with his father. The father experiences nostalgia upon 
177 
 
encountering objects and memoirs from the past” (89). The trauma of consumerism and its 
ineffectual postapocalyptic fate, this study suggests, seems to be intensified by such images. 
Equally germane and meaningful here is the redemptive power of storytelling and its 
impact on not only on the formulation of the second path but the whole narrative. As Hustvedt 
contends, a separate plane of psyche hosts the traumatic event(s) whose narration or storytelling, 
likewise, abides by separate and exclusive rules and principles. This way, as the author avers, 
“Trauma isn’t part of the story; it is outside story. It is what we refuse to make part of our story” 
(51-52). Testimonial monologues of Sherriff Bell in No Country for Old Men were the plane which 
accommodated the irreversible traumas of the narrative separately and as it shaped an utterly 
exclusive line of storytelling, McCarthy, proposed by this study, italicized this plane. This 
disjunction loses its clarity to the omnipotent nature of the post-apocalyptic atmosphere in The 
Road.  
The author cannot allow one particular plane of narrative to host the traumas of the 
characters as the traumas are so overwhelmingly ubiquitous as to conquer each and every corner 
of the narrative, not to mention the very ambiguity of the apocalyptic event whose narrational 
allusion seems to be far beyond reach. Indeed, one could dare to claim that there is no separate 
plane to host the traumas and, in one way or another, all the planes are informed by the traumatic 
event. Briefly, “there is no other tale to tell” (McCarhty 14), but the tale of the trauma(s). As all 
the planes are traumatized, the characters, in ways of redeeming their wounded soul through 
storytelling, fall back on their own dreams or fantasies, as Walsh’s commentary duly affirms the 
same: 
 
[T]he son pleads with his father to read him a story (7), and the father obliges, 
recounting ‘[o]ld stories of courage and justice as he remembered them’ (41). At 
one stage the child starts to develop his own fantasies about ‘[h]ow things would 
be in the south’ (54), where he even dares to imagine a community of sorts, perhaps 
one including other children. (McCarthy Journal 53) 
 
And these fantasies, a good part of which emerge as flashbacks to the preapocalyptic era, do 
salvage the pair from exposing themselves to excessive traumatization. One of these emancipating 




There was a lake a mile from his uncle’s farm where he and his uncle used to go in 
the fall for firewood. He sat in the back of the rowboat trailing his hand in the cold 
wake while his uncle bent to the oars. The old man’s feet in their black kid shoes 
braced against the uprights. His straw hat. His cob pipe in his teeth and a thin drool 
swinging from the pipebowl…This was the perfect day of his childhood. This the 
day to shape the days upon. (6) 
 
Thus, the fantasy of utopian land where children fare safely and the flashback to the preapocalyptic 
fishing trip, respectively for the son and the father, serve as the very few therapeutic storytelling 
staples in which the pair can seek refuge. Allowing the echo of the sentence “[t]his was the perfect 
day of his[my] childhood. This the day to shape the days upon” to resonate within his psyche, the 
father seems to rise above the occasion enabling his psyche to sugarcoat the apocalyptic pains that 
have already blighted them.  
Transposing the notion of survival akin to the “Art of Trauma”, Laub and Podell claim that 
“survival itself should be considered as a type of art of trauma” (991). Alluding to Celan’s poetry, 
Laub and Podell exalt the art of poetry as the medium or art which enhances the likelihood of 
holding efficacious dialogues with the past as well as providing the means of the survival. Baer, 
too, relies on the unparalleled power of poetry to delineate how a poetic engagement can allow the 
trauma victim to come to terms with the unresolved experience, hence a successful survival. Then, 
“considering the poetic representation of unresolved experience” (9), is the redemption many 
trauma victims yearn for. McCarthy’s language in The Road is deeply rhymed, poetic and lyrical. 
Regarding such poetic nuances, Lincoln’s thoroughgoing account seems to be apt: 
 
The Road begins in ballad lyric prose under the ashen graylight of a nuclear winter: 
‘When he woke in the woods in the dark and the cold of the night / he’d reach out 
to touch the child sleeping beside him.’ The anapests, reverse spondaic feet, and 
alliterative rhythms give fine classic cadence to the tale’s opening, a father-son love 
story at the end of the world, all balanced in blank verse couplets turning back on 
themselves to Shakespeare, Milton, and Yeats. McCarthy classically cadences a 




Perhaps by rendering the language profoundly poetic, McCarthy is aiming at an even deeper 
meaning: “the impossibility of understanding”.  The simple language is not sufficient to transmit 
the impossible, hence turning to a poetic register more frequently to serve the purpose. This lucidly 
evokes Linda Belau’s theoretical vantage point which is predicated on the inadequacy of the 
signifier, which is language here. From Belau’s position, trauma is the pitfall of the language and 
its deficient capacity to convey the “real” in the guise of the symbolic and this failure cannot and 
should not make something sublime or celestial out of the traumatic experience. Apropos this 
impossibility, she contends: 
 
Because traumatic experience is grounded in the repetition of an impossibility, it is 
indelibly tied to the real beyond the signifier. In this sense, trauma opens up an 
ethical space beyond the symbolic which is, nevertheless, intimately tied to the 
materiality of the signifier and, therefore, to our social and linguistic destiny…The 
psychoanalytic intervention assures us, then, that we are responsible in the face of 
something that exceeds symbolic guarantee. This is the ethical dimension of trauma 
that gets left behind when we attempt to place traumatic experience beyond 
language and representation, beyond the traumatic materiality that is the signifier. 
(par 2) 
 
This defective linguistic feature to address the impossible real is evidently and analogously 
reflected in Derrida’s “‘impossibility and necessity’ of bearing witness to the ‘unexperienced 
experience’” (qtd. in Wolfreys 133) and Lanzmann’s “Obscenity of Understanding”, which were 
detailed in chapter one. Within the context of The Road, McCarthy, this thesis posits, embellishes 
his thoughts with as many artfully poetic terms, rhythm, and devices as possible not only to reach 
the emancipating aesthetics of “the art of trauma” within the hypothetical arsenal of Laub and 
Podell, but also to compensate for the inherent lack of language as a signifier, to recall Belau, 
Derrida and Lanzmann, in expressing what is practically out of its jurisdiction (real). Put 
differently, the weight of the apocalyptic event is too much to be contained in the aesthetics of a 
plain language insofar as its material signification is lost to something beyond one’s ken. It now 
transpires that McCarthy’s deeply poetic and literary language is targeted at revitalizing the 
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traumatized audience in conjunction with promoting the aesthetics of language in an effort to beat 
the material signifier’s defeat. 
The third exegetic account is what I call the in-between mystery. Prior to shedding light on 
the semantics of this compound term, I should wish to entail the last paragraph of the novel, for it 
serves as the cornerstone of my future arguments: 
 
Once there were brook trout in the streams in the mountains. You could see them 
standing in the amber current where the white edges of their fins wimpled softly in 
the flow. They smelled of moss in your hand. Polished and muscular and torsional. 
On their backs were vermiculate patterns that were maps of the world in its 
becoming. Maps and mazes. Of a thing which could not be put back. Not be made 
right again. In the deep glens where they lived all things were older than man and 
they hummed of mystery. (105) 
 
McCarthy’s repertoire of codes in this closing coda is compelling, thought-provoking, and 
alarming. Is he lamenting the extinction of the trout or the annihilation of the human civilization, 
mother earth and nature, whose maps mean very little once an apocalypse happens? Or is he urging 
us all to solely bear witness, contemplate, and hum the ancient paradoxical mysteries of man? 
 Not a lot of emancipating voice is heard within the traumatic codes of this paragraph. Nor 
is one inclined to think otherwise once the word “mystery” stands out, hence a liminal space which 
could shift to any direction in the light of existential free choices man makes. But should the scale 
of this liminality weigh in favor of care or otherwise oblivion? Or for that matter, where does 
McCarthy stand? McCarthy’s fiction has constantly ushered in novel waves of ethical support for 
nature and earth. The Road marks the inception of a shift from the individual traumas of the 
humanity towards collective apocalyptic traumas, which asks for nothing but call to care and 
action. When asked what he really wanted his audience to ascertain by The Road, McCarthy 
replied: “It would be to just simply care about things and people and be appreciative. Life is pretty 
damn good even when it looks bad and we should be appreciative more. We should be grateful” 
(qtd. in Hardwig 49). 
The constructive outlook the author of The Road has apropos the trauma of the apocalypse 
should immediately evoke the words of Rothberg whose trauma rhetoric meshes, in an unmediated 
style, with the very underlying apocalyptic narrative aesthetics of The Road, for Rothberg spurs us 
to take more heed of the traumatic events such as global labor and climate change than Holocaust 
and Euro-centric events. Entitling it “slow violence”, Rothberg purports “[t]he slow violence of 
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climate change does not only require a shift in temporal perception away from the shattering event 
of classically conceived trauma; it also requires a recalibrated understanding of humanist history 
and subjectivity that displaces (without entirely eliminating) the positions of victim and 
perpetrator” (xvi). Underlining the future dynamics of trauma, Rothberg goes to great lengths to 
prompt us to move from suffering and violence towards “resistance, healing, and social change” 
(xvii). The Road, given the outlook of its author and the analogous angle held by Rothberg, should 
instill in the audience the same determination and morale. 
 Of immediate pertinence here is Estes’s commentary on the same paragraph with an 
emphasis on the intrinsic sanctity of nature and the humanity’s mission in ensuring its longevity: 
“the passage emphasizes the sacred quality of nature itself and of our interactions with it …the 
feeling of loss connoted by ‘once there were’ joins with ‘hummed of mystery’ to produce a call to 
action” (214). Furthermore, Estes exploits the Hegelian dialectic model of thesis, anti-thesis, and 
synthesis to better depict how environment emerges “from a background of calamitous loss” (215), 
which again “serve as a call to action, a call to re-think the ways in which we have written and are 
writing American spaces” (215). Estes’s activist interpretation apropos McCarthy’s closing coda, 
which invokes reform and practical involvement, is best portrayed in what follows: 
 
Biocentric maps, such as the one etched into living fish at the end of The Road, are 
examples of just such a thing. These biocentric maps stress the intrinsic rights of 
nature, the imbrication of humans within a web of biota and a flexible and dynamic 
approach to dealing with the environment. McCarthy’s texts, read in terms of a 
dialectic and culminating with the Hegelian Aufhebung of bioecentric maps, thus 
call for a re conceptualization of the ways in which we conceive of environment, 
of the ways in which we participate in the writing of American spaces. (216-217) 
 
What, however, casts doubt on the essence of this activist call-to-action modality, sustained 
by Rothberg, Estes and McCarthy himself, is how McCarthy and his fiction both keep 
enigmatically silent as to the details and nuances of this path, hence my propensity for the term 
liminality or in-betweenness. So much, intentionally or otherwise, goes unsaid as to how this 
liminal conundrum will fare in any direction. McCarthy astutely exhorts the audience to bear 
witness to a mysterious event that has wreaked havoc on the earth and remains equally and 
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mysteriously wordless as to how one could find a way out. This purely thought-provoking power 
of witnessing what remains is elegantly depicted in the words of Rambo: 
 
In the aftermath of the collapse of the world, there is no end in sight, no destination, 
and no promise of life ahead. But in the face of these impossibilities, the impulse 
to impose redemption is replaced, instead, by an imperative to witness to what 
remains. Could we discover, in these texts, a witnessing breath, not a triumphant 
one? Instead of leading to a redemptive ending, it may provide a necessary 
disruption of that familiar framework and a reorientation to life as a living on. As 
readers, we are handed over the perilous question: ‘What does it mean to ¡witness 
to what remains?’ The question is not who will save the world but, instead, who 
will witness its shattering? (115) 
 
Once more, we are reverted to Felman’s testimony or testimonial criticism whose heart hinges 
upon the very act of bearing witness. In other words, it is solely through the act of bearing witness 
to the unbearable monstrosity of the trauma that one can allow the testimony to come alive. This 
instantaneously evokes Laub and Podell’s model of “witnessing and emptiness” maintaining, “[i]n 
essence it is only through its indirect and dialogic nature that the art of trauma can come close to 
representing the emptiness at the core of trauma while still offering the survivor the possibility of 
repression and repossession” (993).  
Thus, the more one gazes into the very labyrinths of the trauma, here the liminal 
apocalyptic trauma, the more one could cogitate about how McCarthy has brought into being such 
a mysterious conundrum, hence the birth of the efforts to decipher and work-out the conundrum. 
Comparing The Road to its likes, mostly apocalyptic films such as 2012, McSweeney avers that 
The Road offers something that most apocalyptic films do not, which is offering an open-ended 
enigma. While most apocalyptic films aim at annihilating the world to have it stereotypically start 
anew, The Road “offers no such easy resolution or formulaic opportunities for redemption, and 
perhaps this is why, in years to come, it may be seen as one of the most potent and resonant science 
fiction films of the first decade of the new millennium” (55). The liminal mysteries of The Road 
beneath which its traumatizing narrative runs seem to be barely on anyone’s radar, which is what, 
this essay suggests, ushers in a fresh wave of trauma dynamics. 
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Hillcoat’s Survival Outlook and a Leap of Faith beyond Trauma: Last Words 
 
That Hillcoat’s visual aesthetics encapsulate, with perfect economy and tact, all the three exegetic 
survival accounts this study has offered so far is axiomatic. All the planes including the 
traumatizing path, the beacon of emancipation, and the liminal space are intrinsically felt 
throughout the film. Yet, it is the emancipation plane, this study should suggest, which tips the 
scale in its favor. Put differently, Hillcoat, albeit enamored with McCarthy’s non-redemptive and 
liminal testimonies, decides to affix his own redemptive signature to the bottom of the film.  
This signature, serving as the director’s epistemological stance towards an apocalyptic 
trauma plaguing the hearts and souls of humanity, offers the resolution which McCarthy does not, 
or at least he demands his audience to come up with it. McCarthy’s liminal mystical voice stems 
from the portrayal of “brook trout”, on whose back “were vermiculate patterns that were maps of 
the world in its becoming” (105). He trims his mysterious depiction further through the word 
“maze” and how it is akin to the ancient “mysteries” of world. The paragraph as elucidated before 
is hermeneutically the most quintessential part of the novel, which buttresses the constantly 
thought-provoking and philosophical tone of McCarthy. This vital epilogue, to any critics’ despair, 
faces an elliptical approach at the hands of the director and the screenwriter. 
 It is of little surprise, then, if Hillcoat’s refurbishing or manipulating signature to “a 
powerful novel’s vision of a dystopian future” (Monbiot 29), arouses diverse controversies. Not 
only has Hillcoat excised the most meaningful paragraph of the literary source but he has also lost 
sight of the hermeneutics of the mysteries at which McCarthy was aiming. The brook and the 
magical trout are replaced with a well-fed dog in the company of the family who seemed to quickly 
adopt the newly orphaned child (see appendix: figure 22). This elliptical transformation seems to 
be unforgivable in the eyes of Hawkins: 
 
The other, and in my view unforgiveable, error the film makes is the Oprah-licious 
ending. As in the novel, after his father’s death, the boy meets a man in the road. 
This man has a family, and he is willing to take the boy with him. The novel ends 
with a quite mysterious paragraph that speaks to the beauty of trout and the 
disappearance of nature. The film, on the other hand, invites the entire family to 
meet the boy at ocean’s edge. I guess this would have been okay; they all look filthy 
184 
 
and ragged, all of them except for the dog. Huh? A dog? Yes, a great looking dog, 
so well-fed. OMG. And they all go off together. And this is how focus groups have 
ruined American movies: the apocalypse meets Lassie. (58) 
 
Against this raged and rigid state of Hawkins in addressing this scene comes the rationally mild 
interpretation of Mcsweeney contending “they are a family; they have a dog who has not been 
eaten; the veteran (Guy Pearce) seems hardened and prepared” (54). That the dog has not been 
consumed seems to be the redemptive and civilizing mark Hillcoat has left on the ending thematics 
of the film in the mysterious brook’s stead. This assures the boy, and by extension the audience, 
that the family “carry the fire” and they have not fallen into the camp of cannibals who would not 
have mercy on humans much less dogs.  
Hillcoat, once more, displays the ending scene, albeit deemed overstated by Hawkins and 
her likes, “as an indication that these are a family just like his own family and that is the hope in 
it” (Hillcoat qtd in Mcsweeney 54). In an even more upbeat rendering, Hoberman asserts: “my 
favorite addition to the novel is the close-up of The Post-Apocalyptic Puppy of Hope that appears 
in the movie’s final scene. It’s a last-minute Christmas card reminiscent of the voiceover that opens 
Sam Fuller’s Vietnam-set China Gate: ‘In this ravaged city where people are starving, all the dogs 
have been eaten except one’” (2). 
 Hillcoat’s redemptive signature, albeit deviating from the mysterious tone of the novel, 
invokes the same hope and growth which echoes most of the new trauma poetics of Balaev. 
Resilient enough to grow out of the traumas of a post-apocalyptic cannibalistic era, the family 
seems merciful, compassionate and united in solidarity. To return to chapter one once more, Balaev 
diverges from the Caruthian parlance on many fronts, in that she urges trauma scholars to 
reconsider all the terms like “unrepresentable, unspeakable, timeless, repetitious, contagious and 
infectious”, and instead seek out for untapped alternatives such as rebirth, fluidity and perhaps 
growth. All such constructive terms should be analogously intertwined with Stampfl’s concept of 
resilience: “[t]he idea of resilience introduces uplifting themes to the study of trauma. Along these 
lines, ideas of rebirth or redemption come into play, ideas which exceed the concept of recovery 
defined merely as the return of normal functioning” (136). This way, the Caruthian jargon of 
abreaction and the Freudian compulsion to repeat, which are exemplified all along the first 
testimonial path, are repudiated by the redemptive voice of the director who prefers hope, rebirth 
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and resilience over bitter stagnant acting-out, hence his elliptical signature affixed to the bottom 
of the film.  
 Hillcoat’s silver screen translation also tends to wittingly miss out on McCarthy’s 
lamenting sentences or phrases like “something was gone that could not be put right again” (52) 
and “[o]f a thing which could not be put back. Not be made right again” (105), which denote 
nothing but irreversibility of the trauma. This stance, in trauma tropes, does not seem to sit well 
with Hillcoat’s ideology, hence its elision in the film to enable it to resonate with the voice of hope 
and growth. Apropos this elision, Peebles contends: 
 
[o]n a larger scale McCarthy reminds the reader that some things really can’t be 
made right again. Though the film adaptation depicts the bleak environment and 
the depth and moral significance of the father-son relationship, it backs off 
somewhat from the novel’s eco-tragic elements, suggesting in the end that broader 
recovery may indeed be possible. (10) 
 
Then, such irreversibility articulated by McCarthy is not only excised but also replaced with the 
imagery of hope which is portrayed by animals and how they have not been extinct yet, against 
the way McCarthy speaks of the extinction of all the animals and birds: “[t]hey stood, their clothes 
flapping softly. Glass floats covered with a gray crust. The bones of seabirds. At the tide line a 
woven mat of weeds and the ribs of fishes in their millions stretching along the shore as far as eye 
could see like an isocline of death. One vast salt sepulchre. Senseless. Senseless” (83). Up against 
all this traumatizing death of birds and animals, comes not only Hillcoat’s dog but also another 
innovatively added beacon of hope like beetle. Trying to get over their shock upon witnessing this 
phenomenal miracle, they are further amazed by how the beetle ethereally flies away (see 
appendix: figure 23). This, once more, marks another directorial seal added by Hillcoat to the 
textual aesthetics of the literary source, which is subtly observed by Peebles: “[t]he film’s addition 
of small hints of the possibility of renewal, like a beetle wondered over by the father and son, 
leaven the film with a level of hope that…” (13). 
 Hillcoat’s directorial voice of hope does not give up even when the credits roll. Transposing 
the credits to a cacophony of children’s sounds along with the sound of animals and nature, 
Hillcoat daringly revives all the lost and traumatizing threads of the narrative: children, animals, 
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and nature. This, albeit deemed a leap of faith by this study, has been censured by many critics 
who take a dim view of such overstated adaptational changes, as entailed in the interpretations of 
Peebles: 
 
The Road ends with an affirmation of the revelatory fire that the father and son 
carry, and a fairly clear sense of optimism for a restored world, tempered only by 
that minor tone overtaking the sounds of children playing during the final credits—
though that optimism feels a bit false after the film has spent some one hundred 
minutes emphasizing the difficulty of survival. It is a cinematic narrative that flirts 
with tragedy but avoids it in the end. (16) 
 
Albeit considered overstated by Peebles and perhaps many others, Hillcoat’s ending scene 
embodies the same sense of appreciation to which McCarthy strives to aspire. Returning to his 
words once more, “It would be to just simply care about things and people and be appreciative. 
Life is pretty damn good even when it looks bad and we should be appreciative more. We should 
be grateful” (qtd. in Hardwig 49), one can find the relatively justifiable bond between Hillcoat’s 
ending scene and McCarthy’s aspiration towards care, appreciation and gratefulness. One could 
infer that McCarthy’s implicit themes are rendered explicit through the visual world of Hillcoat. 
McCarthy has never addressed matters of war and politics openly in The Road and all the 
interpretations apropos the Post-9/11 and the war of terror in Bush’s administration, far-fetched or 
otherwise, seem to be the subjective response of the screenwriter and the director, whose 
comments are mentioned below: 
 
There is certainly something to do with the decade of the Bush administration . . . 
In the last decade there has been a lot of fear out there and 9/11 has been part of 
that. Fear about the environment, fear about the economy, fear about lots of things 
. . . that setting was meant to highlight what happens when fear takes over. (Hillcoat 




[P]ost-9/11, post-Katrina, post-Iraq, ordinary Americans can at last conceive of a 
world bereft of humanity—a world McCarthy has depicted for decades. (Penhall 
qtd in Mcsweeney 46) 
 
This subjectivity is by no means unfunded. Through politicizing McCarthy’s work, whose 
transparent visual emblem is the portrayal of the smoke upon the collapse of the World Trade 
Center, both Hillcoat and Penhall are calling all to action, which is, once more, reminiscent of 
Estes’s activist interpretation, which invokes reform and practical involvement. Rothberg’s words, 
which spur us to move from suffering and violence towards “resistance, healing, and social 
change” (xvii), can be vividly noted upon this occasion. This way, McCarthy’s implicit or passive 
mysteries of trauma metamorphose to limpidly active notions at the hands of the director and the 
screenwriter. This resonantly compelling message of the Hillcoat and Penhall is how I prefer to 
draw this chapter to a close.  
The Road, visually and textually, is the tale of humanity’s narcissism and how ash defeats 
it effortlessly. What follows is more apocalyptic and painful than the apocalypse, for the 
apocalypse did not plant the seeds of cannibalism or infanticide; it was the narcissism of humanity 
which brought such saturnine trauma chapters into being. Such chapters do not fare well within 
the codes of absurdity, violence, extremism, jeremiad and even randomness to which the aesthetics 
of No Country for Old Men fairly aspired.  
This ashen tale is grounded on a wasteland which is “shorn of its referents and so of its 
reality” (35). An unfairly losing, if not lost, battle is what it is. It is more than plain to verbally 
address the new trauma-oriented hope words like resilience, fluidity, growth and rebirth, yet once 
one bears witness to what the father and son laid eyes on, things might not start to look up, hence 
the far-fetched and overstated nature of hope and emancipation within this ashen context. 
Hillocat’s beetle and dog of hope are no rival for the cannibals who roast infants. This, then, should 
be precisely why McCarthy himself refrains from such portrayals of hope and instead urges us to 
solely bear witness to the traumas which could be simply avoided if we cared. Humanity could 
save itself the trouble of effortful survival through the effortless vocabulary of care, solicitude and 
respect regarding not only each other but also mother earth. Few, if not no, trauma notions have a 



































Here at the end, precisely unlike the nature of a non-referential trauma narrative, the foregoing 
study needs to recapitulate the conclusive references to which the chapters of the study contributed. 
The present project is composed of three chapters whose underlying theoretical narrative revolves 
around how the concept of trauma tends to inform, if not form, two of McCarthy’s selected 
canonical works, namely No Country for Old Men (2005) and The Road (2006). The analytical 
trauma exegesis, whose staples are investigated in depth throughout the first chapter, becomes not 
only the very premise upon which the analysis of the novels is predicated, but also a point of 
departure for the study’s interpretational forays into some particular trauma moments in the filmic 
adaptations of the literary sources, which came to life at the hands of the Coen brothers and Hillcoat 
respectively. 
 The first chapter of this study touches on some epistemologically significant thought 
currents which shape the discourse of the trauma. Unfolding the chapter through Caruth’s 
pioneering notions of trauma, this study intends to display her most quintessential concepts such 
as incomprehensible and non-referential nature of traumas. Allied with such concepts is the 
haunting or ghostly essence of the trauma from which the victim constantly fails to wrench oneself 
free. Such spectral threads of argument are further substantiated by Wolfreys’s pertinent terms 
such as “phantasmatic or phantomatic”. Freud, I should not hesitate to remark, never leaves the 
stage of trauma arguments insofar as a good part of Caruth’s trauma poetics stems from Freudian 
dicta premised on his Moses and Monotheism.  
 The metaphorical concept of haunting comes down to earth via the practical notion of 
flashback. Put differently, flashbacks are the recurrent post-traumatic sensory ordeals, mostly in 
the guise of dreams or nightmares, out of which the haunted patient or victim finds no way. In this 
respect, the study has recourse to Hustvedt’s findings which are indicative of the very intrusive 
nature of flashback’s visual and auditory fragments, as opposed to the linguistic mode for which 
the victim finds no use. Ineluctably interlaced with the concept of flashback is the notion of 
“compulsion to repeat” with which Feud seems to have been credited. Not knowing what has 
blighted his/her psyche, Freud posits, the victim repeats or acts the moment out, hence a sort of 
compulsive return to the very moment which has never been made sense of. In the words of Caruth, 
the moment has not been given a “psychic meaning”. All such trauma tropes run in tandem with 
the Lacanian “real” which is tangential to the very hermeneutics of “missed encounter” or a 
moment that seems to have never incorporated itself into the realm of signification or the symbolic. 
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Unassimilable, silent, missed, and mysterious are the terms with which one can characterize “the 
real” efficiently. 
 Hartman’s rare and innovative thread of trauma aesthetics steps into our trauma discourse 
next. Enamored with Wordsworth’s haunting poetry and his Boy of Winander in particular, he 
underscores the role of nature in facilitating the processing of the haunting imagery which haunts 
the boy. Apocalypse, otherwise, is what befalls the humanity. Put simply, if the reciprocal bond 
between the man and nature falls into disarray in any way, the apocalyptic moment will come into 
being. The boy’s epiphanic journey, the study later adds, is all mute, hence another trope in the 
trauma rhetoric. This trope is then efficiently meshed with Green’s famed concept of “secondary 
thinking”, for the trauma victim cannot reveal the unsaid, even though he/she goes through an 
ordeal of doing so, hence the silenced psyche. 
LaCapra’s contribution to the semiotics of trauma occupies the next portion of the 
developmental narrative of this study. Distinguishing between the particularity of the “loss” and 
the ambiguity of the “absence”, LaCapra is at pains explicating how the conflation of these two 
could be vexing and irreversibly traumatic. This author, however, opts for the conversion of 
“absence” to “loss” eventually, insofar as the anxiety inherent in “absence” could only be 
eradicated through this transformation. In other words, one has to identify a traceable source for 
the untraceable concept of “absence” and consequently annihilate the same source. This way, the 
anxiety attendant upon “absence” will wane. The culture of nostalgia and lament is what otherwise 
awaits the victim. 
Of most germane significance at this juncture of trauma survey was the famed dichotomy 
of “acting-out/working-through”, with which Freud is originally credited and for which LaCapra 
is belatedly famed. From LaCapra’s vantage point, which is completely indebted to and analogous 
with the Freudian model, one could aim for impasse or otherwise revival banking respectively on 
“acting out” and “working through”. The emancipating beacon of hope LaCapra speaks of is at 
odds with the Caruthian jargon of “unspeakability”, “incomprehensibility” and 
“unrepresentability”. Consonant with the voice of LaCapra in this particular province is that of 
Craps who impugns Caruth’s jargon of fixation on the stagnant mode of “acting-out” of trauma. 
Another grave ramification of not working the trauma through should be how the victim finds 
himself/herself at the mercy of images and symbols once “acting-out” overwhelms his/hers soul. 
This is the area in which the voice of Onega and Ganteau resonates through. Žižek’s notion, via 
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his famed saying “[i]n order to cope with a trauma we symbolize” (qtd. in Wolfreys 126), best 
captures the soul of this thread of arguments. 
Release from trauma has brought into being another thought current termed “testimony” in 
critical trauma studies, which constitutes the next portion of this chapter. The term is indebted to 
the efforts of Shoshana Felman through her seminal book Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in 
Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History co-authored by the renowned psychoanalyst Dori Laub. 
Taking her cue from the above-mentioned thinkers, Marder deems that the acts of listening and 
speaking constitute the very essence of testimonial discourse of trauma. Inextricably laced to the 
testimonial criticism, this study has put forth, is Hustvedt’s therapeutic perspective apropos trauma 
through the power of narration and story-telling, which fosters a sense of agency in the victim. 
This sentiment is readily corroborated by Harmtan, Modell and Mallot later. 
It now transpires that all the testimonial efforts of the trauma victims should boil down to 
nothing but survival, which is the realm in which Laub and Podell fared well. Through the 
incontrovertible power of witnessing and conversing with the past, the trauma victims have 
recourse to the art of trauma in shaping efficient survival pathways. Alluding to Celan’s poetry, 
Laub and Podell elevate the art of poetry as the medium or art which effectively mirrors the 
empowering means of not only conversing with the past but also seeking out the trace of survival. 
Baer, in like manner, delineates how the poetic engagement can bring the victim to practical terms 
with the traumatic experience. 
Belatedness was the next staple of the trauma discourse to be enquired into by this study. 
Deriving its nature primarily from Freud and innovatively from Caruth, the concept basically 
purports that the traumatic experience is too much to be digested at the time of its occurrence, 
hence its initial slip from the memory only to be recovered later. This is how the term “latency” 
can be accounted for in the hermeneutics of trauma. Opting for the term “Nachträglichkeit”, which 
was translated to “afterwarsdness”, Laplanch perfected the belatedness vocabulary of Caruth. 
Eventually, Caruth and Laplanche concur unanimously with the “uninterpreted or unassimilated” 
nature of the trauma. The belatedness trope, the chapter has already delineated, attracts proponents 
and opponents alike. Disregarding the socio-cultural schemes and overemphasizing the linguistic 
and psychic facets of the traumatic event, Stampfl argues, are among the salient points shaping the 
complaining voice of the opposing camp.  
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Balaev’s new voice occupies the next portion of this chapter, which resonates with fluidity, 
rebirth and change. Calling into question most staples of the Caruthian jargon, Balaev strives to 
put on a pedestal the role of the trauma victim’s ability to rebuild his/her identity upon 
traumatization, hence the outlook of growth and rebirth. Furthermore, trauma is not a disease, nor 
is it contagious or infectious. Put differently, trauma has the potential to be expressed, represented 
and given voice to, while the classic approach contended otherwise and believed trauma was 
unspeakable, silent and haunting. The same insight pervades the trauma thoughts of Belau who 
purports that trauma falls into a representable and accessible domain. The materiality of the 
signifier in a traumatic narrative, she asserts, is eclipsed, if not eradicated, by the impossibility of 
the experience or the original encounter, hence a left-behind ethical condition and the complexity 
of the victim’s ethical/psychic mode. From Belau’s position, trauma is the pitfall of the language 
and its deficient capacity to convey the “real” in the guise of the symbolic and this failure cannot 
and should not make something sublime or celestial out of the traumatic experience 
Childhood trauma is the arena to which the next staple of this chapter was the allocated. 
Reviere’s analytical thinking in this area is what founds a good part of this study’s focal attention. 
A traumatized child, according to the lights of Reviere, is devoid of the advantages of self-
awareness, adaptation, schemas and flexibility. Furthermore, such children will not be able to make 
sense of the reality surrounding them. Shengold’s notions apropos childhood trauma provides a 
new insight towards our efforts regarding this chapter’s analytical efforts through adding the 
concept of “soul murder”. A soul murdered child, Shengold should contend, might never feel 
whole in dimensions such as identity, joy, deprivation and family. Some, to one’s dismay, might 
even sustain a self-destructive path, which eventually creates in them a strong, conscience-
distorting need for punishment. 
Craps’s insight is what emerges on the stage of this chapter’s analysis at this juncture. His 
ethical ideals are what most trauma scholars have lost sight of. Centered on TRC and awed by the 
novel Mother to Mother, Craps, this study implies, urges us to put the Caruthian rigidities behind 
us and instead unearth the ways by which the dialectics of pain and suffrage between or among 
cultures could be not only explored but also alleviated, hence new horizons towards forgiveness 
and redemption. 
I drew this chapter to a close through a pithy account of Freudian “the uncanny”. Having 
defined it through instantiation and exemplification, the chapter is quick to adduce its cardinal 
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constitutive elements such as repetition, death, and alienation. Whitehead’s vantage point apropos 
a simple fateful repetition and the uncanny sense thereof shapes the section pertaining to the 
element of repetition. The concept of death acquires its significance through a close dialogue with 
the concept of repetition too. Through its repetitive yet unknown nature, death traumatizes “the 
uncanny” by means of adding to its already deeply bizarre and frightening state. Alienation, as the 
last piece of this spectrum, is the feature which dramatizes the feeling of uncanny by exposing one 
to the unfamiliar state of a familiar entity. Rothberg’s more abstract, culturally diverse, and bio-
political direction is how I wish to bring this chapter to an end, asking my readers to listen for the 
novel voice of trauma inviting us to veer towards the “possibilities of resistance, healing, and social 
change” (xvii). 
Chapter two of this study aims at McCarthy’s No Country for Old Men and the adaptation 
thereof under the same title. Having shed light on the bizarrely traumatic state of Chigurh and his 
peculiar cattle gun as his murder weapon, the chapter divulges how his insanity pits against his 
particular philosophical principles, hence a liminal paradoxical state. To all this comes his 
unstoppable spectrality. Put differently, Chigurh, in all his liminality, insanity and inhumanity, is 
the phenomenal ghostly trauma of the narrative, in that he haunts his victims by virtue of his 
spectral stealth in much the same way the ghost of trauma never ceases to chase its victims. All 
this evokes traumas tropes of “phantasmatic” and “Phantomatic”, which came to light earlier. 
Later, the chapter has recourse to the breath-taking encounter between Chigurh and Moss as the 
most traumatic or ghostly encounter of the narrative, which is further substantiated by the textual 
instances extracted from the novel. 
This haunting spectrality, the chapter next delineates, plans its incursion into the arena of 
the generic nuances as well, hence the genre ambivalence. This subversion of the genre or the 
ambiguity must be what cajoled the Coen brothers into visualizing this novel as their first direct 
effort in adaptation of a literary source. Later, the chapter sheds light on the two paths by virtue of 
which this generic subversion occurs, aka the eccentricities of the showdown and an aberrant 
Chigurh.  
Departing from Chigurh’s barbarity marks this chapter’s arrival at Bell’s defeat, which 
shapes most of the testimonial staples of the narrative. The chapter pursues Bell’s psychic pain 
and the monologues thereof as the plane on which the testimonial staples of the narrative fall. 
Having borne witness to war, crime, drugs, rape and many other atrocities, Bell has no more room 
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for another phenomenal trauma like Chigurh. Unable to digest this new chapter of malice and 
inhumanity, Bell responds to this via the jeremiad of the testimonial monologues placed at the very 
outset of each chapter. Such monologues are reminiscent of the Caruthian jargon of 
incomprehensibility and Felman’s testimony. Later, the chapter opts for the most moving 
monologues of the book whose weight is undeniably heavy on the psyche of Bell. Hustvedt’s 
talking cure, as another corresponding angle by which the monologues could be scrutinized, seems 
to have been eclipsed by the Caruthian jargon of incomprehensibility.  
Departing from the McCarthy’s monologues, the study, prior to shedding light on the 
brothers’ treatment of the monologues, veers in the direction of the shared stylistic and thematic 
aesthetics between the McCarthy and the Coen brothers, including the aberrant or idiosyncratic 
characters, subverted genres, western (anti-western) genre, and violence. Later, the chapter 
displays how the opening voice-over of the film captures the soul of almost the majority of 
McCarthy’s moving monologues, with the sheer tone of defeat deeply felt in the voice of Jones 
and the low-key dark images portrayed by the brothers at the very outset of the film. However, the 
brothers do affix their signature to the bottom of this monologue by transforming the defeated 
Caruthian sentence “And I think a man would have to put his soul at hazard. And I wont do that. I 
think now that maybe I never would” to a more activist sentence, more in line with the new school, 
like say “He would have to say, okay, I’ll be part of this world.” 
The chapter next arrives at the analysis of the dream monologue which takes its shape at 
the end of the film by Bell’s dream being unfolded. Many critical readings of this dream aim at its 
symbolically absurd and nihilist tone which could be argued through the Caruthian jargon as well 
as the melancholic voice of LaCapra. Read through the lens of LaCapra, Žižek and Onega/Ganteau 
and their symbol-oriented interpretations, the figure of father is the most prominent symbol Bell 
can resort to. The stark difference between the textual and visual account here is that, this 
monologue, in essence, transforms into a dialogue in the film, whose other side is Loretta. The 
monologue to dialogue transformation, which is the creative brainchild of the Coen 
brothers’adaptation, closely ties it to the therapeutic “talking cure”, hence the replacement of the 
testimonial passive tone with the active testimony of the Coen brothers. 
LaCapra’s famed innovation of “absence/loss” formulates the next portion of this chapter. 
Having differentiated between the two, the chapter swiftly shifts its lens on how the trauma of 
Chigurh in No Country for Old Men could metamorphose from “loss” to “absence”. The individual 
195 
 
and specific “loss” derived from Chigurh’s trauma, owing to its compelling nature, is likely to 
transform into a wider and more ubiquitous culture of “absence”, which could be analogously 
likened to the decaying America. This transformation, As LaCapra posits, brings nothing but 
melancholy, lament and nostalgia, which is evidently witnessed in the psyche of most of the 
characters, particularly Sheriff Bell. This transformation is the first course of the chapter’s 
hypothetical trauma hermeneutics.  
The second course, however, includes the anxiety-oriented thread of LaCapra’s discourse. 
According to LaCapra, a sense of anxiety is attendant upon the concept of “absence”, which cannot 
be obliterated unless one is able to convert it to “loss” via seeking a specific source for it. The 
more Bell strives to locate a source for such an anxiety-generating trauma (Chigurh), the more his 
efforts fail him. Neither able to locate a tangible source for his anxiety nor consequently successful 
in facilitating the process of transforming “absence” to “loss”, Bell, if not all the characters, is 
mired in his formless circumstance. All this, once more, evokes the Freudian “repetition 
compulsion” or “acting-out” and the Caruthian jargon of abreaction, as opposed to the process of 
working-through and redemption. 
 Balaev’s fluid trauma discourse is the next staple of this chapter’s arguments. Rather than 
shatter, the victim’s subjectivity, Balaev asserts, could be said to be exposed to further growth and 
fluidity in terms of identity, in the face of a traumatic experience. Having expounded on the 
nihilistic tone of the narrative and Bell’s defeated character, the foregoing exegesis concluds that 
the newly established trauma culture would not accommodate Balaev’s concepts of rebirth and 
growth. Caruth’s intergenerational trauma theory is later examined and exemplified through 
diverse textual instances of McCarthy’s novel, shedding light on how Sherriff Bell’s character is 
in an irremedial state of acting-out. 
 Do LaCapra and Balaev and their arguments lead us somewhere beyond the mere 
theoretical application? A glance at the dichotomies of acting-out/working-through, 
melancholy/mourning, and absence/loss would give us further clues as to how McCarthy tends to 
pave the way for an ominous path towards his ashen imagination The Road. Having his characters 
enact the dialectics of such dichotomies in favor of the abreactive jargon, McCarthy is taking the 
trajectory of loss-to-absence transformation against the very warning words of LaCapra. In fact, 
one could hypothesize that McCarthy’s loss (No Country for Old Men) with its specificities and 
particularities necessary for the nature of loss has a propensity for metamorphosing into absence 
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(The Road) with its vague and holistic nature, which generates nothing but anxiety, melancholy 
and nostalgia. 
Carla Jean’s portrayal in the brothers’ visual world, which is symptomatic of her resilience 
and strength, shapes the next portion of this chapter. Carla Jean is the first person in the narrative 
not only to defy Chigurh’s corrupt ideology by saying “The coin didnt have no say. It was just 
you”, but also to disgrace Chigurh by not calling, not to mention her intrepidity in calling him 
“crazy”. This rebelliously resilient state of Carla in the Coen brothers’ innovative art, which is 
contrarily tenuous and docile in the novel, should catapult us into stampfl’s resilience model. 
Trauma does not shatter Carla Jean the way it breaks Bell. This way, the brothers, once more, affix 
their signature to the bottom of the thematic messages of the narrative. 
 “The Uncanny” and its salient features such as death, silence and repetition are interrogated 
next in this chapter. The chapter opts for the initial massacre scene as the uncanniest scene of the 
film whose uncanny nature, this study argues, is informed by the long takes, lack of music, silence 
of the take and the slowness. The repetitional spectrality of Chigurh coupled with his uncanny 
murder weapon, aka the cattle gun, is what makes the narrative further uncanny. Barely can one 
escape the fateful death coming at the hands of Chigurh.  
The surreally haunting encounter between Moss and Chigurh is selected as the most 
haunting of all. Comparing McCarhty’s text to the brothers’ artful adaptation, the study suggests 
that the Coen brothers’ account diverges from McCarthy’s text, in that they embellish their 
visuality with further uncanny aesthetics such as the ghostly walk, silence, repetitive shootings 
(compared to the literary source), death of an additional driver while gurgling blood, and 
eventually the surreal disappearance of Chigurh. All this spectrum of uncanny staples utilized by 
the Coen brothers in this particular sequence transcends the original text’s uncanny nature to its 
unimaginable apex. 
 The epilogue of this chapter entails the Levinasion ethics explored in the character of Moss 
and the mortality of the allegedly immortal Chigurh. Having seen the dying man’s face only once, 
Moss is but distraught, which makes him turn back, albeit belatedly, to the crime scene only to 
find the man dead, and ironically himself dead, as this is the very inception of all the cat and mouse 
game which ultimately brings him to the deathbed. This lucidly evokes the Levinasion “face of the 
other. Another ethically moving encounter throughout the narrative is how Moss decides to 
sacrifice himself for a girl whom he had barely met. He dies trying to save a stranger’s life, whose 
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Levinasion face exhorts him to sense the deepest type of moral obligation. The Coen brothers, 
however, decide to lose sight of the most ethical encounter of the film attempting, this study 
suggested, to magnify the existential random chaos. One might wonder whether Moss’s demise 
would tip the scale in the favor of Chigurh’s further brutal victory. Yet, the ending scene 
disillusions both Chigurh himself and the audience alike. Having tossed the coin to Carla’s death, 
he drives away reveling in his new victory only to be disillusioned by a fatal accident. He has 
waited all this while to lose his narcissistic invincibility only to a random idiotic crash. He seems 
not to be immortal after all. 
 Past these arguments, I would like to suggest a tripartite model which captures the soul of 
my intended messages in this chapter. The suggested triangle or tripartite model seems to 
encompass three vertexes which are shaped by three characters Chigurh, Moss, and Bell, who 
portray three traumatic tropes of spectrality, ethicality and testimony, respectively. No matter how 
this triangle lands, the vertex of Chigurh with the trope of spectrality and the traumatizing 
brutalities thereof seems to defeat the other vertexes which denote ethicality and testimony. This 
must be why the vertex of ethicality (Moss) dies and the vertex of spectrality (Chigurh) walks way, 
while the testimonial vertex does not, or cannot, but complain through jeremiad, melancholy, and 
consequently nihilism. 
Beyond this chapter and on a platform to extrapolate the future trauma outlooks, it would 
be only fair if one went through all the theories and their application once more. All the staples 
seem to fit the bill from where they stand. Yet, where do they stand? Has the new school of trauma 
made any extraordinary difference compared to the abreactive jargon of Caruth when it comes to 
practice, namely the context of No Country for Old Men? Did the Levinasion ethicality and its 
“face of the other” help Moss take a different route than meet his demise, which was yet another 
trauma? Indeed, it was the Levinasion ethicality which did away with him in the first place, hence 
giving rise to further traumatization. In like manner, the testimonial monologues of Sherriff Bell 
not only laid waste to the very morale of the narrative, but it also amplified the very voice of defeat 
and nihilism.  
All such theoretical staples operate on an aesthetically enjoyable plane and deserve only a 
commentary venue. Chigurh can be neither fought nor eluded and the fact that he can be hurt is 
not a relief knowing he gets away with all he has committed. Chapter two of this study lucidly 
appreciates the mortality of Chigurh deducing how this outlook could be constructive. On second 
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thoughts, he walks away and every single thread of practical exegesis is undermined once such a 
trauma is still on the loose. This must be why McCarthy takes us up on another odyssey towards 
the ashen traumas of The Road later. This odyssey is as horrifying as didactic, in that the primitive 
trauma logic of No Country for Old Men will yield itself to an apocalyptic logic, if any, of trauma. 
This transformation, then, would be the least a trauma outlook can covey through the “the prophet 
of destruction” in No Country for Old Men: a prelude to ash. 
Chapter three embarks on a traumatic journey, or a road, whose essence diverges from the 
previous chapter in many respects with noteworthiness. The Road is a tale of ash and dust 
happening in a wasteland. Trauma is an understatement in addressing the narrative, if any, of The 
Road, which is shaped majorly by two characters, viz the father and the son. The chapter initiates 
its arguments with the traumatic non-referentiality and goes so far as to bring to light the very 
pertinence of the concept in the narrative. The traumatized history, Caruth argues relying on Freud, 
cannot be reliable. Similarly in The Road, nobody could even venture a guess as to whether where, 
when and how the original trauma or the apocalypse has occurred. All one is entitled to know is 
“[t]he clocks stopped at 1:17” (McCarthy 21). The lost temporality and its ensuing non-
referentiality informs much of the plot and characters as well, as they cannot contribute much to 
the demystification of the original apocalyptic trauma, and even if they do, their accounts, 
according to the lights of Caruth, cannot be reliable, hence the non-referentiality. In contrast to 
McCarthy, Hillcoat has recourse to direct visual references to some particular traumas of the recent 
history, such as the 9/11 attacks or hurricane Katrina, which is precisely at odds with the logic of 
non-referentiality. Later, the chapter turns towards the scene of the original trauma and how 
Hillcoat’s camera keeps the audience in the dark regarding the very underlying traumatic event by 
restraining its operation only to the domestic space of the house. This, suggested by this study, 
paves the way towards the traumatic non-referentiality. 
 The chapter, then, approaches flashbacks and their traumatic haunting within the context 
of The Road. The suicide of the wife and the obligation to euthanize the boy, lest the cannibals 
rape and eat him, were thought, by this study, to be the most ubiquitous flashbacks haunting the 
psyche of the father throughout the narrative. All this haunting runs in tandem with the Caruthian 
possession and the spectrality thereof. Lacanian “real” was likewise utilized to account for the 
inexplicably missed nature of the original moment of trauma. Hillcoat’s flashbacks emphasize the 
role of the wife further, but they miss out on the intellectual weight of the character instead.  
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Moreover, the study chose to analyze the very initial flashbacks of the film portraying the 
wife’s innocent beauty and the unblemished verdant nature. Differentiating all the prelapsarian era 
from the postlapsarian era by means of color─ all the prelapsarian scenes are shot in vibrant 
colorful photography whereas the postlapsarian scenes are shot in nothing but dark or gray color, 
to signify nothing but death─ Hillcoat aims to create a dichotomy which instantly evokes Torok’s 
concept of split psyche and Baer’s “twofold structural disjunction between an experience and its 
integration into narrative memory, understanding, and communicability” (10), save for the fact 
that what is split here is not the psyche of the victim, but the narrative.  
 The chapter, next, touches upon the concept of childhood trauma and how its elements rob 
the boy in the narrative of his self-image, schemas and his sense of reality. All these elements were 
explored by dint of referring to particular textual examples which highlight each trauma staple. 
The study also proposed that the most fatal wound to the psyche of the boy, which murdered his 
soul beyond redemption, was bearing witness to infanticide, culminating in the child’s total silence 
and shock. Furthermore, with respect to Shengold, the traumatized child develops self-destructive 
pathways, whose instance was shown through textual examples within the framework of The Road. 
Hillcoats adaptation, however, loses sight of two important traumas namely, the infanticide and 
the captivated pregnant women whose children were most likely to be consumed by the cannibals. 
This, many critics hold, is simply unfilmable. 
 Barely could the ashen traumas of The Road situate themselves in the immediacy of the 
testimonial threads of trauma discourse. Yet, the testimonial plane of the narrative, held by this 
study consisted of three approached: talking to each other, talking to the dead, and talking to the 
past(flashbacks). All throughout the narrative the pair rely on the unbreakable bond between one 
another which is fueled by the sentimentally meaningful dialogues exchanged between the two, 
whose textual examples were detailed in the course of the composition of the chapter. Such 
conversation aside, the father and the son find themselves unable to avoid conversing with the 
dead traumatic space of the narrative, mainly the “cauterized” nature. The third course, talking to 
the past, was the very flashbacks whose analytical implications had already come to light. These 
flashbacks, suggested by this study, occupied a liminal space between past and present which ran 
back and forth in the traumatized psyche of the father, creating a “twofold structural disjunction” 
not only in the psyche of the father but also the narrative. As such, the Green’s “secondary 
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thinking” found its relational mode into the argument of the chapter, as the more the traumatized 
father wanted to speak, the more went unspoken. 
 Hartman’s visual imagery was the next staple to be interrogated at this point. Placing a 
huge body of emphasis on the role of nature processing the haunting images, Hartman steadfastly 
believes in the reciprocal dialectics between the man and the nature. The annihilation of this 
reciprocation is, Hartman remarks, the first step towards the apocalypse which hold utterly true in 
the context of The Road. Later, the study shapes an analogy between the “pastoral pipe” of 
Hartman’s Boy of Winander and the flute played by the boy in McCarthy’s The Road. 
 At this juncture, I propose, in ways of developing a conclusive axiom apropos McCarthy’s 
characters in the face of their traumatic moments, we take a retrospective look at how he shapes 
them through corpus narratives’ trajectory. This matters inasmuch as the characters, at times, 
reveal the language of trauma more evidently than the narratives since the narrative, particularly 
in The Road, seems to have suffered the same death that has befallen the ashen world. In so doing, 
a certain resemblance between a certain Carla Jean and the father, respectively in No Country for 
Old Men and The Road, seems to surface. Both characters seem to fight, rebel and resist surrender 
even in the face of the most traumatizing moments of facing Chigurh and the ashen world 
respectively. This should evoke Stampfl and Balaev. On the other hand, one can spot a certain 
kinship between Sheriff Bell and the wife once more, in that both opt for regressive paths. Bell in 
No Country for Old Men yields to defeat and retires himself away upon realizing how he can never 
be a match for Chigurh in much the same way, or perhaps even more radically, the wife in The 
Road takes her own life in the face of an apocalypse reveling in cannibalism and infanticide. This, 
however, taps on the old haunting voice of trauma evoking Caruthian jargon once more. 
 Hillcoat’s testimonial trademarks shaped the next portion of the chapter, which 
encompassed his preference for the real locations and aesthetics over the special effects, 
diminished poetic tone, masterful voice-over of Mortensen and the tempo of editing. Albeit 
censured for the slow pace of editing by many critics, this study held that for a true testimonial 
process to come alive, the narrative should allow the characters to digest, or listen and speak to, 
the very pivotal core of the traumatic experience. This testimony then cannot, the study put forth, 
run in tandem with the dynamics of certain other apocalyptic or dystopian films. Later, the chapter 
sheds some quick light on how the stellar performance of Mortensen and McPhee and the decent 
voice-over of Mortensen amplified the testimonial voice of Hillcoat’s adaptation. 
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 The chapter, later, essays to survey the concept of survival, which is inextricably linked to 
trauma. The study has delineated three routes of survival as follows: the traumatic wasteland, the 
emancipation, and in-between mystery. The first path, pithily put, yields nothing but despair, 
desperation, traumatization, violence and savagery, which all stand against the values of the 
redemptive path. This path, viz the traumatic wasteland, falls very akin to the ideals of the old 
school of trauma, with the Caruthian discourse of abreaction and the Freudian “compulsion” at its 
core.  
The second path called emancipation by this study, however, entails all the constructive 
hope-oriented staples such as the existence of the messianic child, the “fire”, the miraculous family 
emerging at the end of the story, and eventually McCarthy’s “south”. All these features were 
investigated in the light of particular trauma tropes such as images and symbols theorized by Zizek 
and Onega/Ganteau. Last but not least, this path involves”, Laub and Podell’s claim that “survival 
itself should be considered as a type of art of trauma” and their admiration for poetry as the stage 
upon which the testimonial dialogues with the traumatic past can occur. This exaltation, suggested 
by this study, closely allies itself to the deeply poetic language of McCarthy in The Road. To the 
end of the novel emerges a paragraph portraying the nostalgic memory of “trout” and their graceful 
movement. This closing coda is the premise upon which I have built the stapled of the third path 
called in-between mystery. Shorty put, the paragraph simply, and paradoxically mysteriously, 
demands us to bear witness to what we see. It neither redeems nor traumatizes, hence liminality. 
Contemplation, proposed by this study, lies at the core of this path. Rothberg’s constructive trauma 
vocabulary and Estes’s reform-based tenets help the theoretical exegesis of this path. 
 Once more and upon closer inspection, another tripartite trauma model can be witnessed 
whose components (characters) correspond precisely to the very three paths this study has offered 
so far. This trio is characterized by the wife, the father and the son, who respectively characterize 
the first, the second and the third paths. The first path, aka the traumatic wasteland, can closely 
ally itself to the psyche of the wife who, upon her realization of the irreversibility of the traumas 
imposed on her, decided to commit suicide, which strikes a close chord with the staples of the first 
path once more. On the other hand, the father, unrelentingly haunted by a myriad of traumas, the 
mentioned suicide in the main, does not yield to the very same irreversibility which kills the wife. 
Instead, he works it through and grows out of it, while the wife tends to solely act it out. The 
father’s trauma language is that of hope, fluidity and rebirth which might evoke the new school 
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voices such as Balaev and Stampfl. Eventually, the son’s trauma rhetoric closely converses with 
the third path, for he neither acts out nor works through. In other words, he develops suicidal 
tendencies which echo the abreactive jargon, while at the same time he tends to grow out of all the 
traumas that have befallen him. He is lost but not a lost cause. Unlike his mother, he intends to 
fight and survive, yet he reflects certain destructive inclinations occasionally, hence his affinity 
with the third path. 
 Hillcoat’s visual world abides by the three hypothetical trauma-oriented survival paths that 
this study has set forth. However, the most significant paragraph of the novel (the ending 
paragraph), which portrays the trout and the other enigmatic messages, faces an elliptical decision 
by the director, which could be deemed to be a way of affixing his signature to the bottom of The 
Road. This signature, moreover, entails other redemptive additions such the dog in the ending 
scene and the beetle flying away miraculously some mins before that. Even when the credit roll, 
Hillcoat speaks of hope and emancipation through adding a collection of different sounds which 
seem to be indicative of nature, children, and animals, the very same entities McCarthy’s novel 
had striven to portray as extinct or lifeless. All these visual additions coupled with politicizing 
McCarthy’s text (portrayal of World Trade Center’s collapse) are indicative of Hillcoat’s calling 
all to action, which evokes once more the logic of Rothberg and Estes. 
 Through a further deductive reasoning, I would like to state that the visual world of the 
corpus narratives of this study seems to outweigh, in terms of hope and traces of redemption, the 
textual world of McCarthy. Both the Coen brothers and Hillcoat tend to affix their redemptive 
signatures of hope, rebirth, and growth to the bottom of their adaptations, which means the 
directors, via resorting to characters (Carla Jean in No Country for Old Men), creative additions 
(Twin Towers in The Road), and certain transformations (“He would have to say, okay, I’ll be part 
of this world.” in No Country for Old Men) develop certain affinities in approaching the new school 
of trauma. 
 Once more, and beyond the staples of the chapters which the foregoing study has examined, 
I believe I owe this project more than mere theories and the application thereof. The odyssey, 
whose inception McCarthy created through Chigurh’s walking away, turns out to yield to more 
than a Chigurh-like traumatic trajectory. The prelude of No Country for Old Men with the “prophet 
of destruction” lying at its core is nothing compared to the postlude of The Road with the 
apocalypse at its heart. Chigurh kills robotically, yet he neither eats humans nor roasts infants. 
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Even the way I, wittingly or unwittingly, have tried to utilize the traumas theories differs from the 
first to the second narrative with utmost noteworthiness.  
Testimonial threads of No Country for Old Men (the monologues) which evoke Felman’s 
notions metamorphose to Hartman’s visual imagery and muteness in The Road. Bell’s wife, whom 
I had called the talking cure incarnate, listens wholeheartedly in ways of curing Bell’s traumatized 
nature, while the man’s wife in The Road prefers to fade into nothingness, hence further 
traumatizing his psyche. LaCapra’s “absence/loss” dichotomy, its conflation or its transformation, 
and the anxiety attendant upon the concept of “absence” made some sense in No Country for Old 
Men, yet one might wonder for years what is lost or otherwise absent in The Road?  
The traumas are way past the anxiety and no specific source can be genuinely stipulated 
for its point of departure, in the least, hence my eluding such arguments in the context of The Road. 
Even on a visual scale, when one compares the directorial signatures of hope and redemption in 
both pictures, what the Coen brothers did with Carla Jean seems to make more sense than what 
Hillcoat did with the beetle and the dog. Belatedness, by the same token, seems to be a cogent 
argument in No Country for Old Men as the characters, albeit disillusioned by the “prophet of 
destruction”, might try to make sense of him over time, whereas, the characters in The Road, would 
not stand the chance of doing so, even if they tried for a hundred years, hence the futility of 
belatedness.  
The narrative in No Country for Old Men seems to have a structured plot, yet The Road 
seems, owing to the traumatic loss of temporality, to have fallen short of reliable referential clues 
as to what constituted the narrative, hence my preference for the arguments of Caruthian non-
referentiality in The Road. Venturing into the ethical realm made sense in No Country for Old Men 
as Moss portrayed the Levinasion “face of the other” in his ethical encounter with the hitch-hiking 
girl, while I eschewed the ethical plane in The Road, as no morality seems to have survived upon 
the apocalypse, save for the boy’s case, whose innocence was more the result of naivety which 
was in turn the consequence of childhood trauma. “The Uncanny” seems to lose its significance 
along this ruthless transformation as well, once concepts like death and repetition are likely to be 
deemed quite trivial and powerless compared to cannibalism and infanticide, hence my eluding 
this particular line of arguments. What is left, the study seems to suggest, is how the post-traumatic 
survival efforts fare in the face of the apocalyptic savagery, which is what a good part of chapter 
three hinged on. 
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 The thematic codes change from the prelude to postlude in much the same way the trauma 
discourse evolves from an anxious prelude to an already ashen postlude. One reason Chigurh walks 
away with ease in the prelude is the nihilist and ineffectual testimonial jeremiad of Bell, which 
could readily, with an iota of intrepidity or positivity, turn into a step towards standing up against 
him. The farther Chigurh escaped, the closer the humanity got to its demise, as the metaphorical 
escape of Chigurh is proportionate with the narcissism of humanity (Bell) in solely trying to protect 
oneself rather than protect the collective good. The “prophet of destruction”, alas, got away with 
all he had wreaked havoc on. Unpunished was Chigurh and untouched was the narcissist psyche 
of the humanity. Then rose the apocalypse as the consequence of this blatant oblivion which 
shattered not only the said narcissism but also the whole planet. This ashen postlude, this study 
avers as its last words, could have been halted if the “prophet of destruction” as the metaphorical 
portrayal of humanity’s narcissism had given its place to the vocabulary of care, bravery, solicitude 
for all. It was too late, though. This tardiness collapsed McCarthy’s world. Let us hope we will not 
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Chapter 2─ description  
 
Figures 1-5: the Coen brothers’ shots at the outset of No Country for Old Men portraying the barren 
non-human habitats and dark landscapes. 
Figures 6-7: the double-sided dialogue between Bell and Loretta as opposed to the dour soliloquys 
of the novel accompanied with the caring listening side of Loretta. 
Figures 8-9: Carla’s resilient defiance against Chigurh’s insistence on calling the coin. 
Figures 10-12: the Coen brothers’ shots portraying the uncanny massacre scene.  
Figure 13: an exemplary shot with Chigurh punching a hole through the forehead of his victim 
asking him: “Would you hold still please, Sir?” 
Figures 14-18: the uncanny shots displaying the spectral encounter between Moss and Chigurh 
and the surreal disappearance of Chigurh. 



































































































































































Chapter 3─ description  
 
Figures 1-2:  Hillcoat’s images of destruction of World Trade Center and the marooned ships after 
Hurricane Catrina in The Road 
Figures 3-5:  the shots displaying “abandoned stretches of freeway, deserted coalfields, a burned-
down amusement park” 
Figures 6-7: the scene including the aesthetics of traumatic apocalypse moment with the alienated 
face of the wife and the man's hasty bathtub filling to save water for the rainy day. 
Figures 8-11: pre-apocalyptic flashbacks including the birth of the baby, the concert, the piano 
duet scene, and the car scene 
Figures 12-14: Hillcoat’s flashbacks to the pre-apocalyptic nature, namely trees, flowers, and the 
wife at the very outset of the film 
Figures 15-18: the apocalyptic shots of deserted gas stations, looted grocery stores, burning-down-
to-ash landscapes, and industrial ruins 
Figures 19-21: Cellar shots including dismembered bodies in the cellar with McPhee’s shocked 
face while later covering it with his hand to avoid witnessing the alienating mutilated bodies 
Figure 22: Hillcoat’s hopeful depiction of a still-living dog 
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